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21 - Shared Interoceptive Representations

The Case of Alexithymia

from Part V - Learning and Development

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2016

Sukhvinder S. Obhi
Affiliation:
McMaster University, Ontario
Emily S. Cross
Affiliation:
Bangor University
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Summary

This chapter is concerned with shared representation of emotion. In particular, we focus on the abilities to identify and to describe one’s own emotion, and consider how this ability may co-vary with, and even cause, difficulties in representing the other. We take an individual differences approach; the ability to identify and describe one’s own emotions varies considerably across individuals and this ability predicts the ability to recognize, represent, and empathize with the emotions of others. Within the clinical domain, impairments in emotion recognition and empathy have been reported in numerous disorders, yet empirical findings have been equivocal. In autism, eating disorders, schizophrenia, and many other clinical populations, mixed evidence concerning these abilities has produced an extremely inconsistent literature. Here we consider whether alexithymia, associated with difficulties identifying and describing one’s own emotions, is responsible for the mixed empirical findings. Alexithymia is known to co-occur with several disorders associated with inconsistent reports of affective impairments – making it possible that this sub-clinical phenomenon may be responsible for emotion-related atypicalities across these disorders (Bird & Cook, 2013). The following discussion presents existing evidence for this alexithymia hypothesis, and highlights areas requiring further investigation. If supported, the alexithymia hypothesis provides evidence for the necessity of intact representations of one’s own emotions in representing those of other individuals.

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