In the course of 1943, London and Algiers gradually became aware of the scope of the STO crisis, and of the proliferation of mountain redoubts formed spontaneously by STO refugees known collectively as le maquis. While the Allied camp was keen to operationalize this maquis, everyone had different motives for doing so, both operational and political. These considerations caused Allied planners to minimize the military limitations of the maquis, that included the inviolability of “maquis redoubts” and the willingness and ability of Anglo-American conventional forces rapidly to reinforce them with arms drops and paratroops. The fate of the maquis at Glières should have served as a wake-up call. But too many players had too much vested in the maquis concept to submit their expectations to a reality check. One result was that the myth of an alleged “betrayal” of the maquis by the Gaullists and the Allies became the focus of a polemical debate in the post-war years pursued principally by the communists, but also a theme in films and novels.