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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 May 2023

Daniel M. Hausman
Daniel M. Hausman
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey

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The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics , pp. v - xi
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

Contents

  1. List of Figures

  2. List of Tables

  3. Introduction

    1. What Is Economics?

    2. Methodology and the Problem of Theory Assessment

    3. A Reader’s Guide

    4. Changes in the Second Edition

    5. Sources

    6. Acknowledgments

  4. Part IIntroduction: Content, Structure, and Strategy of Mainstream Economics

    1. 1Rationality, Preferences, and Utility Theory

      1. 1.1Rational Choice with Perfect Knowledge: Preferences and Ordinal Utility Theory

        1. 1.1.1Certainty and Perfect Knowledge

        2. 1.1.2Preference Axioms

        3. 1.1.3Utilities and the Ordinal Representation Theorem

        4. 1.1.4Further Assumptions Concerning Preferences

        5. 1.1.5Ordinal Utility Theory as a Theory of Rationality?

      2. 1.2Revealed Preference Theory

      3. 1.3Rationality and Uncertainty: Expected Utility Theory

        1. 1.3.1Conditions on Choice When There Is Risk or Uncertainty

        2. 1.3.2The Cardinal Representation Theorem

        3. 1.3.3Expected Utility Theory and Its Anomalies

      4. 1.4What Are Preferences?

      5. 1.5Preferences and Self-interest

      6. 1.6Conclusions

    2. 2Demand and Consumer Choice

      1. 2.1Market Demand for Consumption Goods

      2. 2.2The Theory of Consumer Choice

      3. 2.3Market Demand and Individual Demand Functions

      4. 2.4The Model of a Two-Commodity Consumption System

      5. 2.5Deriving Individual Demand

      6. 2.6Conclusions

    3. 3The Theory of the Firm and General Equilibrium

      1. 3.1Market Supply of Consumption Goods and the Theory of the Firm

      2. 3.2Market Supply and the Model of a Two-Input Production System

      3. 3.3Deriving a Competitive Firm’s Supply Function

      4. 3.4Market Equilibrium and Price Determination

      5. 3.5Microeconomic Theory

      6. 3.6General Equilibrium Theories

      7. 3.7Abstract General Equilibrium Models

      8. 3.8Conclusions

    4. 4Equilibrium Theory and Normative Economics

      1. 4.1Welfare and the Satisfaction of Preferences

        1. 4.1.1Constitutive versus Evidential Views

        2. 4.1.2Should Satisfying Preferences Be the Objective of Normative Economics?

      2. 4.2How Is Welfare Economics Possible?

        1. 4.2.1Disavowing Utilitarianism

        2. 4.2.2The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics

        3. 4.2.3Externalities and the Limits of Markets

        4. 4.2.4Social Choice Theory and Arrow’s Theorem

      3. 4.3Welfare Economics in Practice

      4. 4.4Rationality and Benevolence: The Moral Authority of Economists

      5. 4.5Conclusions and Alternatives

    5. 5Equilibrium Theory and Macroeconomic Models

      1. 5.1Equilibrium Theory and Models of Economic Growth

      2. 5.2Equilibrium and Booms and Busts

      3. 5.3Simplified Keynesian Theory: IS-MP

      4. 5.4Microfoundations and the Confirmation of Macroeconomic Theories

      5. 5.5Causation and Identities in Macroeconomics

      6. 5.6Conclusions

    6. 6Models and Theories in Economics

      1. 6.1Logical Positivism, Theories, and Models

        1. 6.1.1Models and the Syntactic View of Theories

        2. 6.1.2Semantic, Predicate, and Lawlike Statement Views of Theories

      2. 6.2Predicate Models, Semantic Models, and Model Systems

      3. 6.3Model Systems as Representations of Target Systems

      4. 6.4Why Are Models So Important in Economics?

      5. 6.5Epistemological Implications of Model Reasoning

      6. 6.6Conclusions

    7. 7The Structure and Strategy of Economics

      1. 7.1Disciplinary Matrices

      2. 7.2Research Programs

      3. 7.3The Structure of Economics

      4. 7.4The Vision of Economics as a Separate Science

      5. 7.5The Practice of the Separate Science of Economics

      6. 7.6Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice, and the Separate Science of Economics

    8. 8Overlapping Generations: A Case Study

      1. 8.1The Basic Model

      2. 8.2Stationary and Constant Growth Cases

      3. 8.3“Hump-Saving” and Social Welfare

      4. 8.4On the Reception and Influence of Samuelson’s Model

        1. 8.4.1Objection from the Right: Samuelson Is Subversive

        2. 8.4.2Objection from the Left: Against the Pretense of Individual Savings

        3. 8.4.3Later Influence

      5. 8.5Concluding Remarks: On Mainstream Modeling

  5. Part IITheory Assessment

    1. 9Inexactness in Economic Theory

      1. 9.1Mill on Tendencies

      2. 9.2Four Kinds of Inexactness

        1. 9.2.1Inexactness as Probabilistic

        2. 9.2.2Inexactness as Approximation

        3. 9.2.3Inexactness as Vague Qualification

        4. 9.2.4Inexactness as Tendency

        5. 9.2.5Some Remarks on Idealizations

      3. 9.3The Meaning or Truth Conditions of Inexact (Causal) Generalizations

      4. 9.4Qualification or Independent Specification

      5. 9.5Mechanical Phenomena and the Composition of Economic Causes

      6. 9.6Conclusions

    2. 10Mill’s Deductive Method and the Assessment of Economic Hypotheses

      1. 10.1Confirmation: Likelihoods and Bayesian and Hypothetico-Deductive Methods

      2. 10.2Confirmation in Economics: An Old-Fashioned View

      3. 10.3When Do Generalizations Express Genuine Tendencies?

      4. 10.4Mill’s Deductive Method

      5. 10.5The Inexact Deductive Method

      6. 10.6Conclusion and Qualms

    3. 11Methodological Revolution

      1. 11.1Terence Hutchison and the Initial Challenge

      2. 11.2Paul Samuelson’s “Operationalism”

      3. 11.3Fritz Machlup and Logical Empiricism

      4. 11.4Friedman’s Narrow Instrumentalism

      5. 11.5Koopmans’ Restatement of the Difficulties

    4. 12Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos: Falsificationism and Research Programs

      1. 12.1The Problems of Demarcation

      2. 12.2Logical Falsifiability and Popper’s Solution to the Problem of Induction

      3. 12.3Falsificationism as Norms to Govern Science

      4. 12.4Decisions, Evidence, and Scientific Method

      5. 12.5Why Are Economic Theories Unfalsifiable?

      6. 12.6Lakatos and Sophisticated Methodological Falsificationism

      7. 12.7The Appraisal of Scientific Research Programs

      8. 12.8Further Comments on Induction, Falsification, and Verification

      9. 12.9Concluding Remarks on Popperian and Lakatosian Methodologies

    5. 13The Inexact Deductive Method

      1. 13.1Apparent Dogmatism and the Weak-Link Principle

      2. 13.2Are Economists Too Dogmatic?

      3. 13.3Expected Utility Theory and Its Anomalies

        1. 13.3.1The Allais Problem

        2. 13.3.2Qualification versus Disconfirmation

        3. 13.3.3Incomplete Preferences: Levi’s Alternative

      4. 13.4Behavioral Economics and Methodological Changes

      5. 13.5The Economists’ Deductive Method

      6. 13.6The Deductive Method and the Demands of Policy

      7. 13.7Conclusion: Economics as a Decreasingly Separate Science

    6. 14Casting off Dogmatism: The Case of Preference Reversals

      1. 14.1The Discovery of Preference Reversals

        1. 14.1.1The First Experiments

        2. 14.1.2Apparent Significance

      2. 14.2Grether and Plott’s Experiments

        1. 14.2.1How Preference Reversals Might Be Explained Away

        2. 14.2.2Grether and Plott’s Results

        3. 14.2.3Apparent Dogmatism: Grether and Plott’s Conclusions

      3. 14.3Dogmatism and the Commitment to Economics as a Separate Science

      4. 14.4Further Responses by Economists

      5. 14.5Preference Reversals and “Procedure Invariance”

      6. 14.6Current Thoughts on Preference Reversals

  6. Part IIIConclusion

    1. 15Economic Methodology

      1. 15.1The Hegemony of Equilibrium Theory

        1. 15.1.1People Will Learn

        2. 15.1.2Arbitrage Arguments

      2. 15.2How to Do Economics

      3. 15.3Cautionary and Encouraging Examples

        1. 15.3.1Samuelson’s Overlapping-Generations Model Revisited

        2. 15.3.2Preference Reversals

        3. 15.3.3Stretching Mainstream Economics

      4. 15.4What Is to Be Done?

      5. 15.5Epistemology, Methodology, and the Practice of Economics

    2. 16Conclusions

      1. 16.1The Structure and Strategy of Mainstream Theoretical Economics

      2. 16.2Appraising Microeconomics and General Equilibrium Theory

      3. 16.3Reasons and Causes: Rationality and Economic Behavior

  7. AppendixAn Introduction to Philosophy of Science

    1. A.1Historical and Philosophical Background

    2. A.2The Goals of Science: Realism versus Instrumentalism

    3. A.3Causation and Scientific Explanation

    4. A.4Laws, Theories, and Models

    5. A.5Paradigms and Research Programs

    6. A.6Scientific Discovery

    7. A.7Induction, Testing, and Assessing Scientific Theories

    8. A.8Demarcation and Scientific Method

    9. A.9Social Theory and the Unity of Science

      1. A.9.1Are There Laws in the Social Sciences?

      2. A.9.2Explanations in the Social Sciences

      3. A.9.3Policy Relevance

    10. A.10Concluding Philosophical Remarks

  8. References

  9. Index

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  • Contents
  • Daniel M. Hausman, Rutgers University, New Jersey
  • Book: The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics
  • Online publication: 25 May 2023
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  • Contents
  • Daniel M. Hausman, Rutgers University, New Jersey
  • Book: The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics
  • Online publication: 25 May 2023
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Contents
  • Daniel M. Hausman, Rutgers University, New Jersey
  • Book: The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics
  • Online publication: 25 May 2023
Available formats
×