Book contents
8 - Messianism, Imperialism and Anti-Colonialism
from Part IV - International Dimension
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2025
Summary
Messianism and imperialism permeate the schizophrenic Russian state. A lack of borders is praised as an attribute of Russia’s schizophrenic ‘state-civilisation’ identity. Russia’s schizophrenic identity is especially visible in its relationship with Ukraine and the West, where it is exhibited in an angry, xenophobic and militarily aggressive manner. Russia’s ‘state-civilisation’ is touted as superior to the West, irrespective of the fact social data disproves this claim. Russians claim they are more spiritual than the public in the Western countries, and yet Church attendance in Russia is similar to that found in the EU and half that found in Ukraine and the US. Russia’s schizophrenic messianism and imperialism should be understood in five ways. Firstly, Soviet nostalgia is combined with a schizophrenic blaming of Vladimir Lenin for cultivating an ‘artificial’ Ukrainian identity. Secondly, Russia’s fascist dictatorship accuses Ukraine of being ‘nationalist/fascist/Nazi’ while supporting the far right in Europe. Thirdly, Russian claims of Ukraine dominated by ‘nationalism/fascism/Nazism’ are not evident in their electoral unpopularity. Fourthly, Russia’s colonial history of genocide and the imperial nature of the Soviet Union are obfuscated by using Soviet anti-colonialist propaganda to fight alleged Western colonialism in the Global South and against the ‘Global Majority’. Fifthly, Russia’s superior civilisation as the guardian of true European values, which have been lost in the EU and ‘collective West’, compensates for Russian feelings of dependence, poverty and humiliation.
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- Russia's War on UkraineThe Four Roots of Putin's Invasion, pp. 297 - 341Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
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