Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-pkds5 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-04-15T06:09:06.804Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2025

Randall G. Holcombe
Randall G. Holcombe
Affiliation:
Florida State University
Get access

Information

Type
Chapter
Information
Politics as Exchange
An Analysis of the Political Marketplace
 , pp. 269 - 280
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Acemoglu, Daron, and Robinson, James. The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. New York: Penguin, 2019.Google Scholar
Achen, Christopher H., and Bartels, Larry M.. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alchian, Armen A. “Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory.” Journal of Political Economy 58, no. 3 (June 1950): 211–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aligica, Paul Dragos, Boettke, Peter J., and Tarko, Vlad. Public Governance and the Classical-Liberal Perspective: Political Economy Foundations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.Google Scholar
Antunes, Catia, and Gommans, Jos. Exploring the Dutch Empire: Agents, Networks, and Institutions, 1600–2000. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.Google Scholar
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Company, 1958.Google Scholar
Arrow, Kenneth J. “General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, Collective Choice.” American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 253–272.Google Scholar
Arrow, Kenneth J. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951.Google Scholar
Arrow, Kenneth J., and Debreu, Gerard. “Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy.” Econometrica 27, no. 3 (1954): 265–290.Google Scholar
Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984.Google Scholar
Babcock, Richard F. The Zoning Game: Municipal Practices and Policies. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.Google Scholar
Bailyn, Bernard. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.Google Scholar
Bator, Francis M. “The Anatomy of Market Failure.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 72, no. 3 (August 1958): 351–379.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bator, Francis M. “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization.” American Economic Review 47, no. 1 (March 1957): 22–59.Google Scholar
Beard, Charles A. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. New York: Macmillan, 1913.Google Scholar
Bearle, Adolf A., and Means, Gardner C.. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1934.Google Scholar
Becker, Gary S. “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, no. 3 (August 1983): 371–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beinhocker, Eric D. The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006.Google Scholar
Benson, Bruce L. The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State. Oakland, CA: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990.Google Scholar
Bergson, Abram. “A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 52, no. 2 (February 1938): 310–334.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bergson, Abram. “On the Concept of Social Welfare.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 68, no. 2 (May 1954): 233–252.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Hamlin, Alan. “A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994): 345–368.Google Scholar
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Buchanan, James M.. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.Google Scholar
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Buchanan, James M.. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.Google Scholar
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Lomasky, Loren. Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.Google Scholar
Browning, Edgar K. “Inequality and Poverty.” Southern Economic Journal 55, no. 4 (April 1989): 819–830.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. “Afraid to be Free: Dependency as Desideratum.” Public Choice 124, nos. 1/2 (July 2005): 19–31.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. “An Economic Theory of Clubs.” Economica n.s. 32, no. 126 (February 1965): 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, James M. “Individual Choice in Voting and the Market.” Journal of Political Economy 62, no. 4 (August 1954): 334–343.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, James M. “Politics, Policy, and the Pigouvian Margins.” Economica n.s. 29, no. 113 (February 1962): 17–28.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. “Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a Research Program.” Fairfax, VA: Center for Study of Public Choice, 2003.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. “Public Choice: Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications.” In The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, vol. 1 (1999): 45–59.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. “Public Finance and Public Choice.” National Tax Journal 28, no. 4 (December 1975): 383–394.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, James M. “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 62, no. 2 (April 1954): 114–123.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. “The Domain of Constitutional Economics.” Constitutional Political Economy 1, no. 1 (December 1990): 1–18.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1975.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M., and Congleton, Roger D.. Politics by Principle, Not Interest. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.10.1017/CBO9780511664816CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, , James, M., and Gordon, Tullock. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962.Google Scholar
Caplan, Bryan. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.Google Scholar
Case, Anne, and Deaton, Angus. Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020.Google Scholar
Chakraborty, Rabindra Nath. “Sharing Culture and Resource Conservation in Hunter-Gatherer Societies.” Oxford Economic Papers 59, no. 1 (January 2007): 63–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chatziathanasiou, Konstantin, Hippel, Svenja, and Kurschilgen, Michael. “Does the Threat of Overthrow Discipline the Elites? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment.” Journal of Legal Studies 51, no. 2 (June 2022): 289–320.Google Scholar
Christensen, Clayton. The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 1997.Google Scholar
Coase, Ronald H. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica n.s. 4, no. 16 (November 1937): 386–405.Google Scholar
Coase, Ronald H. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law & Economics 3 (1960): 1–44.Google Scholar
Coleman, James S. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.Google Scholar
Commons, John R. Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy. New York: Macmillan, 1934.Google Scholar
Commons, John R. The Legal Foundations of Capitalism. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1924.Google Scholar
Congleton, Roger D. Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Reform, Liberalism, and the Rise of Western Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.Google Scholar
Congleton, Roger D., and Hillman, Arye L., eds. Companion to the Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2015.Google Scholar
Coward, Barry, and Gaunt, Peter. The Stuart Age: England, 1603–1714, 5th ed. London: Routledge, 2017.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J. and Hall, Abigail R.. How to Run Wars: An Confidential Playbook for the National Security Elite. Oakland, CA: Independent Institute, 2024.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Hall, Abigail R.. Manufacturing Militarism: U.S. Government Propaganda in the War on Terror. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2021.Google Scholar
Crain, W. Mark. “On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 85, no. 4 (August 1977): 829–842.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Jouvenel, Bertrand. On Power: Its Nature, and the History of Its Growth. New York: The Viking Press, 1949.Google Scholar
Delsol, Jean-Philippe, Lecaussin, Nicolas, and Martin, Emmanual, eds. Anti-Piketty: Capital for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2017.Google Scholar
de Soto, Hernando. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper & Row, 1989.Google Scholar
Diamond, Jared. The World Until Yesterday: What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies? New York: Viking, 2012.Google Scholar
Diamond, Peter A., and Mirrlees, James A.. “Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I and II.” American Economic Review 81 (March): 8–27 (June 1971): 261–278.Google Scholar
Dixit, Avinash. “Governance Institutions and Economic Activity.” American Economic Review 99, no. 1 (March 2009): 5–24.10.1257/aer.99.1.5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1957.Google Scholar
Dunbar, Robin L. M. “Neocortex Size as a Constraint on Group Size in Primates.” Journal of Human Evolution 22, no. 6 (1992): 469–493.Google Scholar
Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. London: Methuen, 1964.Google Scholar
Edelman, Murray. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964.Google Scholar
Epstein, Richard A. Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.Google Scholar
Foldvary, Fred. Public Goods and Private Communities: The Market Provision of Social Services. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1994.Google Scholar
Forde, Daryll, and Douglas, Mary. “Primitive Economies,” ch. 2 in Dalton, George, ed., Tribal and Peasant Economies: Readings in Economic Anthropology. Garden City, NY: Natural History Press (1967): 13–28.Google Scholar
Frank, Robert H. Luxury Fever: Weighing the Cost of Excess. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.Google Scholar
Friedman, David D. The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to Radical Capitalism. Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1973.Google Scholar
Friedman, Walter A. American Business History: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Furbotn, Erik G, and Richter, Rudolph. Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contributions of the New Institutional Economics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000.Google Scholar
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Anatomy of Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983.Google Scholar
Graaf, J. de V. Theoretical Welfare Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957.Google Scholar
Graeber, David, and Wengrow, David. The Down of Everything: A New History of Humanity. New York: Aarrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021.Google Scholar
Grofman, Bernard, ed. Political Gerrymandering and the Courts. New York: Agathon Press, 1990.Google Scholar
Hardin, Garrett. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162, no. 3859 (December 13, 1968): 1243–1248.10.1126/science.162.3859.1243CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hayek, Friedrich A. Individualism and Economic Order. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1944.Google Scholar
Hayek, Friedrich A. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hayek, Friedrich A. The Road to Serfdom. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1944.Google Scholar
Hayek, Friedrich A. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35 (1945): 519–530.Google Scholar
Heilbroner, Robert L. The Making of Economic Society. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962.Google Scholar
Hicks, John R. Value and Capital. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1939.Google Scholar
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950 [orig. 1651].Google Scholar
Hochman, Harold M., and Rodgers, James D.. “Pareto Optimal Redistribution.” American Economic Review 59, no. 4, Part 1 (1969): 542–557.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. Advanced Introduction to Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2016.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “A Note on Seniority and Political Competition.” Public Choice 61, no, 3 (June 1989): 285–288.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. Coordination, Cooperation, and Control: The Evolution of Economic and Political Power. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “Contractarian Ideology and the Legitimacy of Government.” Journal of Institutional Economics 17, no. 3 (June 2021): 379–391.10.1017/S1744137420000521CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “Creative Destruction: Getting Ahead and Staying Ahead in a Capitalist Economy.” Review of Austrian Economics 35, no. 4 (July 2022): 467–480.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. Entrepreneurship and Economic Progress. London: Routledge, 2007.10.4324/9780203966341CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. Following Their Leaders: Political Preferences and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. From Liberty to Democracy: The Transformation of American Government. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable.” The Independent Review 8, no. 3 (Winter 2004): 325–342.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. Liberty in Peril: Democracy and Power in American History. Oakland, CA: Independent Institute, 2019.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. Political Capitalism: How Economic and Political Power Is Made and Maintained. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.10.1017/9781108637251CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Resources.” Review of Austrian Economics 15, nos. 2/3 (June 2002): 143–159.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “Populism: Promises and Problems.” The Independent Review 26, no. 1 (Summer 2021): 27–37.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “Political Incentives for Rent Creation.” Constitutional Political Economy 28, no. 1 (March 2017): 62–78.10.1007/s10602-016-9228-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “Principles and Politics: Like Oil and Water.” Review of Austrian Economics 22, no. 2 (June 2008): 151–157.10.1007/s11138-009-0074-8CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “The Coase Theorem, Applied to Markets and Government.” The Independent Review 23, no. 2 (Fall 2018): 249–266.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. The Economic Foundations of Government. New York: New York University Press, 1994.10.1007/978-1-349-13230-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “The Economic Theory of Rights.” Journal of Institutional Economics 10, no. 3 (September 2014): 471–491.10.1017/S1744137414000137CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “The Transformative Impact of Rent-Seeking on the Study of Public Choice.” Public Choice 196, nos. 1/2 (July 2023): 157–167.10.1007/s11127-023-01066-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. “Why Does Government Produce National Defense?” Public Choice 137, nos. 1/2 (October 2008): 11–19.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G., and Boudreaux, Christopher J.. “Regulation and Corruption.” Public Choice 164, no. 1 (July 2015): 75–85.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G., and Williams, DeEdgra W.. “The Cartelization of Local Governments.” Public Choice 149, nos. 1/2 (October 2011): 65–74.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G., and Parker, Glenn R.. “Committees in Legislatures: A Property Rights Perspective.” Public Choice 70, no. 1 (April 1991): 11–20.Google Scholar
Huemer, Michael. The Problem of Political Authority: An Examination of the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.Google Scholar
Hughes, Jonathan R. T. The Governmental Habit: Economic Controls from Colonial Times to the Present. New York: Basic Books, 1977.Google Scholar
Hume, David. A Treatise on Human Nature, 2nd ed., Sir Lewis Amherst, Selby-Bigge, and Nidditch, P. H. (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978 [orig. 1739–40].Google Scholar
Ikeda, Sanford. Dynamics of the Mixed Economy: Toward a Theory of Interventionism. London: Routledge, 1997.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H.. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3, no. 4 (October 1976): 305–360.Google Scholar
Kelman, Steven. “‘Public Choice’ and Public Spirit.” The Public Interest 87 (Spring 1987): 80–94.Google Scholar
Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1936.Google Scholar
Kinsella, N. Stephan. Against Intellectual Property. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008.Google Scholar
Kirzner, Israel. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1973.Google Scholar
Koford, Kenneth J. “Centralized Vote Trading.” Public Choice 39, no. 2 (1982): 245–268.10.1007/BF00162117CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koppl, Roger. Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.Google Scholar
Krueger, Anne O. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” American Economic Review 64 (1974): 291–303.Google Scholar
Kukathas, Chandran. The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.Google Scholar
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter. Rational Choice, Collective Action, and the Paradox of Rebellion. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen Institute of Political Science, 1997.Google Scholar
Lange, Oskar, and Taylor, Fred M.. On the Economic Theory of Socialism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1938.Google Scholar
Lerner, Abba P. The Economics of Control: Principles of Welfare Economics. New York: Macmillan, 1944.Google Scholar
Levi, Margaret. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988.Google Scholar
Lewis, Hyrum, and Lewis, Verlan. The Myth of Left and Right: How the Political Spectrum Misleads and Harms America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023.10.1093/oso/9780197680216.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lichbach, Mark Irving. The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995.10.3998/mpub.13970CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lingle, Christopher. The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century: False Starts on the Path to the Global Millennium. Barcelona: Editions Sirocco, 1997.Google Scholar
Lingle, Christopher. Singapore’s Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions, and Political Dependency. Fairfax, VA: Locke Institute, 1996.Google Scholar
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960 [orig. 1690].Google Scholar
Lofgren, Mike. The Deep State: The Fall of the Constitution and the Rise of a Shadow Government. New York: Penguin Random House, 2016.Google Scholar
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985 [orig. 1532].Google Scholar
Malthus, Thomas Robert. An Essay on the Principle of Population. London: J. Johnson, 1798.Google Scholar
Malthus, Thomas Robert. Principles of Political Economy. London: William Pickering, 1836.Google Scholar
Martis, Kenneth C. The Historical Atlas of United States Congressional Districts: 1789–1983. New York: Free Press, 1982.Google Scholar
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1906.Google Scholar
Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. The Communist Manifesto. New York: International Publishers, 1948 [orig. 1848].Google Scholar
McChesney, Fred S. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.Google Scholar
McChesney, Fred S. “Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation.” Journal of Legal Studies 16, no. 1 (January 1987): 101–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McConnell, Grant. Private Power and American Democracy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.Google Scholar
McKenzie, Richard B., and Lee, Dwight R.. Quicksilver Capital: How the Rapid Movement of Wealth Has Changed the World. New York: Free Press, 1991.Google Scholar
Medima, Steven G. “The Coase Theorem at Sixty.” Journal of Economic Literature 53, no. 4 (December 2020): 1045–1128.10.1257/jel.20191060CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1915.Google Scholar
Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.Google Scholar
Minasian, Jora R. “Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods.” Journal of Law & Economics 7 (October 1964): 71–80.10.1086/466600CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mirrlees, James A. “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation.” Review of Economic Studies 38 (1971): 175–208.Google Scholar
Mirrlees, James A. “Optimal Tax Theory – A Synthesis.” Journal of Public Economics 6, no. 4 (1976): 327–358.Google Scholar
Mises, Ludwig von. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Scholar’s Edition. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998.Google Scholar
Mises, Ludwig von. Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1951.Google Scholar
Mosca, Gaetano. The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw Hill, 1939.Google Scholar
Munger, Michael, and Vanberg, Georg. “Contractarianism, Constitutionalism, and the Status Quo.” Public Choice 195, nos. 3/4 (June 2023): 323–339.Google Scholar
Neal, Larry, and Cameron, Rondo. A Concise Economic History of the World: From Paleolithic Times to the Present, 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.Google Scholar
Niskanen, William A. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C. “A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 2, no. 4 (1990): 355–367.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C. “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 97–112.10.1257/jep.5.1.97CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, Douglass C. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton, 1981.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C., and Thomas, Robert P.. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C., Joseph Wallis, John, and Weingast, Barry R.. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.10.1017/CBO9780511575839CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olson, Mancur, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur, Jr. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982.Google Scholar
Osborne, David, and Gaebler, Ted. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992.Google Scholar
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.Google Scholar
Paine, Thomas. “Common Sense.” [1776]. Ch. 15 in Conway, Moncure Daniel, The Writings of Thomas Paine, vol. 1. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sone, 1894: 67–120.Google Scholar
Persson, Torsten, Roland, Gerard, and Tabellini, Guido. “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (November 1997): 1163–1202.10.1162/003355300555457CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pierre, Jon, and Guy Peters, B.. Advanced Introduction to Governance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2021.Google Scholar
Piketty, Thomas. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.10.4159/9780674369542CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pinker, Steven. Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress. New York: Viking, 2018.Google Scholar
Pinker, Steven. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking, 2011.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1971.Google Scholar
Ricardo, David. Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 3rd ed. London: John Murray, 1821 [1st ed. 1817].Google Scholar
Richman, Barak D. Stateless Commerce: The Diamond Network and the Persistence of Relational Exchange. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.10.4159/9780674977266CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, William H. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962.Google Scholar
Rohde, David. In Deep: The FBI, CIA, and the Truth about America’s “Deep State.” New York: W. W. Norton, 2020.Google Scholar
Rothbard, Murray N. For a New Liberty: A Libertarian Manifesto. New York: Macmillan, 1973.Google Scholar
Rothbard, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982.Google Scholar
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992 [orig. 1755].Google Scholar
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. The Social Contract, Or Principles of Political Right. Translated by Cole, G. D. H.. London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1923 [orig. 1762].Google Scholar
Rummel, R. J. Death by Government. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. “What Desires Are Politically Important?” Nobel Lecture, December 11, 1950, found at www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1950/russell/lecture.Google Scholar
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Warner, Andrew M.. “Natural Resources and Economic Development: The Curse of Natural Resources.” European Economic Review 45 (2001): 827–838.10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saez, Emmanuel, and Zucman, Gabriel. Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich Dodge Taxes and How to Make Them Pay. New York: W. W. Norton, 2019.Google Scholar
Sahlins, Marshall. “Notes on the Original Affluent Society.” In Lee, Richard B. and DeVore, Irven, eds., Man the Hunter: The First Intensive Survey of a Single, Crucial Stage of Human Development—Man’s Once Universal Hunting Way of Life. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing Company (1968): 85–99.Google Scholar
Samuelson, Paul A. “A Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure.” Review of Economics and Statistics 37 (November 1955): 350–356.10.2307/1925849CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, Paul A. Economics, 9th ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 1973.Google Scholar
Samuelson, Paul A. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1947.Google Scholar
Samuelson, Paul A. “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure.” Review of Economics and Statistics 36 (November 1954): 387–389.Google Scholar
Schattschneider, E. E. Party Government. New York: Reinhart & Company, 1959.Google Scholar
Schattschneider, E. E. The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960.Google Scholar
Schattschneider, E. E. The Struggle for Party Government. College Park: University of Maryland Program in American Civilization, 1948.Google Scholar
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd ed. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1947.Google Scholar
Schweizer, Peter. Extortion: How Politicians Extract Your Money, Buy Votes, and Line Their Own Pockets. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2013.Google Scholar
Schweizer, Peter. Secret Empires: How the American Political Class Hides Corruption and Enriches Family and Friends. New York: Harper, 2018.Google Scholar
Sinclair, Upton. The Jungle. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1906.Google Scholar
Skarbek, David. The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199328499.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. New York: Modern Library, 1937 [orig. 1776].Google Scholar
Smith, Eric Alden, and Codding, Brian F.. “Ecological Variation and Institutionalized Inequality in Hunter-Gatherer Societies.” PNAS 118, no. 13 (2021) e2016134118.10.1073/pnas.2016134118CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Solow, Robert M. “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 70 (1956): 65–94.10.2307/1884513CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Starkey, David. Magna Carta: The True Story behind the Charter. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2015.Google Scholar
Stigler, George J. “Director’s Law of Public Income Redistribution.” Journal of Law & Economics 13, no. 1 (April 1970): 1–10.10.1086/466680CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stigler, George J. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, no. 1 (1971): 3–21.Google Scholar
Stigler, George J. The Theory of Price, 3rd ed. New York: Macmillan, 1966.Google Scholar
Stiglitz, Joseph E. The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers the Future. New York: W. W. Norton, 2012.Google Scholar
Stockman, David A. The Great Deformation: The Corruption of Capitalism in America. New York: Public Affairs Press, 2013.Google Scholar
Suzman, James. Affluence without Abundance: The Disappearing World of the Bushmen. New York: Bloomsbury, 2017.Google Scholar
Tideman, T. Nicolaus, and Tullock, Gordon. “A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices.” Journal of Political Economy 84, no. 6 (December 1976): 1145–1159.Google Scholar
Tiebout, Charles M. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political Economy 64, no. 5 (October 1956): 416–424.Google Scholar
Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.10.1515/9781400831456CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. “The Charity of the Uncharitable.” Western Economic Journal 9, no. 4 (December 1971): 379–392.Google Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. The Economics of Income Redistribution, 2nd ed. New York: Springer, 1997.10.1007/978-94-011-5378-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965.Google Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. The Social Dilemma. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005.Google Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. “The Transitional Gains Trap.” Bell Journal of Economics 6, no. 2 (Autumn 1975): 671–678.Google Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. “The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” Western Economic Journal 5, no. 3 (June 1967): 224–232.Google Scholar
Wagner, Richard E. Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007.Google Scholar
Wagner, Richard E. Politics as Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2016.10.4337/9781785365485CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waldo, Dwight. The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1948.Google Scholar
Walras, Leon. Elements of Pure Economics. London: Routledge, 2003 [orig. 1874].Google Scholar
Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation.” In Gerth, H. H. and Wright Mills, C., eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, 77–128.Google Scholar
Weingast, Barry R., Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Johnsen, Christopher. “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics.” Journal of Political Economy 89, no. 4 (August 1981): 642–664.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver E. “A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic Methodology.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146, no. 1 (1990): 595–613.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver E. The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.10.1093/oso/9780195078244.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, Woodrow. “The Study of Administration.” Political Science Quarterly 2, no. 2 (June 1887): 197–222.10.2307/2139277CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wittman, Donald A. The Myth of Democratic Failure. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995.Google Scholar
Wittman, Donald A. “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results.” Journal of Political Economy 97, no. 6 (1989): 1395–1424.10.1086/261660CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yeager, Leland B. Ethics as a Social Science: The Moral Philosophy of Social Cooperation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2001.Google Scholar
Yeager, Leland B. “Rights, Contract, and Utility in Policy Espousal.” Cato Journal 5, no. 1 (1985): 259–294.Google Scholar

Accessibility standard: Unknown

Why this information is here

This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.

Accessibility Information

Accessibility compliance for the HTML of this chapter is currently unknown and may be updated in the future.

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×