Introduction
How do individuals justify their viewpoints during public disputes? What practices do they mobilize to do so? How do they determine whether a state of affairs is fair or unfair? The term ‘economies of worth’ – sometimes called ‘French pragmatist sociology’ (Reference Barthe, de Blic, Heurtin, Lagneau, Lemieux, Linhardt, Moreau de Bellaing, Rémy and TromBarthe et al. 2013; Reference LemieuxLemieux 2018) or the ‘School of conventions’ – describes an ensemble of contributions within French sociology that addresses these questions. These contributions, described by Reference Baert and Carreira da SilvaBaert and Carreira da Silva (2010: 43) as ‘the most important post-Bourdieu treatise in French sociology’ (see also Reference StarkStark 2000; Reference Stark2009), focus on the competencies of actors to reach agreements in mundane dispute situations (Reference BoltanskiBoltanski 2012 [1990]; Reference Boltanski, du Gay and Morgan2013; Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]; Reference ThévenotThévenot 2007). They do so by building a comprehensive framework to analyse how social actors evaluate the worth of things and beings across multiple social spheres, establish equivalences among them and, in so doing, forge agreements that enable collective action (Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]). Initially, the authors of these works sought to distance themselves from critical sociology notably by refusing to explain social relations by means of structures, power or violence but, rather, by means of actors’ practices (Reference BoltanskiBoltanski 2012 [1990]; Reference CochoyCochoy 2000). Such practices point broadly to the discursive, cognitive and material resources that actors deliberately mobilize in specific social situations (Reference Thévenot, Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von SavignyThévenot 2001a). Among the diverse social practices that fit this description, economies-of-worth scholars have paid particular attention to the practices of justification, valuation and critique, which they deem essential for resolving disputes or dealing with injustice in everyday social life.
Such a focus makes the economies-of-worth framework a fitting perspective to advance the strategy-as-practice (SAP) literature. Despite a growing body of research elucidating different aspects of the practice of strategy (Reference Kohtamäki, Whittington, Vaara and RabetinoKohtamäki et al. 2022; Reference Rouleau and CloutierRouleau and Cloutier 2022; Reference Vaara and WhittingtonVaara and Whittington 2012), surprisingly little is known about the normative, evaluative and critical practices that underlie the making of strategy (Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington 2014; Reference WhittingtonWhittington 2006). This comes as a surprise, given that strategy practitioners spend a great deal of their time justifying (Reference HendryHendry 2000), evaluating and defending their strategic decisions in the wake of criticisms from staff, board members, analysts and other stakeholders (Reference Whittington, Jarzabkowski, Mayer, Mounoud, Nahapiet and RouleauWhittington et al. 2003). Furthermore, the growing interest of SAP scholars in grand challenges (Reference Ferraro, Etzion and GehmanFerraro, Etzion and Gehman 2015) renders the need for frameworks that capture the underlying normative foundations of strategy practices while demonstrating how strategy practice relates to macro-social issues even more salient (Cloutier, Desjardins and Rouleau 2024). By theorizing the relationships between multiple forms of worth and actors’ everyday situated actions (Reference Cloutier and LangleyCloutier and Langley 2013), not only can the economies-of-worth framework support studies of strategy-making in pluralistic contexts (Reference Denis, Langley and RouleauDenis, Langley and Rouleau 2007) and socio-material situations characterized by moral multiplexity (Reference Reinecke, van Bommel and SpicerReinecke, van Bommel and Spicer 2017) within which multiple normative orders are in tension (Reference Demers and GondDemers and Gond 2020), it can also provide useful conceptual tools for addressing recurrent calls to bridge micro-level praxes with larger social phenomena (Reference Kaplan and MurrayGrattarola, Gond and Haefliger 2024; Reference Kohtamäki, Whittington, Vaara and RabetinoKohtamäki et al. 2022; Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington 2014; Reference WhittingtonWhittington 2006). In our view, the economies-of-worth framework offers a uniquely relevant and interesting lens through which to advance our understanding of strategy as a social practice.
Focusing on the framework developed by Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]; Reference Boltanski and Thévenot1987), our aim in this chapter is to specify what makes this stream of research specific and distinct from other perspectives and to present its potential and value-added for investigating new areas of inquiry within the SAP literature. The chapter is organized as follows. First, we provide an historical account of the emergence of the economies-of-worth framework and introduce its key concepts including order of worth, worlds, critique, test and compromise. Next, we discuss how the framework has thus far been used by strategic management scholars to analyse how actors deal with strategic pluralism and, more specifically, to investigate the social dynamics underlying strategic legitimation, strategic localization and strategic materialization. The third section offers a research agenda concerning how to better leverage underused or overlooked conceptual, phenomenological and methodological insights, which an integration of the economies-of-worth framework with SAP research allows.
The Emergence of Economies of Worth
From Critical Sociology to the Sociology of Critical Capacity
Economies of worth originated in an attempt to address a paradox inherent in the ‘critical intention’ of French classical sociology in particular and critical sociology more generally, both inspired by the works of Pierre Bourdieu. The intent of Bourdieu’s sociology was to unveil the structures of domination at work in society to favour the emancipation of agents (Reference Golsorkhi, Leca, Lounsbury and RamirezGolsorkhi et al. 2009). Following this approach, sociological knowledge is itself ‘critical’, as it aims to provide actors with the knowledge they need to understand their own social situations.
This perspective creates an important blind spot, however, by failing to clarify its own normative standpoint:
[I]t has the defect of revealing inequalities, described as so many injustices, without clarifying the position of justice on the basis of which they can be defined as such (Reference BoltanskiBoltanski 2012 [1990]: 26 [58], emphasis added).
It also tends to assume that sociologists have a capacity to understand injustice that to some extent is denied to laypeople. Nevertheless, prior empirical work conducted by Boltanski, Thévenot and others on the ordinary practices of ‘denunciation’ (when individuals denounce or complain that a particular way of being or doing in social life is not ‘right’ or acceptable) has suggested that laypeople also have critical capacities of their own (Reference Boltanski and ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 1983; Reference Boltanski and Thévenot1989; Reference Boltanski, Darré and SchiltzBoltanski, Darré and Schiltz 1984). The sociology of critical capacity used in ordinary contexts of disputes can thus address the blind spots of critical sociology by revealing the underlying mechanisms inherent in all types of critical activity in society. It can also uncover the value scale or principles of equivalence that are tacitly used by critical sociologists when they criticize various aspects of the existing social order (Reference BoltanskiBoltanski 2012 [1990]; Reference CochoyCochoy 2000).
Consequently, building on Reference ChomskyChomsky (1975) and Reference HabermasHabermas (1984), Reference BoltanskiBoltanski (2012 [1990]) suggests that ordinary people share a set of common competencies that allows them to engage in justification work or critique and, thereby, denounce what they view as unfair or protest that the values they believe in are not being respected (Reference Boltanski, Darré and SchiltzBoltanski, Darré and Schiltz 1984). To specify this point, Boltanski and Thévenot adopt, as an axiom, the idea of a ‘common humanity’, which states that all social actors ‘belong to humanity on the same basis’ (Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]: 74). On this basis, actors can mobilize justifications based on multiple grounds, each of which grants them ‘more agency’ than is typically assumed in the Bourdieusian model of habitus (Reference CochoyCochoy 2000) or in the institutional logics framework (Reference Pernkopf-KonhäusnerPernkopf-Konhäusner 2014). Although this axiom is restrictive – it excludes social contexts within which human beings would see their humanity denied, such as slavery, even though such situations are obviously relevant to the social analysis of justice (Reference GodechotGodechot 2009: 195) – it has the virtue of enhancing actors’ agency by pointing to the existence of an autonomous sense of justice and possible form of indignation shared by all human beings.
A second consequence of this positioning is that from this perspective, ‘critical’ or ‘Bourdieusian’ scholars no longer hold a monopoly over lucidity and critical capacity (Reference BoltanskiBoltanski 2012 [1990]). Thus, the role of scholars is not to ‘free’ social actors from Bourdieu’s ‘biographical illusion’ (Reference BourdieuBourdieu 1986) but, rather, to account for the diversity of social actors’ justifications and the multiple forms of critique they voice. In so doing, they are able to uncover the underlying principles at stake in the process of denunciation articulated by critical sociology (Reference Boltanski, du Gay and MorganBoltanski 2013). Accordingly, the position of professional sociologists and of laypersons becomes ‘symmetric’ during analysis: from this perspective, both categories of actors have critical capacities.
Third, the ambition of the economies-of-worth perspective is not only to account for agents’ justifications and the logics underlying them but also to clarify what allows these critiques to be heard by others and to produce social effects (Reference Boltanski and ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 1999). Inspired by the early developments of Actor–Network theory, the economies-of-worth framework offers insights into the elements that might favour or improve the deployment of critical capacity (and thus agency), notably by considering the role of objects or material artefacts in critical activities and by focusing on the specific ‘social situations’ or ‘critical moments’ when critique takes place rather than focusing solely on actors’ cognitive capabilities (Reference BoltanskiBoltanski 2012 [1990]; Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]).
Fourth, and finally, there is no intention within the economies-of-worth perspective of offering an overall framework for understanding social interactions. Consequently, it can be combined with other approaches, such as Actor–Network theory or ethnomethodology (Reference Blondeau and SevinBlondeau and Cevin 2004; Reference ThévenotThévenot 1984). As an analytical framework, economies of worth is therefore meant to be combined with other approaches to better unveil actors’ critical capacity and the multiple regimes of action that they use when engaging in critique (e.g., Reference Denis, Langley and RouleauDenis, Langley and Rouleau 2007).
Capturing Actors’ Competencies within and across Regimes
The overall aim of the economies-of-worth framework is thus to study how actors use their competencies in situated actions (Reference BoltanskiBoltanski 2012 [1990]; Reference Boltanski and ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 1999; Reference Boltanski and Thévenot2006 [1991]; Reference BoxenbaumBoxenbaum 2014; Reference ThévenotThévenot 2001b). To account for the logic behind the behaviours of actors, Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]) refer to the notion of regime (in French, régime). Consistent with their emphasis on actors’ competencies, here, Boltanski and Thévenot’s intention is to account for the multiple modes of action that actors need to be competent in to be able to evolve within complex, pluralistic contexts (Reference Pernkopf-KonhäusnerPernkopf-Konhäusner 2014). As Reference ThévenotThévenot (2006: 6) puts it,
She too (the actor) is confronted by a plurality of models, not those of the social theorist, but those that laypersons usually use to comprehend events in terms of action, to understand what others do, or to reassess their own behavior. For the subject of action, plurality isn’t about classification; it is about one’s connection to the world. Indeed, a person’s integrity as well as his integration within a community depends on his ability to compose with such plurality.
Hence, the goal of Boltanski and Thévenot is to move beyond the description of practices and account for the logics on which actors rely to ‘coordinate’ their actions, notably by capturing the specific competencies involved in achieving coordination (Reference BoltanskiBoltanski 2012 [1990]; Reference ThévenotThévenot 2006; Reference Thévenot2007). While the list of such regimes continues to grow and the concept of ‘regime of action’ has been extended and redefined as ‘regime of engagement’ (Reference ThévenotThévenot 2008; Reference Thévenot2010; Reference Thévenot, Dumouchel and Gotoh2015), specifically, Reference BoltanskiBoltanski (2012 [1990]: 68–78 [129–47]) has defined four different regimes of action based on whether a regime involves a dispute or not and whether it is possible to justify action through a system of equivalence. Table 15.1 provides an overview of this typology of regimes of action. The regime ‘peace in agape’ refers to situations in which actors are ready to give without expecting anything in return, exemplified by two people in love with each other. Principles of equivalence are of no use in such contexts, as ‘counting’ activities can hardly help establish the sincerity of love. Nor is equivalence an issue in the regime ‘dispute in violence’ because when a dispute occurs, dialogue is impossible, and actors will resort to violence to resolve their conflict. Principles of equivalence are, however, central to the other two regimes of action. The regime ‘peace in fairness’ refers to situations in which actors behave routinely: while rules are not questioned, actors will be careful to ensure that everyone behaves in an appropriate way. Routines embed principles of equivalence and hence ensure the fair distribution of objects and status among people: respecting routines suffices for maintaining peace, and following them is regarded as appropriate behaviour. Finally, the regime ‘dispute in justice’ refers to situations in which a dispute occurs between actors who can argue about justice or fairness without resorting to violence. In such situations, actors must publicly justify their claims and engage in dialogue to arrive at some form of resolution. To do so, they will rely either tacitly or explicitly on existing conventions or principles of equivalence to evaluate the situation and resolve their dispute. According to Boltanski and Thévenot, actors can easily shift from one regime of action to another in their daily activities.
| Nature of the relationships between actors | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Dispute | Peace | ||
| Possibility of justifying action through a system of equivalence | Yes |
|
|
| No |
|
| |
The last regime, ‘dispute in justice’, offers the best opportunity for apprehending the full set of principles of equivalence that actors are likely to mobilize to justify their actions, as, in this context, actors have to formulate and articulate their rationales to justify the pursuit or interruption of a course of action. An initial mapping of possible justifications (Reference Boltanski and ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 1987) was subsequently developed using eleven empirical studies later published in a collection edited by the authors entitled Justesse et justice dans le travail (Reference Boltanski and ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 1989; for an overview in English, see Reference JagdJagd 2011: 348). This book complemented the earlier works of this research team regarding denunciation (Reference Boltanski, Darré and SchiltzBoltanski, Darré and Schiltz 1984) and was used by Reference BoltanskiBoltanski (2012 [1990]), elaborating additional conceptual elements of what would form the economies-of-worth framework. This consolidated version of the economies-of-worth framework thus appears in the book On Justification: Economies of Worth (Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]), which was first published in French in 1991 and then translated into English in 2006. We rely on this seminal book to present the core elements of the economies-of-worth framework.
The Economies-of-Worth Framework
As discussed above, the economies-of-worth framework captures the ‘grammars of justification’ mobilized by actors in real-life contexts and builds on an axiom of ‘common humanity’ according to which there is a shared sense of justice among human beings. Under the constraint of justification, people, to be heard, have to ground their statements in what others consider legitimate worth. For Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]), there is a ‘limited plurality’ of principles that can be used to establish such legitimate worth during a dispute. The aim of the economies-of-worth framework, then, is to capture this ‘limited plurality’ in orders of worth and provide a set of core concepts to explain how they are mobilized by actors on a day-to-day basis.
Orders of Worth and Common Worlds
Orders of worth correspond to higher-order principles that can be mobilized by actors to justify their claims. Because orders of worth point to specific representations of the common good, they function as the ultimate principles of justification on which actors can agree. According to Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]), several ‘common worlds’ organized around specific orders of worth can be distinguished. Specifically, their original framework distinguishes six ‘common worlds’ (‘cities’ or ‘polities’, depending on how the French word cité is translated), each of which is related to a distinct order of worth: the civic world, the world of fame, the market world, the industrial world, the domestic world and the inspired world. To describe the principles of equivalence upon which these common worlds are organized, the authors conduct a systematic analysis of classical works of political philosophy, as these texts ‘clarified and formalized’ the competencies that people mobilize in disputes to reach a form of social equilibrium.
Since this list of six worlds proposed by Boltanski and Thévenot was never meant to be exhaustive, additional ‘common worlds’ have since been identified. For instance, Reference Lafaye and ThévenotLafaye and Thévenot (1993) and Reference Thévenot, Moody, Lafaye, Lamont and ThévenotThévenot, Moody and Lafaye (2000) proposed the green world, and Reference Boltanski and ChiapelloBoltanski and Chiapello (2005[1999]: 154–89]) proposed a projective (or project) world to reflect the ‘new spirit of capitalism’. Table 15.2 presents a consolidated overview of these eight worlds. Each of these eight worlds specifies how legitimacy is assessed, what tests demonstrate actors’ worth, the types of objects and actors populating it and the world’s relationship with time and space. The orders of worth inherent in each world can thus be best observed when usual interactions or social coordination are disrupted – that is, during instances that Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]) have called ‘critical moments’.
| ‘Common worlds’ | Market | Industrial | Civic | Domestic | Inspired | Fame | Green* | Project** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mode of evaluation (worth) | Price, cost | Technical efficiency | Collective welfare | Esteem, reputation | Grace, singularity, creativeness | Renown, fame | Environmental friendliness | Connection, flexibility, adaptability |
| Test | Market competitiveness | Competence, reliability, planning | Equality and solidarity | Trustworthiness | Passion, enthusiasm | Popularity, audience, recognition | Sustainability, renewability | Transition from one project to another |
| Form of relevant proof | Monetary | Measurable criteria, statistics | Formal, official | Oral, exemplary, personally warranted | Emotional involvement and expression | Semiotic | Ecological ecosystem | Reputation |
| Qualified objects | Freely circulating market good or service | Infrastructure, project, technical object, method, plan | Rules and regulations, fundamental rights, welfare policies | Patrimony, locale, heritage | Emotionally invested body or item, the sublime | Sign, media | Pristine wilderness, healthy environment, natural habitat | Project, networks |
| Qualified human beings | Customers, consumers, merchants, sellers | Engineers, professionals, experts | Equal citizens, solidarity unions | Authorities | Creative beings, artists | Celebrities | Environmentalists, ecologists | High-social-capital, adaptable individuals |
| Time formation | Short-term, flexibility | Long-term planned future | Perennial | Customary part | Eschatological, revolutionary, visionary moment | Vogue, trend | Future generations | Time of the project |
| Space formation | Globalization | Cartesian space | Detachment | Local, proximal anchoring | Presence | Communication network | Planet ecosystem | Network |
Notes: * Reference Thévenot, Moody, Lafaye, Lamont and ThévenotThévenot, Moody and Lafaye (2000: 241);
**Reference Boltanski and ChiapelloBoltanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]: 161–92).
Critique and Critical Moments
A regime of justification will be mobilized by actors in contexts of disputes. Thus, to observe how actors justify their positions, one must focus on the ‘critical moments’ in a dispute when actors criticize each other. Indeed, differences in organizational actors’ justifications are often identifiable by means of the critiques that each address to the other in such situations. These will often take the form of the reasons that each partner gives to explain why a particular course of action is not acceptable (Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]) or why particular evaluative criteria are not appropriate for assessing a task or a decision (Reference LamontLamont 2012). For example, a CEO arguing that investments in green technology (green world) should not be pursued because they decrease shareholder value is critiquing the view that business decisions should be made on any basis other than the market (market world).
Test of Worth
In their desire to resolve a dispute, actors may choose to subject a decision or an action to a test to determine whether or to what extent it meets the criteria for determining worthiness within a given world (Reference Dansou and LangleyDansou and Langley 2012). Such tests are not necessarily performed explicitly but are reflected in the rhetorical arguments that one actor might address to another in an effort to convince the other that she is ‘right’ (Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]). If the test criteria are met, then the decision or proposed course of action is deemed worthy within that world, and the dispute is resolved. If not, the actors may propose applying a different test based on criteria stemming from a different world, or they may propose a different course of action and then re-subject it to the same test. This process might continue until an agreement is reached, or actors may give up and choose to walk away, leaving their dispute unresolved.
Tests may also apply to specific persons. Indeed, as a spokesperson for a particular world, a specific actor may also be subject to a test to determine whether she is ‘worthy’ enough to represent the interests of a given world in a dispute. These nuances are interesting, as they allow for considerable analytical richness when applied to empirical data. For example, certain large multinational corporations (MNCs) have begun to hire former non-governmental organization (NGO) executives to handle relations with environmental or community stakeholders. A spokesperson with such a background may (or so the company hopes) be more worthy in the eyes of these stakeholders compared to a public relations professional with no prior relations in the field. Therefore, stakeholders will probably subject this hiring decision to their own test of worth to decide whether they endorse the decision.
Device
According to Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]: 12), the establishment of a proof in the context of a test of worth does not rely only on actors’ cognitive engagement:
Proofs oriented toward the sense of what is just have in common with scientific proofs the fact that they both rely not only on mental states, in the form of convictions or beliefs, but also on stable and coherent arrangements, and thus, on objects subject to general assessment.
Accordingly, objects may be used to evaluate worth across a variety of criteria, and once an agreement on criteria has been reached, this may be sealed by means of a device (in French – dispositif), which usually takes some material form (such as a protocol or a form). Hence, the purpose of objects within the economies-of-worth framework is both to support the evaluation of various types of worth in a context of disputes and to provide a device to bind actors together in some concrete way by triggering a change in practice, which over time might become institutionalized and embedded into new routines (Reference d’Adderiod’Adderio 2008; Reference d’Adderio2010; Reference Leonardi and BarleyLeonardi and Barley 2008).
The Search for a Compromise and the Matrix of Critiques
The recognition of a variety of common worlds highlights the complexity of reaching agreements in situations of dispute that involve a plurality of worlds and associated orders of worth. The search for a compromise will be facilitated if actors agree to resolve their dispute within one common world, thereby relying on the principles of equivalence and tests of worth structuring that world. In such contexts, criticisms can still exist, but they will generally focus on whether the material device used to conduct the test is appropriate or revolve around denouncing biases related to the implicit presence of criteria from another world affecting the test being conducted. Nevertheless, an agreement can usually be reached by removing any ambiguity in the test and making it as pure as possible.
The outcomes of situations in which actors fail to agree on which world is most appropriate for resolving a dispute are far less certain. In such situations, actors cannot rely on the well-established principle of equivalence of one world but, rather, have to develop a novel or specific test of worth that mixes the principles of equivalence from two or more worlds. The agreement thus reached is often complex and less stable, as it can easily be denounced from the perspective of the other worlds involved.
To clarify these situations and ascertain how common worlds conflict with each other, Boltanski and Reference ThévenotThévenot (2006 [1991]: 237–73 [291–334]) have developed a ‘matrix of critiques’ to systematically analyse how each of the six common worlds might criticize the other five. For instance, government subsidies granted to artistic organizations for civic reasons (civic world) (such as the ‘cultural exception’ argument supporting French cinema) can be denounced by private entities that are not funded by the state on the basis that such subsidies distort competition (market world). Accordingly, although Boltanski and Thévenot’s matrix suggests that the types of critiques addressed by one world to another are relatively predictable, the question of whether one type of criticism will dominate in a given interaction remains an empirical question.
Distinctiveness of the Economies-of-Worth Perspective
Our account of the historical emergence of the economies-of-worth framework clarifies how this perspective addresses a blind spot arising from the normative foundations of critical activity within Bourdieu’s sociology. In particular, the economies-of-worth framework accounts for the competencies of actors that they use to mobilize orders of worth from multiple common worlds. Moreover, the social competencies related to justification are regarded as common to all human beings – whatever their ‘habitus’ or status. Another distinctive element in this framework is the deliberate down-tuning of power. By construction, the economies-of-worth framework therefore avoids the question of power relations to focus on how justification and agreement are collectively achieved in specific institutional spheres:
While the existence of power relations clearly has to be acknowledged, it was important for me [in the economies-of-worth framework] to show that, in certain situations, people can reach justifiable and universalizable agreements that are capable of holding up in the face of denunciations that characterize them as mere power relations disguised as relation of justice (Reference BoltanskiBoltanski 2012 [1990]: 41 [83]).
Bracketing power was thus a necessary step to clarify the normative basis of critical sociology and make the critical activities of actors explicit. Hence, Reference BoltanskiBoltanski (2011 [2009]; Reference Boltanski, du Gay and Morgan2013) has shown that the sociology of actors’ critical capacity, as captured by the economies-of-worth framework, can be combined with critical sociology to understand how and when actors’ power comes into play, notably, by revealing whether and how they immunize themselves from the imperatives of justification.
The relationship between the economies-of-worth framework and the institutional logics perspective is somewhat less explicit, however. Despite their obvious similarities and potential complementarities (Reference Brandl, Daudigeos, Edwards and Pernkopf-KonhäuserBrandl et al. 2014; Reference Cloutier and LangleyCloutier and Langley 2013; Reference Daudigeos and ValiorgueDaudigeos and Valiorgue 2010; Reference Gond and LecaGond and Leca 2012), the epistemological and ontological stances of each approach are quite different.
For example, within the economies-of-worth framework, conflict and change are normal (Reference Gond and LecaGond and Leca 2012). Stability, when it is achieved, is by definition temporary, whereas within the institutional logics perspective, stability is the norm, and change is the exception. The assumption of agency within the economies-of-worth framework is thus much more pronounced than it is within the institutional logics perspective (Reference BoxenbaumBoxenbaum 2014; Reference Pernkopf-KonhäusnerPernkopf-Konhäusner 2014). The economies-of-worth framework also views social interactions as more fluid and changeable than institutional logics or Bourdieu’s sociology, as explained by Reference FriedlandFriedland (2009: 29, emphasis added):
Boltanski and Thévenot’s conventions of equivalence and the material, embodied practices through which they are enacted are intentionally conceptualized to be transposable across institutional domains.
Finally, ‘worthiness’ within the economies-of-worth framework (the equivalent of which is ‘legitimacy’ within the institutional logics perspective) can be granted in degrees, which is not usually the case for legitimacy (Reference Cloutier and LangleyCloutier and Langley 2013).
Thus, the distinctive theoretical flavour of the economies-of-worth framework, with its focus on situated actions, actors’ social competencies and specific categories of practices that pertain to justification, denunciation and the search for socially acceptable agreement, renders it a particularly relevant perspective for the study of SAP.
Economies of Worth in Practice: Dealing with Strategic Pluralism
The economies-of-worth perspective offers a useful framework for strategy practice research in pluralistic contexts characterized by ‘multiple objectives, diffuse power and knowledge-based work processes’ (Reference Denis, Langley and RouleauDenis, Langley and Rouleau 2007: 179–80). In such contexts, agreements and coordination must be constructed across constellations of stakeholders possessing different normative preferences.
The idea of strategizing as agreement and coordination can be captured through the concept of conventions, i.e., ‘sustainable compromise[s] among competing values’ (Reference Denis, Langley and RouleauDenis, Langley and Rouleau 2007: 193). Accordingly, strategies can be conceptualized as conventions regulating the relations among multiple actors and resources and rooted in societal norms, while strategizing can be envisioned as a process of dealing with the different normative viewpoints concerning such conventions.
Economies of worth can contribute to the SAP perspective by providing an analytical framework for understanding this process, which entails negotiating strategic conventions and reconciling moral multiplexity through practices of justification, valuation and critique (Reference Cloutier, Gond and LecaCloutier, Gond and Leca 2017; Reference Reinecke, van Bommel and SpicerReinecke, van Bommel and Spicer 2017). In fact, in the burgeoning literature of organization and management studies that use the economies-of-worth framework relatively few contributions explicitly refer to strategy or SAP. We suggest, however, that there is considerable overlap between this field of organizational research and the SAP perspective, particularly in three areas: the achievement of legitimacy for strategic conventions among stakeholders and external institutions; the maintenance of internal legitimacy and organizational coherence when strategies are translated into operational decisions; and the use of material, symbolic and representational objects in the formation of strategic conventions. We label these areas strategic legitimation, strategic localization and strategic materialization. That is, we use these labels to refer both to topics in economies-of-worth research and to what we suggest are actual strategic praxes – i.e., ‘stream[s] of activity that interconnect the micro-actions of individuals and groups with the wider institutions in which those actions are located and to which they contribute’ (Reference Jarzabkowski and SpeeJarzabkowski and Spee 2009: 73). In the rest of this section, we illustrate strategic legitimation, localization and materialization with prior economies-of-worth studies.
Strategic Legitimation
By ‘strategic legitimation’, we refer to praxes that aim to legitimize strategic conventions. Economies-of-worth research shows that business models, business strategies, operating models, organizational designs, capital structures, technological choices and industry regulation often emerge from diffuse processes in which multiple actors, deploying their critical capacity and the grammar of the orders of worth, articulate and conventionalize – in the sense of creating a conventional wisdom about – the nature of the uncertainty facing a firm, industry or market and what should be the appropriate responses.
These ‘conventionalizing accounts’ may develop during key events such as industry forums (Reference McInerneyMcInerney 2008), or in response to public controversies regarding issues of corporate conduct and organizational morality (Reference Patriotta, Gond and SchultzPatriotta, Gond and Schultz 2011; Reference Sibai, Mimoun and BoukisSibai, Mimoun and Bukis 2021). They may emerge and evolve over time through extended, publicly performed contests of ideas, for example, between firms and industry regulators concerning the scope and aims of regulation (Reference Cortese and AndrewCortese and Andrew 2020; Reference MunzerMunzer 2019; Reference TaupinTaupin 2012); among entrepreneurs and investors in emergent industries (Reference Kaplan and MurrayKaplan and Murray 2010); or among the different user communities that develop around technological innovations (Reference Miranda, Kim and SummersMiranda, Kim and Summers 2015). Once established, they constitute standards by which actual strategies are assessed.
When strategic conventions are insufficiently inclusive of the disparate normative stances of stakeholders, they may altogether undermine strategic projects (e.g., Reference Cloutier and LangleyCloutier and Langley 2017; Reference Huault and Rainelli-WeissHuault and Rainelli-Weiss 2011). Thus, for an organization, entering the communicative engagements of strategic legitimation – i.e., engaging in controversies, taking part in contests of ideas or joining in communal experimentations with new technologies – can be seen as an essential aspect of strategizing. Such engagements are occasions for promoting and stabilizing an organization’s goals and policies, as well as discovering new possibilities for action. However, they can also entail for organizations the risk of failing to achieve or altogether losing legitimacy for their projects. The practices involved – e.g., identifying relevant conversations, selecting which of them to join, influencing the dynamics of participation, or articulating and demonstrating an organization’s position and projects – are therefore of strategic consequence (Reference Jarzabkowski, Kavas and KrullJarzabkowski, Kavas and Krull 2021).
In this domain, research mobilizing the economies-of-worth has explored the effects of political and relational tactics analysing, for example, how contests over corporate governance arrangements depend on the spaces and formats in which debates occur (Reference Barros and MichaudBarros and Michaud 2020); how a managerial rhetoric of permanent organizational dynamism, supported by specific practices, can pre-empt critique (Reference Daudigeos, Edwards, Jaumier, Pasquier and PicardDaudigeos et al. 2021); how participants in controversies use rhetoric and mobilize their practical context to reframe the criteria by which an issue should be judged (Reference Dionne, Mailhot and LangleyDionne, Mailhot and Langley 2019); how power interacts with justification and critique as stakeholders attempt to reconfigure the constellation of interests around an issue, reshape the perception of uncertainty, and mobilize institutions to strengthen their positions (Reference Gond, Barin Cruz, Raufflet and CharronGond et al. 2016); and how institutionalized norms, for example, regarding gender, can skew the grounds on which entrepreneurs compete for resources and justify their business plans (Reference Pfefferman, Frenkel and GiladPfefferman, Frenkel and Gilad 2022). Additionally, the economies-of-worth literature has investigated the critical roles that personal competencies and resources – including cognitive flexibility, domain-specific technical skills, rhetorical skills and high social profiles (Reference Oldenhof, Postma and PuttersOldenhof, Postma and Putters 2014; Reference Wright and NybergWright and Nyberg 2022) – play in the successful realization of these practices.
Strategic Localization
By ‘strategic localization’, we refer to praxes through which strategic conventions are translated into decisions and actions at the operational, i.e., ‘local’, level. Such translations, which often fall under headings such as tactical planning, strategy execution or strategy implementation, are beset by problems of normative pluralism and interdependencies analogous to those of strategic legitimation, albeit in distinct situations.
Economies-of-worth research has explored cases of strategy implementation in which, on the one hand, strategic conventions are normatively complex and ambiguous and, on the other, the actors charged with implementing them locally themselves possess disparate normative and evaluative orientations. Much of this research revolves around the maintenance of organizational coherence and coordination in the face of strategic change. It suggests that critically competent actors perform ‘justification work’ (Reference JagdJagd 2011) to translate strategy from the global to the local level by justifying, evaluating, critiquing, interpreting and adapting global goals and policies and developing local conventions.
For example, in a study of a contract-awarding ‘megaproject’, Reference GkeredakisGkeredakis (2014) argues that project members experience ‘the challenge of contributing to abstract objectives of large-scale integration’ (p. 1475) as a form of external interdependence concerning local activities. Project members address such interdependencies by developing conventions that define the linkages between project goals and local actions and are sustained by corresponding representations, communications and standards. The problems of coordinating goals and behaviours across different spatial and temporal scales are also explored in a case of marketing chemical products for the upstream oil industry in the North Atlantic (Reference Finch, Geiger and HarknessFinch, Geiger and Harkness 2017). To reconcile the relatively short-term and local concerns of marketing and industrial production with the longer-term and spatially broader concerns of regulation and environmentalism, market participants undertake ‘considerable justification work’ through ‘scientific papers, research alliances, incremental trial and error and simulations [of the environmental effects of chemicals]. More often than not, these solutions are explicitly provisional and configured until further notice [as] the only way to compromise over the issues of worth in this marketing system is by keeping these from settling, and by keeping institutional settings at arms’ length’ (Reference Finch, Geiger and HarknessFinch, Geiger and Harkness 2017: 87–8).
Exploring the implementation of a new sustainability strategy in an oil sands company, Reference Demers and GondDemers and Gond (2020) show how managers find ways of either ‘forming’ or ‘challenging’ the compromise between orders of worth inherent in the organization’s strategy by working with or against the grain of the conventions that embody it – for example, by either endorsing or critiquing the management control systems that embed various normative principles that inform the strategy. Analogous practices of endorsement and critique of conventions have been shown to operate in the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Reference Shin, Cho, Lecomte and GondShin et al. 2022). Given that CSR is ‘a contested notion’ without ‘an established knowledge base’ (Reference Shin, Cho, Lecomte and GondShin et al. 2022: 886), its practitioners have scope to construct competing jurisdictional claims about the ends and means of implementing CSR in organizations by simultaneously articulating normative compromises as justifications for their claims and critiquing competing claims on similarly normative grounds.
Strategic Materialization
‘Strategic materialization’ points to the use of material, symbolic and representational devices for the construction of strategic conventions. Tellingly, several studies around strategic legitimation and localization highlight the role of materiality in consolidating compromises. Artefacts are evidently relevant to strategy-making – for example, business models can be built around technological products, the operational life of plants and machines sets constraints on investment decisions, and the regulatory standards for the calculation and presentation of risk exposures (e.g., Basel regulations) may drive capital allocation decisions. Economies-of-worth show that relevance is rooted in the power of artefacts to embody normative principles in their design and construction and stabilize strategic conventions. Thus, strategic materialization intersects and completes other strategic praxes by creating powerful actants that operate through strategic legitimation and localization.
In relation to strategic legitimation, objects shape the scope and direction of an organization’s search for legitimacy vis-à-vis its markets and competitors. Research has explored, for instance, the values of user rating systems in carpooling services (Reference Barbe and HusslerBarbe and Hussler 2019) and of assemblages ‘resulting from a recomposition of laws, conventions, devices, persons … that harmonised different definitions of justice and of the common good’ (Reference Mercier-Roy and MailhotMercier-Roy and Mailhot 2019: 992) in ride-hailing services. According to these studies, devices and assemblages reflect certain normative priorities – especially those of their designers (e.g., the economically efficient use of cars depending on demand) – and exclude others (e.g., the socializing opportunities of sharing a ride or the civic value of publicly regulated taxis).
These studies also suggest that the embodiment in devices of different norms and values generates possibilities for strategic differentiation and the creation of competitive advantage. In the case of carpooling services, some users may self-select out of some systems and gravitate towards competing services that favour a different value orientation (Reference Barbe and HusslerBarbe and Hussler 2019). In the case of ride-hailing, assemblages can ‘by equipping participants and/or by formatting and orienting behaviours … perform certain conceptions of the common good more powerfully than the apparatuses that characterise the taxi industry …, with the effect of undermining these existing ways of doing things’ (Reference Mercier-Roy and MailhotMercier-Roy and Mailhot 2019: 989). In exceptional cases, material developments may even create entirely new categories (e.g., ‘laboratory grown meat’) that promise to radically redefine the understanding of a market or product by aligning previously conflicting values (Reference Whelan and GondWhelan and Gond 2017).
Value-laden objects – particularly the ‘ambiguous’ objects that can inhabit different ‘worlds’ and support compromises among orders of worth (Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]) – similarly impact the dynamics of strategic localization. For example, as Reference Mesny and MailhotMesny and Mailhot (2007) argue in their study of an industry–university research partnership, the imposition of a government-mandated contractual framework skewed towards the market and industrial orders of worth made it difficult to accommodate the values of (scientific) inspiration that characterize university research, adversely impacting operational decisions.
Conversely, normatively polyvalent objects have been shown to facilitate coordination when they are constructed locally. Reference Mailhot, Gagnon, Langley and BinetteMailhot et al. (2016) examine how leadership in collaborative research projects is distributed across ‘leaders–object couplings’, meaning that leaders identify focal objects around which to organize collaboration ‘including material artefacts, more abstract concepts, and human-material assemblages such as committees and procedures’ (Reference Mailhot, Gagnon, Langley and BinetteMailhot et al. 2016: 55); allow collective negotiation of these objects’ meaning at the point of use across different levels and functions of a project; and conform their actions to the norms that thus come to be materialized. Leader-object couplings help ‘maintain the worldview of the different groups … while directing them toward project objectives’ and ‘ensure the links between the “operational level” of the research team and … the more strategic level of the [central organization coordinating research partnerships] and government departments’ (Reference Mailhot, Gagnon, Langley and BinetteMailhot et al. 2016: 81). In another study of academic knowledge commercialization, locally constructed assemblages (e.g., licensable software, a marketable user manual, and a research and development laboratory) have been shown to synergistically combine different concepts of value (e.g., academic visibility and market success reinforcing each other), allowing knowledge to transfer between worlds connoted by different evaluative principles such as academia and business (Reference Mailhot and LangleyMailhot and Langley 2017).
Another salient example is offered by conceptual and formal models of strategy. As argued in a longitudinal study of strategy-making in a corporation, theoretical strategic models interact with practices at the market or industry level, valuation metrics and justification efforts by managers in ‘performing strategic practice’ (Reference Ottosson and GalisOttosson and Galis 2011: 455). Other studies show how models from academia and consulting can appeal to organizational members because of their multifaceted normative content and the latitude they allow in constructing local compromises (Reference van Elk, Trenholm, Lee and Ferlievan Elk et al. 2021), and how the formal strategic plans of arts organizations, characterized by ideological tensions between managerial and artistic norms, express ‘micro-compromises’ by means of rhetorical devices that ‘accentuate the polyphony of strategic plans’ (Reference Daigle and RouleauDaigle and Rouleau 2010: 13), thereby ‘persuading and rallying’ (Reference Daigle and RouleauDaigle and Rouleau 2010: 25) organizational members and external stakeholders.
In summary, prior organizational and management research based on the economies-of-worth framework contributes to a perspective on strategy as a set of complementary praxes by which strategic conventions are formed, negotiated, interpreted and adapted at multiple levels, through the normative and evaluative practices of multiple actors within and outside formal strategy processes, and the mobilization of numerous material, symbolic and representational objects. In the rest of this chapter, we discuss some conceptual, phenomenological and methodological developments that could extend this perspective further.
Leveraging Economies of Worth to Advance Strategy as Practice: A Research Agenda
In the first edition of this chapter (see Reference Gond, Leca, Cloutier, Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl and VaaraGond, Leca and Cloutier 2015), we outlined the many benefits of integrating economies of worth with SAP. While strategy and organization scholars have started mobilizing the economies-of-worth framework to shed new light on the practices and processes relevant to SAP, our synthesis of this work suggests that untapped avenues for cross-fertilization remain. Here, we thus explain how certain key insights from the economies-of-worth can be further leveraged to continue to advance SAP research at the phenomenological, conceptual and methodological levels.
Phenomenological Level: Strategizing in Situations of Moral Multiplexity
A promising empirical domain for further cross-fertilization between SAP and economies-of-worth research relates to a growing interest among strategy scholars in the plethora of social and environmental issues confronting society, such as endemic poverty, biodiversity loss, migrant flows, water scarcity or climate change, recently gathered under the umbrella concept of ‘grand challenges’ (Reference Jarzabkowski, Bednarek, Chalkias and CacciatoriJarzabkowski et al. 2019). Institutionalized descriptions of these challenges, such as the United Nations’ list of Sustainable Development Goals, further remind us that organizations typically deal not with one but multiple such challenges simultaneously (Reference George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi and TihanyiGeorge et al. 2016). Grand challenges create multiple ‘normative tensions’ – ‘tensions involving moral values’ (Reference Gond, Demers, Michaud, Jarzabkowski, Smith, Lewis and Langley.Gond, Demers and Michaud 2017: 240) – as well as multiple trade-offs between distinct forms of worth, generating a form of ‘morally loaded institutional complexity’ (Reference Demers and GondDemers and Gond 2020) or ‘moral multiplexity’ (Reference Reinecke, van Bommel and SpicerReinecke et al. 2017) that organizations must contend with and that involves the continuous renegotiation of the relationships among multiple forms of worth, which are required to advance towards a consensual approach to the common good.
Although underused in SAP scholarship, the economies-of-worth framework remains a fitting, ‘ready-made’ conceptual apparatus for investigating such situations, given its notion of the common good as inherently pluralistic, its recognition of the uncertainty surrounding, and potentially suspending, collective action, and its conceptualization of the central role of actors’ critical capacity and reflexivity in the evaluation of worth (Cloutier, Desjardins and Rouleau 2024; Grattarola, Gond and Haefliger 2024). These three features can indeed help account empirically for the main aspects of normatively complex situations, such as those characterized by societal grand challenges that by nature involve multiple ‘interactions and associations, emergent understandings, and nonlinear dynamics’ (Reference Ferraro, Etzion and GehmanFerraro et al. 2015: 364) – ‘confront organizations with radical uncertainty’ (p. 364) – and are deemed evaluative because they cut ‘across jurisdictional boundaries, implicating multiple criteria of worth, and revealing new concerns even as they are being tackled’ (p. 364).
Examples of recent research that have explored this empirical territory include Reference Wright and NybergWright and Nyberg’s (2022) study of the controversies surrounding multiple episodes of coral bleaching at the Great Barrier Reef, Reference Bullinger, Schneider and GondBullinger, Schneider and Gond’s (2023) analysis of the struggles of refugee migrants in Austria and Germany to access the job market and Reference Anesa, Spee, Gillepsi and PetaniAnesa et al.’s (2024) analysis of a highly mediatized public dispute surrounding tax minimization practices in Australia. Collectively, these studies show how moral multiplexity can shape strategy both within and across organizations and demonstrate that not only mainstream (e.g., extractive companies, job-placement organizations or senior tax practitioners) but also marginalized actors (e.g., activists, refugees) can rely on multiple forms of worth to strategically impose their assessment of a given issue.
However, these studies have only scratched the surface of the moral complexity faced by organizations and how they deal with them. Crises such as the Ukrainian war, the energy crisis it has triggered or the COVID-19 pandemic have exacerbated and made more visible than ever the tensions embedded in the contradicting moral orders that confront organizational actors and that have brought with them calls for in-depth strategic renewal. By relying on economies-of-worth-informed concepts – potentially, but not necessarily, in combination with concepts from paradox theory or institutional analysis – future empirical research could thus further investigate how organizations navigate the plurality of approaches to the common good that are inherent in situations characterized by moral multiplexity. Recent extensions of the economies-of-worth framework by French pragmatist scholars can help fulfil such an ambitious empirical agenda.
Conceptual Level: Moving between Common Worlds and Grammars, Regimes, Power Dynamics and Infrastructures
Although the main constructs of the economies-of-worth conceptual apparatus described above continue to be relevant for advancing our understanding of strategizing-related phenomena, some aspects of the framework that have yet to be discussed can offer interesting conceptual opportunities. In addition, the framework itself has been extended over time in ways that can enhance studies of SAP at the conceptual level. In this section, we discuss some reconsiderations of the notion of common worlds through the concepts of grammars and regimes and deepen our examination of power dynamics through the analysis of infrastructures, both of which offer potentially fruitful and novel avenues through which to further integrate economies-of-worth and SAP research.
Extending Common Worlds: Grammars of Interests and Regimes of Engagement
Over time, pragmatist sociologists have extended the economies-of-worth framework to examine other forms of justification in addition to those based on abstract notions of the ‘common good’, as captured by the economies-of-worth ‘worlds’, and to look more closely at the other ‘regimes of action’ excluded from the original framework (see Table 15.1). Working on the blurred boundary between justification and the familiar ‘regime of engagement’, Reference ThévenotThévenot (2008; Reference Thévenot, Dumouchel and Gotoh2015) has proposed an approach to the ‘liberal’ grammar of interests that points to the transformation of familiar commitments into that of an interest, or a ‘stake’, for which individuals choose to take a public stand, without necessarily adopting the format of a common world. Such claims reflect the best interest of a coalition of actors rather than an abstract conceptualization of the common good. This approach to multiple interests provides a conceptual tool that accounts for the bottom-up processes of justification in strategizing for the common good by groups of actors. The common good is thus seen as emerging from the negotiation of actors’ competing interests. Actors present their plans as ‘action plans’ that other individuals involved in disputes choose to engage with or not. Disputes are then channelled through a comparison of evaluations based on individual preferences. It is through this negotiation process that the ‘common good’ for the community is defined. Focusing future research on such processes can extend future analyses of strategizing.
Returning the concept of regime of engagement into the scope of analysis also enables the consideration of other aspects related to the regime of familiarity in the strategic work of justification. Here, the intimate, emotional and personal dimensions of justification, overlooked in prior studies on the higher-level aspects of the common good, can be considered in strategizing processes. Emotional attachments to persons, objects and places could thus become more central, whereby the strategizing work of justification takes a radically different form. It points to new forms of common worlds that relate to deeply personal concerns that are difficult to make commensurable (Reference Luhtakallio and ThévenotLuhtakallio and Thévenot 2018; Reference ThévenotThévenot 2007). While the familiar regime of engagement is more difficult to communicate than abstract notions of the common good, the relationships between this regime and public claims regarding the common good can help renew contemporary analyses of how individuals express their personal identity through their social roles (Reference Lupu, Ruiz and LecaLupu, Ruiz and Leca 2022). Such an approach, then, could enrich analyses of how and why actors commit themselves to processes of strategy-making, particularly those related to grand challenges or which are morally loaded.
Future research could also extend the analysis of how the common good is strategized by consolidating the conceptual apparatus of the economies-of-worth with that of the grammar of interests and regimes of engagement. Such a consolidated approach could account for forms of dispute and argumentation within and between organizations overlooked in prior studies of strategy-making. In terms of dispute, a consolidated economies-of-worth framework brings its individual and situational roots back into the scope of analysis by recognizing the issues that actors might face when judging events and behaviour. Mundane, rather than public, forms of discussion and dispute can be considered within the scope of strategizing. Future studies could explore how actors with critical capacity cope with a plurality of justifications, from the very familiar to the most public, in the context of strategizing. In terms of argumentation, from this perspective, the very definition of the common good becomes an open-ended, ongoing practical issue. Such an approach resonates with recent suggestions to better integrate moral and ethical dimensions into strategizing and to approach ‘business ethics as practice’ (Reference Clegg, Kornberger and RhodesClegg, Kornberger and Rhodes 2007: 107) by focusing ‘on what organizations do about ethics rather than just on abstract principles’ (Reference Clegg, Kornberger and RhodesClegg, Kornberger and Rhodes 2007: 116), to which our expanded economies-of-worth framework can contribute.
Thus, by refocusing researchers’ attention on how individuals with emotions and stakes engage in discussions about the common good, an extended economies-of-worth approach to strategizing opens new directions for a better understanding of the benefits that individuals expect – and whether they benefit – from the achievement of a particular type of common good that they support during a controversy.
Bringing Back Power and Infrastructure into the Scope of Analysis
Another fruitful conceptual avenue of research involves reconsidering the bracketing of ‘power relations’ as a foundational premise of the economies-of-worth framework. This assumption has led to the analysis of strategic situations within which multiple and distinct types of actors could justify their claims on an equal footing with each other (in terms of their critical, justificatory and evaluative capacity), leading to forms of deliberation from which some consensus regarding the common good, either temporary or long lasting, might emerge. Such an approach has effectively neglected the role played by power asymmetries in these debates by downplaying the extent to which powerful actors influence shared understandings of the common good and, thereby, which strategic options are deemed worthy of pursuit.
Indeed, studies have shown that organizations can leverage their power positions within a field to build arguments based on compelling tests of worth and to promote specific configurations of the social order that best protect their interests (Reference Gond, Barin Cruz, Raufflet and CharronGond et al. 2016). Such an approach could be extended by relying on recent developments in French pragmatist sociology that have focused on how the settings within which actors deliberate shape power relations. These settings have been conceptualized in organizational research as ‘infrastructure’ (Reference StarStar 1999), i.e., the ensemble of mundane artefacts such as production standards, power plugs or bureaucratic forms that enable and constrain how actors operate. Although such ideas have long informed the economies-of-worth tradition, they have not been adopted, to the best of our knowledge, by organizational scholars with an interest in this approach or by students of SAP. French pragmatist sociology often refers to such settings as ‘investments in forms’ (Reference ThévenotThévenot 1984), such as, in the context of Taylorization, the definition of a standardized task, the coding of time and the formulation of rationalized relations by experts, which have together created the material conditions for redefining production and ultimately worked as a ‘factor that is assimilable to a quantity of time which can be consumed without any resulting workforce immobilization’ (Reference ThévenotThévenot 1984: 16). Seriously considering how power operates through strategic materialization can therefore deepen our understanding of these effects. For instance, focusing on the empirical context of a multi-stakeholder initiative – the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil – Reference Cheyns and ThévenotCheyns and Thévenot (2019) have found that despite the principle of ‘free, prior, and informed consent’ and a claimed ‘horizontality’, the long list of procedural principles, standardization and measures adopted have constrained how stakeholders can express their claims. In this study, local communities appear to have been the weakest stakeholders, as they had to abandon their familiar regime of engagement which was not deemed acceptable within the highly restrictive ‘participation formats’ of the roundtable. Hence, focusing on the material setting within which strategizing work takes place can clarify the power dynamics that are central when dealing with moral multiplexity.
Methodological Level: Playing within and across Contexts, Levels of Analysis, Foci of Attention and Temporal Frames
As we have shown, prior research applying the economies-of-worth framework has pointed to the discursive, cognitive and material practices that actors in situated disputes mobilize to justify and (they hope) achieve their ends. While not necessarily positioned as SAP research, these studies nevertheless elucidate the normative, evaluative and critical practices that underpin the ‘doing’ of strategy in a variety of contexts where the interests and shared understandings of actors concerning an appropriate course of action are not aligned. As discussed above, there is ample room to advance our understanding of these dynamics, especially within the field of SAP. Here, we outline some of the methodological implications of doing so.
First, the choice of context is important. Contexts should be chosen because they involve situations that are controversial in some way (extend beyond disagreements over technicalities) and give rise to debates where the interactions between the actors involved and the outcomes thereof can be tracked. The tracking of these interactions can be in writing (reports and/or white papers put forward to justify or contest a new law, regulation or policy; the frenzy of media articles following a controversial event; transcripts of regulatory hearings; a contentious debate gone viral on social media), verbal (recorded exchanges between actors during formal and/or informal meetings), visual (images that evoke and attribute meanings to phenomena – see e.g., Reference Bullinger, Schneider and GondBullinger, Schneider and Gond 2023; Reference Höllerer, Jancsary and GrafströmHöllerer, Jancsary, and Grafström 2018) or bodily (video record of actors’ use of bodily gestures, such as pointing at or picking up objects and/or emotional displays when making a point – see e.g., Reference Liu and MaitlisLiu and Maitlis 2014; Reference Wenzel and KochWenzel and Koch 2018) form. Of particular interest are actors’ specific responses (written, verbal, bodily) to accusations or critiques levied at them, the counterreactions that these responses give rise to and their effects (whether these interactions cause a shift in power relations between actors or help shift the debate in some way, either further away or closer to agreement).
Such debates might occur anywhere and at any time, over short or long periods of time, and across various levels of analysis, each offering potentially interesting insights into how social actors’ disparate conceptualizations of what is acceptable and/or appropriate to think or do in each situation shapes organizational, interorganizational and market outcomes. At the organizational level, we may evaluate internal debates within a firm about the most suitable strategy to pursue, especially regarding the pursuit of potentially contradictory objectives that elicit moral concerns or reflect situations of moral multiplexity, such as exploration/exploitation (Reference Andriopoulos and LewisAndriopoulos and Lewis 2009; Reference Smith and TushmanSmith and Tushman 2005), CSR (Reference Hahn, Preuss, Pinkse and FiggeHahn et al. 2014; Reference Hengst, Hoegl, Jarzabkowski and MuethelHengst et al. 2020), or the simultaneous management of social and market objectives in social enterprises, as well as other types of hybrid organizations (Reference Battilana and LeeBattilana and Lee 2014; Reference Battilana, Sengul, Pache and ModelBattilana et al. 2015; Reference Ramus, La Cara, Vaccaro and BrusoniRamus et al. 2018). At the interorganizational level, this may concern the negotiation and ongoing management of cross-sectoral and cross-boundary collaborations aimed at addressing social and environmental issues (Reference de Bakker, Rasche and Pontede Bakker, Rasche and Ponte 2019; Reference Levy, Reinecke and ManningLevy, Reinecke and Manning 2016; Reference Quick and FeldmanQuick and Feldman 2014). At the industry or societal level, this may involve taking a closer look at industry efforts to shape the ‘rules of the game’, whereby business is conducted in relation to such issues (Reference FurnariFurnari 2018; Reference McInerneyMcInerney 2008; Reference Ozcan and GursesOzcan and Gurses 2018), industry responses to specific and concerted social movement pressures (Reference ElsbachElsbach 1994; Reference Litrico and DavidLitrico and David 2017; Reference van Wijk, Stam, Elfring, Zietsma and den Hondvan Wijk et al. 2013) and ongoing debates taking place in transnational governance arenas (Reference Aguilar Delgado and Perez-AlemanAguilar Delgado and Perez-Aleman 2021; Reference Djelic and QuackDjelic and Quack 2018; Reference LockeLocke 2013). In each instance, the focus – or unit of analysis – would be on the interactions themselves, the back and forth arguments, critiques, justifications, tests and moments of valuation, evaluation and judgement between actors as these debates unfold during specific moments of crisis or heightened tension (Reference Hällgren, Rouleau and RondHällgren, Rouleau and Rond 2018) and during the mundane, day-to-day interactions of actors working together to achieve their collective objectives (Reference Jarzabkowski, Kavas and KrullJarzabkowski, Kavas and Krull 2021; Reference Jarzabkowski, Seidl and BalogunJarzabkowski, Seidl and Balogun 2022; Reference Kohtamäki, Whittington, Vaara and RabetinoKohtamäki et al. 2022).
Prior research that has mobilized the economies-of-worth framework has tended to examine such debates based on retrospective data that have been captured and recounted in written documents, such as reports, letters to the editor or media articles, as well as informants’ recollections of these debates, situations and events in the (sometimes quite distant) past in interview transcripts. Fewer studies, however, have examined these in vivo and in situ (Reference Zilber, Lounsbury, Anderson and SpeeZilber 2021), and fewer still have done so over longer periods of time. There is tremendous potential for elucidating important dynamics from this perspective, focusing not only on the different ways that actors deliberately and knowledgeably critique, justify and judge past, current and proposed courses of action during such debates but also on how they mobilize these practices processually as well as cumulatively over time (Reference Cloutier and LangleyCloutier and Langley 2020; Reference Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas and van de VenLangley et al. 2013; Reference Reinecke, Ansari, Langley and TsoukasReinecke and Ansari 2017).
While the ‘worlds’ specified by economies-of-worth scholars are helpful when accounting for the diversity of justifications and the multiple forms of critiques they voice in situations of dispute, more interesting is their ability to provide a better and more fine-grained understanding of how exactly actors navigate such disputes and the debates that they give rise to by examining dynamics such as how different actors gain/lose power and voice in the process (Reference Gond, Barin Cruz, Raufflet and CharronGond et al. 2016; Reference Gross and ZilberGross and Zilber 2020), how they acquire, develop and deploy their knowledge of ‘what works’ (Reference Rouleau and CloutierRouleau and Cloutier 2022) in terms of shifting shared understandings of what matters or what counts in various situations, or how they forge agreements between disparate actors in this regard (e.g., how they develop their critical capacity). An under-researched dimension of these debates is how actors refer to, choose and/or impose various ‘tests’ to judge the legitimacy or acceptability of a belief or chosen course of action when arguing or advancing a point (Reference Dansou and LangleyDansou and Langley 2012) and how these dynamics ultimately shape collective outcomes (Reference Wright and NybergWright and Nyberg 2022).
Paying closer attention methodologically – by choice of context, level of analysis, focus of attention and temporal frame – to the interactions that reveal the normative, critical and evaluative dimensions of strategy-making practices and processes not only helps deepen our understanding of how organizational actors ‘strategize’ more generally in paradoxical and contentious situations but also addresses lingering concerns about the ‘micro-isolationism’ (the ‘tendency to explain local activities in their own terms’ according to Reference Seidl and WhittingtonSeidl and Whittington 2014: 1407) that has come to plague SAP research. Indeed, by providing a means for connecting the micro-practices of the social actors involved in disputes with the more macro, institutionalized, and taken-for-granted beliefs and assumptions concerning what is a right or appropriate course of action to take in a given situation, when applied in SAP research, the economies-of-worth lens helps shed new light on why these actors do what they do.
Conclusion
In the prior edition of this chapter (Reference Gond, Leca, Cloutier, Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl and VaaraGond, Leca and Cloutier 2015), we had found that a growing number of scholars in management and strategy relied on the economies-of-worth framework to investigate strategizing activities and practice. These studies extended the boundaries of SAP scholarship by shedding light on the moral, evaluative and material dimensions of strategizing. In writing this update, our aim has therefore been to further consolidate scholarship that cross-fertilizes the economies of worth and SAP to produce new insight into what organizational actors ‘do’ when they strategize. We first looked back, providing an overview of the economies-of-worth framework and featuring studies that have used this framework to investigate strategizing. We then extended this effort by looking forward into the development of a research agenda that can enable the further integration of the economies-of-worth and SAP.
Our review of prior research shows that insights from the economies-of-worth have been fruitfully mobilized to clarify the moral multiplexity inherent in SAP, within and across organizational settings, and regarding multiple facets of strategy-making. The framework has helped understand how strategic conventions are formed, negotiated, implemented and stabilized within and between organizations through praxes of strategic legitimation, localization and materialization. Praxes of strategic legitimation are deployed through communication and evaluation dynamics – they facilitate the recognition of the legitimacy of organizations’ strategic goals and policies vis-à-vis socially accepted approaches by making explicit their link with common worlds. Praxes of strategic localization enable the local implementation of strategic conventions within a variety of situational and operational contexts. Praxes of strategic materialization capture how strategic conventions are solidified for organizational actors, through the production of material, symbolic and representational objects that embed such conventions. Even though we could identify a growing number of studies documenting some of these three aspects, more work is needed to fully conceptualize how strategic legitimation, localization and materialization shape strategizing processes. Among the studies reviewed, not all were conducted under the banners of the economies-of-worth or of SAP, and fewer still referred simultaneously to both streams of research. In our view, there is room for more deliberate institutional and scholarly efforts aimed at expanding and stimulating dialogues and exchanges at the intersection of these approaches.
Indeed, despite the noted developments taking place between 2015 and 2024, scholars have yet to tap into the full potential of this cross-fertilization. To help realize this potential, we offer a three-folded research agenda that proposes potential directions that future research might take, phenomenologically, conceptually and methodologically. At the phenomenological level, we argued that the economies-of-worth provides multiple underused conceptual tools that can help make sense of situations characterized by moral multiplexity that give rise to ‘normative tensions’. In this regard, combining the economies of worth and SAP offers a particularly powerful lens through which to analyse the so-called ‘grand challenges’ or ‘wicked problems’ that managers and strategists face today and that strategy and organization scholars have become increasingly keen to study, alongside and in continuation with prior business and society, business ethics and CSR studies. At the conceptual level, we suggested enriching current studies of the economies of worth and strategizing by capitalizing on the developments of French pragmatist sociology, notably with the refinement of the concepts of common worlds and grammars through the consideration of regimes of engagement or power-imbued infrastructures. Such a shift can help reconsider the process by which concepts of common good are collectively formed from the bottom-up, both within and across organizations, and by so doing, bring back power dynamics within the scope of analysis. Finally, at the methodological level, there remains considerable room for experimentation and innovation. Paradoxically, despite the strong ‘situational’ stance of Reference ThévenotBoltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]), most economies-of-worth informed studies of strategizing have focused on the retrospective analysis of secondary data or interviews, rather than how ‘tests of worth’ or ‘compromises’ are formed, embodied or performed, both in vivo and in situ. Thus, playing within and across contexts, levels of analysis, foci of attention and temporal frames offers multiple opportunities to address such limitations and further cross-fertilize the economies-of-worth with SAP studies.
It is our belief that delivering on this agenda will significantly expand current lines of inquiry with SAP, and enable its cross-fertilization not only with the economies-of-worth, but also with business and society, economic sociology, management control and critical management studies research. Most importantly, by providing a normative, pluralistic and evaluative approach to strategizing, the economies-of-worth framework can help maintain the ethical, societal and ecological relevance of SAP scholarship by refocusing its attention on the importance of considering what society and organizational actors regard as being the ‘common good’.
