In this paper I use historical data to analyze the relationship between crises and growth in Latin America. I calculate by how much the region's GDP per capita has been reduced as a consequence of the recu- rrence of external crises. I also analyze the determinants of major balan- ce of payments crises. The main conclusion is that it is unlikely that Latin America will, on average, experience a major improvement in long run growth in the future. It is possible that some countries will make progress in catching up with the advanced nations. This, however, will not be the norm; most Latin American countries are likely to fall further behind in relation to the Asian countries and other emerging nations. Not everything, however, is grim. My analysis also suggests that fewer Latin America countries will be subject to the type of catastrophic crises that affected the region in the past. Latin America's future will be one of «No crises and very modest growth».

This essay presents recent estimates of average heights for different regions of Argentina during the period 1850–1950. This evidence, taken from registers of prisoners and military recruits, serves to question some traditional views of Argentine economic growth based on income and wage data. The essay suggests that the era of liberal progress resulted in less welfare among the lower classes than is usually assumed. A similar situation occurred during the agrarian-export growth of the first decade of the 20th century. In contrast, the period known as the «great delay» wit- nessed notable improvements in biological welfare, particularly during the 1930s. In addition, height estimates indicate that during WWII and the first Peronist administrations there was a nutritional setback in the Buenos Aires industrial belt. Data on the provincial distribution of heights for the 1920s show an important degree of regional inequality.

Using the Penn World Table, the CEPAL statistics and the OxLAD data base for the period 1950–2000, and considering a sample of 18 Latin American countries, this paper tries to test for convergence within the region. The results from a panel data approach only allow us to speak about convergence in a conditional sense. In fact, one of the main factors behind both economic growth and the catching up process in the region is the level of human capital. This variable has been constructed using Principal Components methodology and taking into consideration primary and secondary school enrolment ratios, the number of inhabitants per doctor, life expectancy, the infant mortality rate and the dependency rate.

Portugal, a poor and small kingdom, became a pioneering mercantile state thanks to its Discoveries. When did Portugal establish its fiscal institutions as a world power? Was such a powerful maritime nation, capable of spearheading a permanent link between Europe and India, able to establish modern fiscal institutions strong enough to guarantee a stable State budget? The objetive for this paper is to show that the country's fiscal and imperial past prevented Portuguese civil society from establishing efficient fiscal institutions and generating a social consent for increasing tax collection.

Long run economic progress in modern Spain is assessed in this paper and its performance placed in European perspective. Over one and a half centuries, income per person rose 15 times. Three main phases can be established: 1850–1950, 1951–1974 and 1975–2000. Spain underperformed in the long run mostly due to its sluggish growth in specific phases of the century prior to 1950. Catching up took place in the late twentieth century, in which the years 1959–74 stand out. Structural change contributed significantly to growth acceleration while lack of exposition to international competition represents a recurrent element of retardation.