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THE ROLE OF REASONS IN EPISTEMOLOGY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 April 2015

Hilary Kornblith
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Abstract

The notion of a reason often plays a central role in epistemological theories. Justification is often explained in terms of the having of appropriate reasons, and a variety of epistemological distinctions are most naturally explained, it seems, by adverting to reasons. This paper examines the extent to which we may, instead, make do without appeal to such a notion. It is argued that the extent to which the notion of a reason should play an important role in epistemological theorizing will depend on how our psychological theories of belief acquisition and belief change are best conceptualized.

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Episteme , Volume 12 , Special Issue 2: 10th Anniversary of Episteme , June 2015 , pp. 225 - 239
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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