Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-2tv5m Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-04-16T05:48:26.741Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Popular Corporatism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 November 2025

Daniela Stockmann
Affiliation:
Hertie School, Berlin
Ting Luo
Affiliation:
University of Birmingham
Get access

Summary

This chapter introduces the analytical framework of the book. It presents a typology of two modes of governance – the command-and-control and popular corporatism logics – with examples from China. It presents each logic in its extreme form to emphasize their differences in the dynamic relation between the state, platform firms, and users. In the command-and-control logic, platform firms are intermediaries that follow and implement the policies of the state, while popular corporatism emphasizes the important role of platform firms. According to this alternative framework, large profit-driven platform firms have bargaining power against the state. That implies they not only refuse to comply without being authorized to do so by the state but also receive concessions from the state. The source of such business power stems from data that is produced by citizens. While positive incentives draw users to platforms, users may engage less or move to alternative platforms when given choices. In this way, users signal their bottom line to platforms through the actions taken on the platform. In authoritarian contexts, this dynamic may lead to conflicts with demands from political elites, thus motivating noncompliance and resistance by platforms.

Information

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Popular Corporatism
  • Daniela Stockmann, Hertie School, Berlin, Ting Luo, University of Birmingham
  • Book: Governing Digital China
  • Online publication: 25 November 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009360692.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Popular Corporatism
  • Daniela Stockmann, Hertie School, Berlin, Ting Luo, University of Birmingham
  • Book: Governing Digital China
  • Online publication: 25 November 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009360692.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Popular Corporatism
  • Daniela Stockmann, Hertie School, Berlin, Ting Luo, University of Birmingham
  • Book: Governing Digital China
  • Online publication: 25 November 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009360692.002
Available formats
×