That papal Christianity was primarily reactive rather than proactive is the least controversial conclusion from the case studies as a whole, something of a ‘folk-theorem’ of historians today, though a generation or two ago there was more of a tendency to think in terms of the deliberate if gradual assertion of an ideology. As already noted in the Introduction, most of the case studies are of papal responses to demand. I have tried to give a better idea of the range and contents of the demand and the responses. Exceptions are Case 1, showing how Cyprian of Carthage inadvertently gave popes the idea that the famous ‘Thou art Peter’ passage in the gospel of Matthew legitimated authority over the whole church, the Donation of Constantine (Case 8), probably not a papal document at all and important mainly half a millennium after its production, and (so far as one can tell) Case 14, Sergius IV’s attempt to launch a crusade avant le mot, in 1010. The absence of any outcome reminds us that it was demand that drove the power of the papacy. Case 16, the Roman reform council of 1049, does show a proactive papacy in action, but without the desired effects for want of understanding of facts on the ground. Case 17, the Dictatus papae, looks like a draft and had no impact to speak of. With Case 28, the pope is rewarding major service that historians have found scandalous, a moralizing judgment I have tried to tone down. In the other cases, popes granted requests: Cases 5, 9, 12, 13 (assuming the initiative came from the emperor), 15, 22, 24, 25, and 30; or resolved conflicts between systems: 5 again, 25 again, 26 again, 27, and 31; or attempted to deal with problems they could hardly escape: 4, 18, and 31 again; or responded to questions: Cases 2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 19, 21, 23, and 27. Evidently, there is overlap between the categories of ‘requests’, ‘conflicts’ and inescapable ‘problems’, and ‘questions’.