Introduction
Over the last three decades, Theodore Schatzki, a North American philosopher, has elaborated a far-reaching social theory based on the idea that practices represent the basic component and unit of analysis of social affairs. His approach has an obvious appeal for strategy-as-practice (SAP) research. While his focus on practices to theorize social reality seems similar to other practice-theoretical approaches (see Gomez, Chapter 8, and Whittington, Chapter 6, in this volume), his theory differs significantly in that he builds on a much more detailed theorization of practices, and rejects the notion of different levels of social reality. Thus, his variant of practice theory is characterized by a flat ontology (Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington 2014), based on a belief that social and human phenomena transpire through and amid a nexus of practices, and thus stretch out horizontally on a ‘single level’ of social practices (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2011). Schatzki has expounded his version of practice theory, which he refers to as ‘site ontology’, in a book trilogy (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 1996; Reference Schatzki2002; Reference Schatzki2010) and several subsequent publications. In this extensive body of work, he refines his practice theory, focusing on specific aspects such as the social domain as materiality, discourse, space, learning, change, and large social phenomena. Despite this existing oeuvre, his work is still in progress.
Possibly owing to its wide applicability, Schatzki’s practice theory has become rather popular in management and organization studies (MOS). Researchers have applied his conceptual vocabulary to studies of various organizational phenomena, including individual and collective knowledge (Reference NicoliniNicolini 2011), management learning (Reference ZundelZundel 2012), the theory–practice relationship (Reference Zundel and KokkalisZundel and Kokkalis 2010), institutional complexity (Reference Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke and SpeeSmets et al. 2015) and market creation (Reference Jarzabkowski and WilsonJarzabkowski, Bednarek and Spee 2015). Schatzki’s theory also offers a rich theoretical apparatus for examining key aspects of SAP. As we argue in this chapter, it allows researchers to give ontological priority to strategy practices (rather than practitioners) as a source of strategy-making; it provides conceptual resources for analysing the embeddedness and situatedness of strategy practices in their wider social, institutional and organizational contexts; and it allows us to trace connections between practices, as well as between larger bundles or constellations of practices.
Schatzki’s Practice Theory in Its Intellectual Context
Schatzki is generally considered to be one of the most prominent figures of the second generation of practice theorists, together with other authors like Reference DreyfusDreyfus (1991), Reference ReckwitzReckwitz (2002), Reference Rouse, Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina and von SavignyRouse (2001; Reference Rouse, Turner and Risjord2006), Reference EngeströmEngeström (1987) and Reference LaveLave (1996). Authors such as Bourdieu (see Gomez, Chapter 8, in this volume) and Giddens (see Whittington, Chapter 6, in this volume), Taylor, and Garfinkel, who established practice as a central object of interest in social science, are labelled ‘first-generation’ practice theorists. Practice theory thus refers to a broad and loosely coupled group of late twentieth-century approaches to social and cultural theory that emphasize the routinized and performative nature of action, its dependence on tacit knowledge and implicit understanding, and its material character – the idea that action and culture are anchored in embodiment and networks of artefacts. In this sense, there is no such thing as a unified practice theory, and equating practice theory with Schatzki’s work, as authors occasionally do, is inappropriate (for a discussion, see Reference NicoliniNicolini 2012).
Like many other practice theorists, Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (1996; Reference Schatzki, Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigny2001; Reference Schatzki2002) explicitly builds on the anti-intellectualist and anti-dualist social philosophy of authors such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger. Authors from the Heideggerian and Wittgensteinian traditions believe that people mostly do (and say) whatever it makes sense for them to do (and say); yet such ‘sense’ always manifests itself as part of an ongoing practical endeavour. It follows that practices, rather than the sense or the individuals that enact the sense-making, are the starting points for investigating and understanding human and social affairs. In seeking to understand human conduct and social order, we must therefore turn to the accomplishment of real-time practices.
However, Schatzki differs from first-generation practice theorists in several important ways. First, unlike authors such as Bourdieu and Giddens, Schatzki provides an extensive and elaborated discussion of practices, their constitutive dimensions, and dynamics (see section on Main Concepts of Schatzki’s Practice Theory below). This contrasts, for example, with Giddens, who never provided an analytical examination of the practice concept, and only defined practices in their most general sense as ‘regularised types of acts’ (Reference GiddensGiddens 1976: 75). Schatzki’s work also enables us to conceive a role for formal organizations and institutions (conceptualized as constellations of practices that produce specific local effects). This contrasts with Giddens’s and Bourdieu’s approach, which connects individual agents more or less directly with the wider societal system or field. In this sense, Schatzki’s work is of immediate interest to SAP scholars as it provides a rich set of sensitizing concepts to aid empirical research on both the practices of strategizing and the organizations in which they take place.
Second, Schatzki’s ideas of practice as the site of activities (Reference NicoliniNicolini 2011; Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2002) and the centrality of active understanding and intelligibility readdress what tends to be the residual deterministic and intellectualist orientation of Bourdieu’s and Giddens’s work. In fact, Bourdieu believes that people respond more or less blindly to the objective conditions carried by the habitus in the form of dispositions; and Giddens gives prominence to rules and resources, while practical understanding takes a back seat. Moreover, both authors risk unintentionally reintroducing the idea that practitioners either think before acting or are blindly driven by practices, two opposing views that Schatzki tries to avoid (for an extensive discussion, see Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 1996). As we explain below, this helps SAP scholars to problematize both voluntaristic views of strategy-making (i.e., strategy as stemming from decisions and calculations) and the opposite view that strategy is simply done to people.
Third, Schatzki’s ontology and idea that practices are materially anchored, open-ended, and in constant evolution are a corrective to the notable absence of change and materiality in the work of first-generation practice theorists. The focus of the latter was, in fact, on the recursive production of society and social reality (Giddens), the reproduction of societal fields and associated privileges (Bourdieu), and the perpetuation of communities (Taylor). Change and evolution were left in the background. Reference Lash, Calhoun, LiPuma and PostoneLash (1993) connects this weakness with the low priority granted to technology, instruments and material mediators in Taylor’s work and Bourdieu’s theory. For example, objects play a relatively minor role in the theory of habitus, and enter Bourdieu’s theory mainly in the form of cultural resources. This oversight is understandable, as Bourdieu was trying to differentiate his approach from certain crude forms of Marxist materialism prevailing at the time. However, his limited attention to the role of material artefacts in perpetuating habitus, making agency possible, and embodying and materializing relations of domination prevented him from seeing the role that materials also play in hampering reproduction, disrupting relations of domination, and introducing new practices and possibilities. This lack of focus on objects, artefacts and materials contrasts with Schatzki’s view that practice and social order are intimately entangled, and his conceptualization of social change as configurations of significantly different bundles of practices and material arrangements (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2019).
Schatzki’s practice theory has some parallels with, but also important differences from, activity theory and Actor–Network theory, which are not practice theories but share a posthumanist stance. Schatzki’s work differs from activity theory (Reference EngeströmEngeström 1987) especially owing to the different emphasis given to conflict, tensions and contradictions. While these concepts play a central role in activity theory, where they are considered both inevitable and generative of innovation and change, they are less in the foreground in Schatzki’s work, where the focus is on harmonization and alignment. As a result, Schatzki’s theory is well equipped to deal with incremental change, but struggles with more radical forms of transformation. The difference can be explained in part by the fact that while Schatzki’s work is rooted in Heideggerian and Wittgensteinian tradition, activity theory is openly Marxist in origin.
Schatzki’s work also differs from Actor–Network theory, with which it shares a strongly relational approach and a flat ontology. In fact, in Reference LatourLatour’s (2005) Actor–Network theory, the basic block of sociality is not practices (or practitioners), but rather ‘translations between mediators that may generate traceable associations’ (Reference LatourLatour 2005: 108). Mediators include both human and non-human entities (artefacts, ideas). Although mediators do work, they do not ‘do things’, which is something that Schatzki only ascribes to humans. Consequently, in Actor–Network theory, there are no performances, practices or events that ‘befall to practitioners’ – this expression is used by Schatzki to denote that while practitioners perform practices, they are not the source or starting point of initiatives (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2016). The basic unit of analysis, so to speak, is different in the two ontologies (practices versus translations). Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2002) openly defines his position as residual humanism, and for this reason, Latour would object to being called a practice theorist.
Main Concepts of Schatzki’s Practice Theory and Their Applications in the Social Sciences at Large
Schatzki’s practice theory is based on the presumption that social and human phenomena transpire through and amid socio-material practices (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 1996). Generally, Schatzki defines practices as ‘embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understandings’ (Reference Schatzki, Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von SavignySchatzki 2001: 2). Activities are not something that actors do but something that agents find themselves doing in specific spatio-temporal conditions prefigured by the ends and motives carried by the practice. Schatzki calls these prefiguring conditions the site of human activity (giving rise to the term ‘site ontology’). Because practice prefigures but does not causally determine human activity, practices remain fundamentally open in the moment of their performance. As we shall see below, this allows Schatzki to develop a version of practice theory that eschews some of the problems affecting the work of previous practice theorists, including unsatisfactory engagement with the issue of agency and the distinction between levels of reality. Phenomena that, from a Giddensian and Bourdieusian perspective, would be referred to as macro phenomena are here defined as aspects of bundles of practices (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2011). In the next sub-sections we introduce the key concepts on which Schatzki’s theory is based, closing with some high-level reflections on how those concepts have been applied in the social sciences at large.
The Concept of Social Practice
Central to Schatzki’s ‘site ontology’ is the concept of practice. To illustrate the components of his notion of practice, we refer to his specific definition of practice as ‘temporally evolving, open-ended set of doings and sayings linked by practical understandings, rules, teleo-affective structure, and general understandings’ (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2002: 87). Essentially, practices are a set of bodily doings and discursive sayings, also referred to as activities. In a strict sense, sayings are a particular form of bodily doings. Sayings and other doings are typically tightly interrelated, so one cannot be understood without the other. Together, doings and sayings also express emotions and sensations, as well as cognitive conditions such as desires, beliefs and expectations (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 1996).
This definition of practice highlights that the set of doings and sayings is organized but also temporally evolving. Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2002) distinguishes four organizing principles by which doings and sayings are organized. The first is the teleo-affective structure. ‘Telos’ denotes a set of ends that participants should or may pursue (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2002: 80), while ‘affective’ denotes appropriate emotions that go along with performing the doings and sayings of a particular practice. For example, the teleo-affective structure of the practice of strategic planning points to an organization’s realization of competitive advantage. Pursuing the end of realizing competitive advantage is accompanied by a repertoire of ways of feeling, including anxiety, enthusiasm and desire.
The teleo-affective structure of a practice is central to Schatzki’s view, as it performs a specific direction, temporal experience and spatiality for practitioners who participate in and become attuned to the practice. It selects specific ends, links together motives and goals (the ‘because of’ and ‘towards which’ of practical action), and also divides the world into material and spatial regions and paths relevant to the accomplishment of practices. In so doing, the teleo-affective structure becomes the foundation for coordinated action, through overlapping ends and motivations, and linking of practices.
The second organizing principle is practical understanding. This refers to actors’ abilities to react appropriately to specific situations, including bodily know-how and implicit knowledge to conduct and recognize activities and react to other activities. For example, professional strategists possess a practical understanding of competitive landscapes, and can thus react appropriately to threats to their competitive position. Practical understanding also renders intelligible the doings and sayings of one person to those of another involved in enacting a practice, because the related actions are linked by the same practical understanding, enabling practitioners to make sense of the actions and understand what is going on.
The third organizing dimension of practice is rules. These include prescriptions and procedures that specify what to do in a given situation and orient future courses of action. For example, the practice of developing a strategic plan might include conducting external and internal analyses from which to derive various strategic options.
The fourth and final organizing principle is general understanding, which means a reflexive understanding of the overall practice, including a societal sense of appropriateness and rightness. For example, a practice for communicating strategy includes a general understanding of aspects such as values, aesthetics and ‘right’ and appropriate ways of communication.
Together, teleo-affective structure, practical understanding, rules and general understanding organize activities – the doings and sayings – into a practice. This organization allows SAP scholars to demarcate one strategy practice from another by identifying which activities constitute a particular strategy practice, and how these actions are interlinked and organized to form a particular strategy practice.
Importantly, practices and their organization are temporally evolving. This means that the performance of these practices in the form of doings and sayings not only reproduces but also continually extends the practices. Thus, practices cannot be reduced to regularity and routine, but evolve over time. In this sense, practices are open-ended, as doings and sayings are altered and changed in reaction to particular situations. Practices are subject to repetition rather than reproduction, where repetition is understood as practices that are linked by their reappearance and re-performance, but they cannot be reproduced in the same way, partly because the results of every performance will be taken into account in future occurrences (Reference Schäfer, Drieschova, Bueger and HopfSchäfer 2022). In this respect, Schatzki’s practice theory is in line with the broad family of processual approaches in MOS (Reference Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas and van de VenLangley et al. 2013).
Material Arrangements and the Socio-Material Nature of Practices
The enactment of social practices always takes place through and amid an array of material entities. Schatzki uses the term ‘material arrangements’ (often abbreviated to ‘arrangements’) to refer to the specific constellations of material entities implicated in a specific practice. Thus, the expression ‘socio-material practice’ is redundant, as all practices are by definition human, social and material. According to Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2002), the entities comprising the arrangements involved in performing a practice may be human beings, artefacts as objects formed by human activity, organisms (animals, plants and other creatures), and natural elements (e.g., mountains, rivers). These arrangements both enable the doings and sayings of a practice (e.g., a monitor is needed to make a Zoom call), and give meaning to the individual entities of the constellation (e.g., a monitor on a desktop versus a monitor in the living room).
Practices and arrangements are linked by two-way relationships (Reference Schatzki, Shove and SpurlingSchatzki 2013). In particular, activities within a practice can change arrangements, such as when strategy practitioners write down ideas on a flipchart, or when they apply a strategy tool and thereby adapt its dimensions to the specific context (Reference Jarzabkowski and WilsonJarzabkowski and Wilson 2006). Conversely, material arrangements may causally modify a practice, such as when a chief strategy officer introduces a new tool and the strategy department starts to discuss how it could be used.
Practices and arrangements form sites of activity, by which Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2002) means the context in which activities are performed and in which entities and activities gain their meaning. Sites also provide ‘action intelligibility’, which determines which actions make sense to be performed in a given situation (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2011). Thus, the sites in which actors perform their doings and sayings also characterize the given situation. As actors become participants in practice-arrangement bundles, they develop what Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (1996) refers to as ‘practical intelligibility’, which enables them to discern appropriate actions in given situations and according to the events confronting them. Participants acquire practical intelligibility through understanding and attunement, and are thus neither rational decision-makers nor dupes of the ‘mysterious force’ (Reference NicoliniNicolini 2012: 164) of social structures.
The concept of the site allows Schatzki to leave room for agency in his practice theory. As noted above, practice shapes activities by constituting a site (what we familiarly describe as an event) and selecting a repertoire of things that make sense to do and things that one should consider (the ‘because’ of an action). However, practice does not causally determine the actual conduct, which means that the actual performance is always open and partly unpredictable. Practice prefigures and often explains human activity, but does not causally determine it. For this reason, Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2002: 209) describes his approach as a form of residual posthumanist, to differentiate himself from stronger posthumanist views that ‘debunk the integrity, unique richness, and significance of human agency’. Residual humanism refers to the fact that while material entities and objects play a critical role in practices (they concur to define and help meet the ends, projects and tasks stipulated by the practice), acting as an event is something that befalls only humans.
From Small to Large: Practice-Arrangement Bundles and Constellations
For Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2002), social phenomena emerge through ‘practice-arrangement bundles’ (sometimes referred to simply as ‘bundles’), which are the coming together of interconnected practices and material arrangements. He uses this concept to highlight interrelationships between practices and material arrangements (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2002; Reference Schatzki, Higgs, Barnett, Billett, Hutchings and Trede2012), which can hang together in different ways. They can be shared; they can be intentionally orchestrated, for example through overlapping ends and/or motives; they can be part of a chain of action, such as during a conversation or routine; they can be directed towards others (who in turn must respond); and they can be kept together by physical, spatial or instrumental connections. Through these forms of connection, practices form larger bundles or constellations that extend in space and time (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2002; Reference Schatzki2019). One might think of global corporations as large constellations of bundles kept together by a combination of all these mechanisms, including practices that delimit the organization from its ‘environment’ and thus constitute it as such.
Practice-arrangement bundles can differ in density. While some practices and material arrangements are strongly entangled with each other, as when the development of strategic issues requires use of a strategy tool to frame them, other practice-arrangement bundles are characterized by less entanglement, as when a room is open to practices such as meetings, lunches or play. The idea of regions with different densities of connections (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2002) can be used as a valuable analytical tool, especially for identifying which connections are worth observing during research, and which can be ignored.
Practice-arrangement bundles also change and evolve. Reference Schatzki, Shove and SpurlingSchatzki (2013) outlines four ways through which they may do so. First, the introduction of new material arrangements may extend an existing practice. For example, video-conferencing technologies such as Zoom have extended how strategy meetings can be conducted. Second, changes in practices give rise to new bundles. For example, practices to communicate strategy transparently are adapted to the differing national transparency requirements of the countries in which organizations operate, and these adaptations then give rise to new bundles in different countries. Third, practice-arrangement bundles may evolve through hybridization or merge, as when a meeting to communicate a strategy includes the possibility of raising new strategic ideas. Lastly, a material entity may ‘flee’ from the practice-arrangement bundle. In this case, the bundle evolves because it has to adapt to the fleeing entity. For example, a strategy meeting may change when some practitioners leave the room.
Finally, individual practice-arrangement bundles are themselves connected to other practice-arrangement bundles, which Schatzki refers to as ‘constellations’ of bundles (often also referred to as ‘nexuses’ of bundles). Schatzki uses this concept of constellations to examine how large phenomena, such as organizations and strategy processes, come into being and are perpetuated over time (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2002: Reference Schatzki2016). Thus, all large social phenomena, including organizations, regimes, states, civil society, markets and institutions, can be conceptualized as constellations of bundles (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2011). As Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2016: 6) writes, ‘A “large” social phenomenon is one that is spatially extensive, consisting in a far-flung constellation of practices or arrangements.’ Schatzki is also clear that constellations or nexuses of bundles are just larger bundles. Therefore, ‘large social phenomena (like macro and global ones) have the same composition as small, local, and micro phenomena: they consist of practice arrangement bundles or of features or slices thereof’ (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2011: 2). Figure 14.1 provides an overview of the different elements of Schatzki’s constellations of practice-arrangement bundles (Reference Loscher, Splitter, Seidl, Clegg and Pinae CunhaLoscher, Splitter and Seidl 2019).
Figure 14.1 Constellation of practice-arrangement bundles
To analyse large phenomena, one must examine the specific connections of their constitutive practice-arrangement bundles, using the four ways of hanging together as sensitizing concepts. For example, a practice-arrangement bundle may be (1) interdependent with another practice-arrangement bundle, as when bundles draw on the same elements of a practice (its activities or organizing principles) or the same material arrangements. The practice-arrangement bundles of having a strategy meeting and having an after-work party may be interdependent because they both draw on the same office space – the same material arrangement. Alternatively, a practice-arrangement bundle may be related to the material arrangement of another practice-arrangement bundle through (2) causal relations; (3) physical proximity; or (4) physical structures. Regarding the latter, an internet cable may link the offices of the chief strategy officer and the CEO and the related practice-arrangement bundles of strategic coordination. Generally, webs of practice-arrangement bundles range from small to extremely large. Accordingly, SAP scholars can analyse large phenomena at different scales, such as potentially smaller webs of practice-arrangement bundles in business unit strategy development, and larger webs in corporate strategy development.
The Centrality of Joint Temporal and Spatial Experience for Coordinated Action: The Concept of Timespace
For Schatzki, as for Heidegger, a critical dimension of being human is that our activities are always structured temporally and spatially. The temporal dimension manifests itself in our familiar experience that whenever we immerse ourselves in a situation or activity, we do so by projecting towards a future (we act towards an end) and departing from something given (we react to something in the past or act in its light). Doing and saying things, engaging with objects and dealing with people in the moment is thus always ‘acting towards an end from what motivates’ (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2010: 29). The spatial dimension, which also derives from the teleological nature of human activities, is manifested in the fact that we experience spaces as meaningful places linked by relationships of closeness/distance or as paths anchored in configurations of things. Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2010) calls this general structure of our experiential acting the timespace of human activity. While temporality and spatiality can be distinguished analytically, Reference Schatzki, Shove, Trentmann and WilkSchatzi (2009; Reference Schatzki2010) emphasizes that the two dimensions are intimately connected in activities, leading him to speak of ‘timespace’.
Timespaces are partly personal (they derive from our biography) and partly social. The socially shared nature of timespaces derives from participation in joint activities, and is carried by its components: norms, understanding and teleo-affectivity all structure our experience of temporality and spatiality. This is because practices perform specific forms of temporality and spatiality which we tune into when we get involved in these practices. Commonality of timespaces is critical to explaining sociality in all its forms. Interwoven timespaces are crucial to social and organizational phenomena, as they provide an infrastructure for interweaving the practices that constitute social phenomena and events. Coordinating action both locally and globally requires, among other things, some overlapping and sharing of participants’ timespaces. For example, intentional coordinated action requires practitioners to hold a shared view of the practice; they must have overlapping views of the future. A common timespace also allows practices to be interwoven in different ‘objective’ times and places. This requires both an understanding of the ends and results of the activity, and a common understanding of the duration of performances, their rhythms and the sequence of tasks. For example, Reference Jarzabkowski and WilsonJarzabkowski, Bednarek and Spee’s (2015) study of the global insurance industry shows how coordination and harmonization of global reinsurance practices is critically dependent on all those involved sharing an overlapping and common timescape.
To the extent that connected actions can be partially explained in terms of the interwoven timespaces of those performing them (Reference Schatzki, Shove, Trentmann and WilkSchatzki 2009), timespace is a critical object of inquiry. To understand coordinated action and organizational phenomena, as well as breakdowns, conflicts and power struggles, such as collapses of coordination, conflicts over land or alternative empowering discourses, we must examine the timespaces performed by the practices involved, those experienced by the practitioners, and the ‘objective’ time and space constraints introduced by non-human elements involved in the activity. In turn, the notion of timespace helps to explain sociality and social action, as well as how practices form bundles and constellations.
Schatzki’s concept of timespace also helps to differentiate practice theory from other processual views, like those derived from the thinking of Henry Bergson (Reference HernesHernes 2014; Reference Linstead and MullarkeyLinstead and Mullarkey 2003). While neo-Bergsonian accounts emphasize the concept of flow and imagine human activity as an uninterrupted flowing, Schatzki proposes that activity consists of structured yet indeterminate events: ‘activity is a temporal-spatial event. The timespace of activity accordingly, is a feature of … performances’ (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2010: 171). For Bergson, life presents itself as an uninterrupted flow, whereas for Schatzki, activity is segmented. As Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2010) highlights, this difference is important, as the idea that life occurs as an uninterrupted flow would make social science as we know it impossible: there would be no events to observe, no cases to compare (only flows), and no mechanisms to explain how we got from A to B. Equally, it would be impossible to understand how the results of one course of action and performance might become the context or background for understanding or explaining subsequent activities.
Application of Schatzki’s Ideas in the Social Sciences at Large
Over the last decade, Schatzki’s ideas have been both directly translated into and inspired new developments in diverse areas of social science. The translation of Schatzki’s ideas into social research has been facilitated by Reference Shove, Panzar and WatsonShove, Panzar and Watson’s (2012) distillation of his complex ontology into the three simple ideas: (1) practices consist of materials, competencies and meanings; (2) these elements can be part of different practices and can travel in time and space; (3) practices can be conceptualized and observed as performances, but also as enduring social entities, thus, they can be turned into epistemic objects (i.e., units of analysis).
Sometimes directly referring to this interpretation of Schatzki’s theory, researchers have directed their efforts in four directions. First, they have used Schatzki’s site ontology to describe and explain a variety of practices, from eating and mobility (Reference KentKent 2022; Reference WatsonWatson 2012) to snacking (Reference TwineTwine 2015) and international relations (Reference BuegerBueger 2014). They also tried to respecify in practice terms phenomena such as energy consumption, public health and social inequalities that have been traditionally understood using different and alternative paradigms. For example, there is work on reframing the obesity epidemic as being a consequence of a specific constellation of social practices rather than individual choices (Reference Blue, Shove and KellyBlue, Shove and Kelly 2021; Reference Blue, Shove and KellyMaller 2015).
Second, some authors have focused on exploring how sites of action are constituted and reproduced, as a precursor to intervening and changing them. For example, in the field of education, Reference KemmisKemmis (2019), with others, has developed a theory of practice architecture building directly on Schatzki’s work. This theory suggests that legitimate and appropriate sayings, doings and ways of relating in any (pedagogical) practice, which are organized according to the purpose of the practice, are made possible and constrained by specific cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements brought to the scene of action by people and things. Analysing and intervening in the practice architecture by modifying its components is therefore preliminary to producing sustainable changes in the practice, as this allows new things to be said and done, new ways of relating to take place, and new relations of power to be enacted.
Third, some authors have used concepts from Schatzki’s work to investigate relationships and connections between practices and how constellations of practices are constituted and maintained (Reference Hui, Schatzki and ShoveHui, Schatzki and Shove 2017). This has allowed them to ask new and interesting questions, including investigating competition and alliance between practices, how practices constitute bundles and constellations, and the effects of these constellations (including their power effects).
Finally, researchers have used Schatzki’s ideas to study the temporal and spatial dynamics of practices (Reference Shove, Panzar and WatsonShove et al. 2012). This includes documenting the emergence, creation, scaling up, decline and disappearance of practices; their journeys in space and time; their take-up and change over time; and how they supplant old practices and with what implications.
Application of Schatzki’s Theory in SAP and Management and Organization Research
Schatzki’s theory offers a rich theoretical apparatus for analysing strategic and organizational phenomena. Table 14.1 presents an overview of existing studies in SAP and in the broader field of MOS that draw on Schatzki’s site ontology, showing the topics covered by each study, the concepts employed and the empirical data used (where applicable).
| Reference | Topic | Concepts employed | Empirical data |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAP | |||
| Reference HydleHydle (2015) | The role of timespaces in connecting distributed strategy practices | Practice, timespace, material arrangements | Global service firm: (group) interviews, documents, observations |
| Reference Jørgensen and MessnerJørgensen and Messner (2010) | The role of materiality for strategic product-development practices | (Organization of) practice, practice-arrangement bundles | Manufacturing firm: interviews, archival material, observations |
| Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington (2014) | Linking local strategizing with larger social phenomena | Practice, practice-arrangement bundles | |
| Reference Splitter, Seidl, Whittington, Seidl, 266von Krogh and WhittingtonSplitter, Seidl and Whittington (2019) | Relevance of Schatzki’s theory for Open Strategy | (Organization of) practices, material arrangements, practice-arrangement bundles, timespace | |
| MOS | |||
| Reference Ahrens and ChapmanAhrens and Chapman (2007) | ‘Situated functionality’ of accounting numbers | (Organization of) practice, material arrangements, nexus of practices | Restaurant chain: interviews, archival records, observations |
| Reference Gehman, Lounsbury, Anderson and SpeeGehman (2021) | Values in practice-driven institutionalism | Practice, site, teleo-affective structure, open-endedness | |
| Reference Jarzabkowski and WilsonJarzabkowski, Bednarek and Spee (2015) | Practice of risk trading (constituting a market) | Sites, practice-arrangement bundles, practical understanding | Global insurance industry: observations, additional field interactions (e.g., social events), interviews |
| Reference Lindberg and RantataloLindberg and Rantatalo (2015) | Competence in professional practices | General understanding, teleo-affective structures | Hospital and police department: interviews |
| Reference LodhiaLodhia (2015) | Development and evolution of reporting | (Organization of) practice, practice-arrangement bundles | Customer-owned bank: interviews and documents |
| Reference LoscherLoscher (2016) | Relationships between commercial and professional practices | Practices, teleo-affective structures, practice-arrangement bundles, general understanding | Public accounting firms: interviews, observations, documents |
| Reference Loscher, Splitter, Seidl, Clegg and Pinae CunhaLoscher, Splitter and Seidl (2019) | Relevance of Schatzki’s theory for organization studies | Practice, material arrangements, practice-arrangement bundles, site, timespace | |
| Reference Nama and LoweNama and Lowe (2014) | ‘Situated functionality’ of accounting in private equity practices | Site, material arrangements (organization of) practice, practical and general understanding, teleo-affective structure, rules | Private equity firm: interviews, field interactions (e.g., public talks) |
| Reference NicoliniNicolini (2011) | Practices (rather than individuals) as the site of knowing | Practice, nexus of practices | Telemedicine: interviews, observations, documents, tools, pictures |
| Reference Nicolini and KoricaNicolini and Korica (2021) | Attention as practice | Practice, open-endedness | Health care organizations: observations, interviews |
| Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2006) | The constitution, occurrence and memory of organizations | Practice, material arrangements, timespace | |
| Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2005) | Site ontology as a new social ontology for studying organizations | Nexus of practices, material arrangements | |
| Reference Seidl, Ohlson, Whittington, Lounsbury, Anderson and SpeeSeidl, Ohlson and Whittington (2021) | Field-level change through restless practices | Practice, teleo-affective structure | |
| Seidl and Whittington (2020) | Changes to practices through crises | (Organization of) practice, teleo-affective structure, general understanding, nexus of practices | |
| Reference Smets, Aristidou, Whittington, Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence and MeyerSmets, Aristidou and Whittington (2017) | Bringing together institutional and practice scholarship | Practice, practical understanding, general understanding, practice-arrangement bundles | |
| Reference Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke and SpeeSmets et al. (2015) | Competent practitioners balancing conflicting-yet-complementary logics in practice | Practical understanding, general understanding | Lloyd’s of London: observations, interviews, documentary data |
| Reference Zundel and KokkalisZundel and Kokkalis (2010) | Practice theory relationship | Practice, practice-arrangement bundles (timespace) | |
Relatively few SAP studies have drawn on Schatzki’s theory. Amongst these, the only empirical study explicitly positioned in SAP research is Reference HydleHydle’s (2015) exploration of a global professional service firm’s use of a technology to structure its organization of strategy practices and connect its different worldwide locations. Hydle draws on the concepts of timespace and material arrangements to analyse her empirical data, drawn from interviews with engineering consultants, observations and documents. Based on this analysis, she demonstrates how different temporal-spatial patterns of strategy work enable distributed agency in globally dispersed organizations. Referring to strategy, but not explicitly positioned in the SAP field, Reference Jørgensen and MessnerJørgensen and Messner’s (2010) empirical study also draws on Schatzki’s theory. In particular, they use the organization of practices and practice-arrangement bundles to examine the role of materiality in a manufacturing firm’s strategic product-development practices. Based on interviews, documents and observations, their study shows that customers’ material misuse of the firm’s products opened up a range of new strategic product-development practices.
In addition to these empirical SAP studies, two conceptual SAP studies discuss the general opportunities of Schatzki’s site ontology for strategy research more programmatically. Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington (2014) draw specifically on the concepts of practice and practice-arrangement bundles to show how local strategizing practices can be linked to larger social phenomena, while Reference Splitter, Seidl, Whittington, Seidl, 266von Krogh and WhittingtonSplitter, Seidl and Whittington (2019) show how Schatzki’s site ontology can be used to explain the new phenomenon of Open Strategy.
In contrast to SAP, Schatzki’s site ontology has been applied fairly widely in MOS. Researchers have applied Schatzki’s conceptual vocabulary to a wide range of different organizational phenomena, such as relationships between particular organizational practices (Reference LoscherLoscher 2016), organizational memory (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2006), managerial attention (Reference Nicolini and KoricaNicolini and Korica 2021), the institutionalization of values (Reference Gehman, Lounsbury, Anderson and SpeeGehman 2021), the construction of markets (Reference Jarzabkowski and WilsonJarzabkowski, Bednarek and Spee 2015), and the relationship between management practice and theory (Reference Zundel and KokkalisZundel and Kokkalis 2010). Most of these studies draw on only one or a few concepts of Schatzki’s site ontology.
In addition to applying Schatzki’s theory to these various organizational phenomena, SAP scholars might learn specifically from MOS studies that have utilized his theory to examine phenomena of particular relevance to strategy research. Amongst these, we highlight three in particular. First, several MOS studies have used Schatzki’s theory to examine evolution and change (Reference LodhiaLodhia 2015; Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington 2021; Reference Seidl, Ohlson, Whittington, Lounsbury, Anderson and SpeeSeidl, Ohlson and Whittington 2021). To explain the drivers and mechanisms of change, these studies typically draw on the concepts of the organization of practice, and particularly teleo-affective structure, as well as practice-arrangement bundles through which evolution and change occur. For example, Reference LodhiaLodhia (2015) draws on both concepts to examine the evolution of reporting practices. He shows that the emergence of reporting practices in a customer-owned bank is connected with the wider economic, social and environmental practices of cooperative banking. In examining the drivers of field-level change, Reference Seidl, Ohlson, Whittington, Lounsbury, Anderson and SpeeSeidl, Ohlson and Whittington (2021) employ the concept of teleo-affective structure to show that so-called ‘restless practices’ are specifically aimed at change, and are thus the main generators of institutional change.
Second, another group of MOS studies has examined competence and knowing (Reference Lindberg and RantataloLindberg and Rantatalo 2015; Reference NicoliniNicolini 2011; Smets et al. 2015), two phenomena that are highly relevant to studies of strategy and strategy practitioners. These typically focus on the concept of general and practical understanding to illustrate skilful performance of practice, as well as on the concept of practice and nexuses of practices to show that knowing does not reside in individuals but is bound socially. For example, Reference Lindberg and RantataloLindberg and Rantatalo (2015) draw on the concept of practical understanding to examine the competence of professional staff in police departments and hospitals. They show that police officers’ and physicians’ competences include appropriate bodily actions to indicate that they possess the practical understanding necessary to carry out their professional practices. Focusing on organizational knowing, Reference NicoliniNicolini (2011) shows that knowing is situated in a historical, social and cultural context composed of a nexus of practices, but also that it must be understood as knowing in practice, through the social and material enactment of expertise.
Third, some MOS studies (Reference Ahrens and ChapmanAhrens and Chapman 2007; Reference Nama and LoweNama and Lowe 2014) focus on situated functionality, drawing on Schatzki’s account of practical intelligibility within practice-arrangement bundles. For example, Reference Nama and LoweNama and Lowe (2014) show how practical intelligibility explains the situated functionality of management accounting. Specifically, practical intelligibility within private equity firms determines how accounting is intermeshed with other practices, which prefigures the situated functionality of accounting (Reference Nama and LoweNama and Lowe 2014).
In addition to these particular phenomena examined by MOS studies drawing on Schatzki’s theory, another group of studies examines the role of his theory programmatically. These include Schatzki’s own application of his theory as a new ontology for studying organizations (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2005), the role of his theory in bridging institutional and practice scholarship (Reference Smets, Aristidou, Whittington, Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence and MeyerSmets, Aristidou and Whittington 2017), and the general relevance of his site ontology for organization studies (Reference Loscher, Splitter, Seidl, Clegg and Pinae CunhaLoscher et al. 2019). As SAP adheres to practice scholarship and is part of MOS, such programmatic studies might also advance SAP.
General Implications and Concrete Guidelines for Using Schatzki’s Theory in SAP Research
General Implications of Schatzki’s Theory for SAP Research
Reference Feldman and OrlikowskiFeldman and Orlikowski (2011) suggest that SAP scholars can use a practice lens in three ways: empirically, theoretically and philosophically. Empirically, such a lens can be used to foreground activity, work, and what is said and done in organizations. Theoretically, the lens can be utilized to understand relationships between activity and other aspects of organizational life. Philosophically, adopting a practice orientation entails granting a constitutive role of practices in producing organizational realities.
Schatzki’s work is mainly philosophical, and his views are rather radical. His stated aim is to provide an original ontology that allows reconsideration and respecification of traditional topics in radically new terms, and asking of new and original questions (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2005). Therefore, translating his views theoretically and empirically in strategy research requires a commitment to some ground-breaking assumptions, and comes with some risks. Authors adopting Schatzki’s views in SAP research must be aware of these implications to avoid introducing contradictions and importing existing limitations into their work.
First, following Schatzki requires resolute commitment to the idea that practices come logically and causally before practitioners in strategy-making and strategic management (Reference 264Chia and MacKayChia and MacKay 2007). This idea is different from and alternative to the idea that practitioners ‘do’ strategy. While this view has its merits, it is not aligned with Schatzki’s post-humanist stance. As indicated above, Schatzki makes room for agency in the moment of action; however, the conditions and possibilities of action are largely prefigured in, by and through the practices in which practitioners are involved. In this sense, adopting Schatzki’s theory entails questioning the traditional view of strategy-making as an effort of individuals to make decisions, and militates against the hypermuscular and rationalist views of agency associated with much strategy literature. This, in turn, might prompt a significant pushback from traditional strategy scholars, as it undermines core assumptions of contemporary strategy discourse (Reference Knights and MorganKnights and Morgan 1991).
Second, adopting Schatzki’s views requires endorsing a flat ontology that disallows seeing (and talking about) the world in terms of levels of reality. Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington (2014) call the latter ‘tall’ ontologies. They observe that tall ontologies are prevalent in SAP research, and are manifested, for example, in the traditional distinction between micro and macro phenomena and the adoption of multi-level research. Causal links between levels of reality and the idea that context influences action, which are typical characteristics of tall ontologies, are incompatible with Schatzki’s view, which situates local praxis in a web of interconnections between practices.
Third, and strictly relatedly, embracing Schatzki’s site ontology coherently requires the adoption of specific research practices, sensitivities and designs. Commitment to a flat ontology ‘oblige[s] us to trace the connections that permit what is going on’ (Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington 2014: 1417). This, in turn, requires empirical tracing of both the work done in a specific site and ‘how one site of interaction connects to others, without presuppositions and insisting on the specific’ (Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington 2014: 1417). The implications are potentially far-reaching. For example, they include questioning the idea that strategy implementation and deployment is mainly a top-down process, and problematizing the conventional focus on top management teams as the locus for strategizing. While these ideas are not alien to SAP authors, adhering to Schatzki’s views requires a rather extreme view to be taken on these topics.
In summary, Schatzki’s work should be embraced reflexively by SAP scholars (Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington 2014). Authors must consider the far-reaching theoretical and methodological implications of Schatzki’s radical views. Importantly, they should follow through coherently on their ontological choices to avoid utilizing incompatible philosophical positions in their work and making contradictory claims that might undermine the validity of their argument.
Reflexive adoption of Schatzki’s work might also prevent authors from importing some of the limitations associated with his work. For example, authors have noted that Schatzki’s approach ‘shows no traces of engaging with the socio-economic dimension’ (Reference Galvin and Sunikka-BlankGalvin and Sunnika-Blank 2016). At the same time, while change figures prominently in Schatzki’s work (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2019), conflict, contradiction and interests are much less prominent. This contrasts with other strands of contemporary practice theory, such as activity theory, as mentioned above (for a discussion, see Reference NicoliniNicolini 2012), as well as with the work of first-generation practice theorists like Giddens and Bourdieu, who conducted lengthy exploration of the effect of socio-economic conditions on practical understanding. Adopting Schatzki’s overall consensual view unreflexively might exacerbate the tendency of some (albeit not all) SAP authors to background issues of struggle and emancipation, and might strengthen existing accusations that SAP too often endorses a managerialist agenda (Reference Carter, Clegg and KornbergerCarter, Clegg and Kornberger 2008: 88).
Concrete Guidelines for Using Schatzki’s Practice Theory in SAP Research
In line with our discussion of the general implications of Schatzki’s theory for SAP research, we provide some more concrete guidelines for using his theory in empirical projects (see also Reference Loscher, Splitter, Seidl, Clegg and Pinae CunhaLoscher et al. 2019).
Zooming in on the activities and organizing principles of which practices are composed. As outlined above, a key strength of Schatzki’s theory is his detailed characterization of the different elements constituting practices. In a way, this can be interpreted as a detailed framework for analysing specific practices. Thus, to the extent that SAP aims to comprehend particular strategic practices, researchers might start by zooming in on the concrete doings and sayings associated with relevant practices, as a basis for seeking to identify the various principles on which those activities are organized. Alternatively, they might start out by observing activities without any preconceived ideas of the practice of which they are part, and differentiate and identify specific practices inductively based on those observations. In this process, ‘the names participants use for their activities are an important clue for identifying existing practices’ (Reference SchatzkiSchatzki 2005: 476). For example, SAP researchers observe the activities of a strategy development process, and based on those observations identify particular practices of which those activities are part.
In their analyses of studied practices, researchers often focus only on individual organizing principles, and particularly teleo-affective structures (e.g., Reference Lindberg and RantataloLindberg and Rantatalo 2015) and practical understanding (e.g., Reference Jarzabkowski and WilsonJarzabkowski, Bednarek and Spee 2015). Such focused analysis may be sufficient in some cases, but to gain a more comprehensive understanding, it may be helpful to examine further organizing principles and their specific interactions. A good example of this, though not in the context of SAP, is Reference Nama and LoweNama and Lowe’s (2014) examination of the organizing principles of particular accounting practices. As Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2005: 476) points out, such detailed analysis involves (at least some degree of) ‘participant observation: watching participants’ activities, interacting with them (e.g. asking questions), and – at least ideally – attempting to learn their practices’.
Zooming in on the entwinement between practices and material arrangements. To gain a comprehensive understanding of particular practices, it is not enough to study the practices as such; researchers must also examine the different materialities involved in those practices. After all, practices are always intimately entwined with particular material arrangements, whether these are mundane materialities such as flipcharts, pens and paper, or more sophisticated materialities such as strategy tools and information technologies. Apart from identifying what materialities are involved in particular practices, researchers also need to examine how those materialities are bundled up with the respective practices. While some material arrangements may be constitutive of a particular practice – for example, one cannot perform the practice of SWOT analysis without the SWOT framework – other material arrangements may be substitutable. Although Reference HydleHydle’s (2015) study focuses on the concept of timespace, it provides a good illustration of how materiality and practices are bundled when a new IT system is introduced into a global service firm.
Zooming out and tracing connections between practice-arrangement bundles. As Schatzki highlights, individual practice-arrangement bundles are always embedded in a network of other practice-arrangement bundles. Thus, even if one is only interested in understanding specific practices, such understanding can only be developed by tracing connections with other bundles. After all, those other practice-arrangement bundles affect how the focal practice-arrangement bundle is set up and performed. For example, many practices focus on providing inputs to other practices, and without understanding this connection between practices, one cannot understand the focal practice. As Reference SchatzkiSchatzki (2016) has described, practice-arrangement bundles can refer to each other; they can be interdependent (i.e., drawing on the same elements); and they can be causally related or connected through physical structures. Beyond an understanding of the individual practice, tracing connections also allows researchers to appreciate the wider effects of individual practices. For instance, a strategic planning practice might, through various connections with other practices, ultimately also affect specific operational practices. For example, Reference Seidl, Ohlson, Whittington, Lounsbury, Anderson and SpeeSeidl, Ohlson and Whittington (2021) have identified how certain consulting practices are linked with ‘support practices’, through which the consulting practices yield wider effects. Tracing connections between practices might also allow researchers to identify larger constellations of practices. For example, a particular company’s strategic management process can be understood as a constellation of different strategic practices. Reference Jarzabkowski and WilsonJarzabkowski, Bednarek and Spee’s (2015) study is a good example of examining larger constellations of practices, describing risk trading as a constellation of multiple interrelated but spatially and temporally distributed bundles.
Tracing the temporal evolution of practices. Apart from zooming out to the wider plenum of practices, SAP researchers can also zoom out temporally and trace the evolution and development of strategic practices over time. As Schatzki highlights, practices evolve temporally, both individually and in concert with other practices. Tracing the evolution of practices temporally means identifying the sources of change and particular ways in which changes within particular practices or constellations of practices might spread to other practices and constellations. For example, Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington (2021) describe how practice changes in the wake of the COVID pandemic may have differential effects on practices, depending partly on how they are embedded in wider constellations of practices. In tracing the evolution of practices, SAP might draw inspiration from Reference Schatzki, Shove and SpurlingSchatzki’s (2013) characterization of the different reasons for practice change described above: the introduction of new material arrangements, bifurcation or hybridization of practices, and retraction of practice elements.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented Schatzki’s practice theory as a particularly powerful, yet so far relatively underutilized, theoretical perspective for studying the practice of strategy. As we have highlighted, Schatzki provides a very sophisticated conceptual vocabulary that allows researchers both to zoom in to the detailed workings of individual practices, and to zoom out to the wider embeddedness of those practices in webs of other practices. We have also discussed how Schatzki allows some shortcomings of other practice theorists to be overcome, such as Giddens’s and Bourdieu’s lack of attention to the role of materiality and their posthumanist stance on human agency; but we have also highlighted that this approach comes with some limitations, including lack of attention to tensions and conflicts, which researchers must bear in mind when adopting this perspective in SAP research. Overall, Schatzki’s approach offers great potential for SAP, and we hope that this chapter will contribute to unleashing this potential in more research projects.
