Introduction

An extensive literature cites religiosity as correlating strongly with nationalism and authoritarianism.

This chapter is based on 168 questions about law, law enforcement, and public perceptions and attitudes towards legal insiders such as the police, lawyers, judges and lawmakers in our wide-ranging hour-long interviews in five European countries that focus on many aspects of the general publics’ legal cultures. Some of these 168 questions might reasonably be classed as indicators of authoritarianism, or more clearly as ‘secular authoritarianism’; but some might reasonably be classed as simply indicators of religious commitment that might conflict with secular authoritarianism; and others might not fit into either category.

Legal cultures vary across the five European countries. But they also vary across different groups within these countries. Here the focus is on the different legal cultures of the more or less religious – that is a focus on the impact of religiosity on legal culture, within each of the countries.

Religion is often associated with an authoritarian attitude towards enforcement of the law. Yet paradoxically, religion is also associated with extreme disregard for the law. Both of these aspects of the impact of religiosity on legal cultures need investigation. Religiosity is two-faced with respect to secular state law.

The impact of religiosity on European legal cultures

Do the more religious have a different conception of law from the less religious and non-religious or irreligious? It can be argued that it is in the nature of religion to ‘proclaim its truth’ irrespective of whether that is popular or not. So religion always has a potentially uneasy relationship with the state and with the fickle trends of the wider public opinion. In the longer term there may be a compromise between religion and broad public opinion, but there is often conflict in the shorter term.

At the state and society level there is tension between church and state, between state law and religion, and also between current public opinion and religion. But there is also tension at the level of the individual, who may simultaneously owe conflicting loyalties to political leaders (i.e. secular authority), to religious leaders (i.e. religious authority), to friends and neighbours and not least to their own conscience.

It has long been argued that ‘because religious true-believers have embraced a body of received doctrines or dogmas, they have difficulty processing (in Max Weber’s phrase) inconvenient facts’, which makes them relatively intolerant and authoritarian (McClosky and Brill Reference McClosky and Brill1983, p. 411; see also Lord Percy of Newcastle 1954, p. 28.)

In a wide review of the literature, Eckhardt (Reference Eckhardt1991, p. 113) cites religiosity as correlating strongly with nationalism, with opposition to civil disobedience (though in Western nations only) and generally with ‘authoritarianism’. Wisneski, Lytle and Skitka (Reference Wisneski, Lytle and Skitka2009, p. 1060) cite a literature that ‘suggests that religiosity reflects a generalised willingness to trust authority, regardless of whether the authority is secular or religious’. But how can they trust two authorities, if and when those authorities conflict?

Altemeyer and Hunsberger (Reference Altemeyer and Hunsberger1992, p. 113) claim that ‘religious fundamentalism is linked with authoritarianism and prejudice toward a wide variety of minority groups’. But authoritarianism is not merely linked to religious fundamentalism: more widely it is claimed that ‘religiosity induces susceptibility to authoritarian ideas and resistance to democratic ones’ (Geddes and Zaller, Reference Geddes and Zaller1989, p. 339). In more detail, Canetti-Nisim (Reference 519Canetti-Nisim2004, pp. 377, 388–9) claims that ‘the negative effect of religiosity on endorsement of democratic values results from the mediation of authoritarianism’: there is, she argues, a ‘closeness found between religiosity and authoritarianism’ which is the consequence of ‘religiosity leading to authoritarianism’ but ‘not the model showing the opposite’. In her view, religiosity leads to authoritarianism, but authoritarianism does not lead to religiosity. Lakatos (Reference Lakatos2010) criticises any notion that religiosity and authoritarianism are different aspects of the same phenomenon, arguing that ‘the impact of non-authoritarian religiosity is too important for religiosity to be treated as a simple correlate of authoritarianism’.

As befits a study of legal cultures, we focus on attitudes towards law rather than the psychological mindsets of individuals. Our measures of legal culture are conceptually closer to Canetti-Nisim’s measure of democratic values, but far more extensive and detailed and in no way intended to form the basis of a single scale such as ‘democratic values’. Even though we can classify certain laws or legal attitudes as authoritarian, we do not classify individuals as authoritarian. And as for religiosity, we rely on respondents placing themselves on a four-point scale that runs from religion being ‘very important’, ‘somewhat important’, ‘not very important’ or ‘not at all important’ to them, rather than assigning levels of religiosity on the basis of detailed questions about their religious beliefs or their participation in religious organisations. Ours is a public opinion approach, and not primarily an analysis of the interconnectedness of various psychological concepts.

Religiosity

When asked, “How important is religion to you personally – very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important”, almost every respondent in the surveys felt able to place themselves in one of these four categories. It is obviously not a difficult question for them.

Self-declared religiosity is strongest in Poland and weakest in Norway and England. Those who say they regard religion as “important” or “very important” are most numerous in Poland (86 per cent); somewhat less – though not very much less – in Ukraine (73 per cent); still less in Bulgaria (64 per cent); and by a large margin least numerous in England (45 per cent) and Norway (42 per cent). This cross-national pattern is broadly the same on the much tighter measure of self-declared religiosity as religion being “very important”: as declared by 35 per cent of the public in Poland and 27 per cent in Ukraine, though only 19 per cent in Bulgaria, 17 per cent in England and 15 per cent in Norway (Table 10.1). On both measures, religiosity is strongest in Poland and Ukraine, and weakest in England and Norway.

At the other end of the scale, the numbers for whom religion is “not at all important” are so low in all three former communist countries – despite decades of Communism – that we need to exercise some caution when interpreting the legal cultures of the very few “most irreligious” rather than the larger numbers of the wider “less religious” (i.e. those who say religion is “not very” important to them, in addition to those who say religion is “not at all” important to them).

Within all these countries, religiosity varies across personal and social backgrounds – though to different degrees in different countries – and very occasionally in different directions in different countries.

Across the five countries, religiosity correlates most with gender and age, less with rurality and income, and even less with education. In every country – though especially in Poland and Ukraine – women are more likely than men to regard religion as “very important” (by a margin of 16 per cent in both Poland and Ukraine, though only 5 per cent elsewhere); and those aged 55 and over are more likely than those aged under 35 to regard religion as ‘very important’ (by margins of 29 per cent in Poland and 20 per cent in Ukraine, though much less elsewhere).

Rurality has a strong impact on religiosity in Ukraine and Poland though less elsewhere. In Ukraine, the numbers who regard religion as “very important” rise steadily from only 12 per cent in the capital, Kyiv, to 33 per cent in villages or rural areas. In Poland there is not much difference between the numbers in Warsaw (27 per cent) and even those in small towns (31 per cent) who regard religion as “very important”; but the numbers rise sharply to 45 per cent in Polish villages or rural areas. In Bulgaria there is not much difference between urban and rural areas (average 23 per cent who regard religion as “very important”) except for an exceptionally low number (just a mere 7 per cent) in the capital, Sofia.

In every country, by a margin of 13 per cent on an average (though by a margin of 21 per cent in Poland) – those who feel their income and “standard of living” is “below average” are more likely to regard religion as “very important”.

Education has little impact on religiosity in Norway and England but, if anything, religiosity in Norway and England appears very slightly greater amongst the well-educated. That is in very sharp contrast to Poland and Ukraine where low, not high, levels of education correlate with religiosity. Compared to those with minimal education, those with university education in Poland are 25 per cent less likely to feel religion as “very important” for them, and in Ukraine 17 per cent less – very different from the pattern in Norway and England.

In Poland especially, though much less elsewhere, those who identify exclusively with their country and not at all with Europe are on an average 21 per cent more likely than ‘Euro-identifiers’ (i.e. those who combine a national and European identity), to regard religion as “very important” to them “personally”. In Poland a strong and exclusively national identity combines to a significant degree with strong religiosity.

Sectarian divisions also have an impact on religiosity, especially in Eastern Europe. By small margins of only 7 per cent in England, and 10 per cent in Norway, Catholics are more likely than Protestants to say religion is “very important” to them “personally”. But Catholics are much more likely than the Orthodox to say religion is “very important” to them “personally”, and by much larger margins, of 14 per cent in Bulgaria, 22 per cent in Poland and 33 per cent in Ukraine.

Clearly religiosity is widespread, and in some degree it is endorsed by a majority in all of the five countries. Indeed, religion is not merely “important” but regarded as “very important” by a large majority in the three East European countries and by a very large minority in the two West European countries. And religiosity tends to be particularly strong – though not necessarily in every country – amongst women, the poor, the old, the low-educated, those who live in rural areas, Euro-sceptics and Catholics (in contrast to Protestants or Orthodox).

But the primary focus here is not on the factors that encourage and sustain religiosity, nor even on the social or personal nature of religiosity, but on the role and impact of religiosity on legal cultures – a primary focus on the ‘consequences’ of religiosity rather than the ‘causes’ of religiosity.

The impact of religiosity on attitudes towards law

Given the findings of Geddes and Zaller (Reference Geddes and Zaller1989) that religiosity induces susceptibility to authoritarian ideas, or the findings of Canetti-Nisim (Reference 519Canetti-Nisim2004) that religiosity leads ‘directly’ to authoritarianism, we might expect that the impact of religiosity would encourage a generally more authoritarian legal culture that would support strict adherence to the law.

But which law? Religiosity may encourage more specific attitudes towards the defence of religion, religious institutions, religious leaders and their pronouncements, ordinary religious people and religious practices – any of which may conflict with the wider legal culture of the general public – and potentially lead to conflict with state law itself.

Although the more religious may be more inclined to bow to authority, the concept of authoritarianism depends critically on the issue of ‘who has recognised authority’. Amongst those who are willing to take instruction from a recognised ‘authority’, some religious people may regard the state as the ultimate authority, but others may regard their religious leaders as the ultimate authority; or they may regard the state as the ultimate authority in one context, but their religious leaders as the ultimate authority in another. In a broad sense, authoritarianism is a willingness to bow before recognised authority, coupled with a willingness to challenge other self-proclaimed, but unrecognised, authorities. For the deeply religious, deference to religion and religious leaders (‘religious authoritarianism’) may therefore take priority over the purely ‘secular authoritarianism’ of the state whenever there is a conflict between these two ‘authorities’. And then the religious authoritarians may morph into ‘secular troublemakers’ – or into something much worse.

The impact of religiosity within legal culture can be assessed by correlating indicators of legal culture – that is, indicators of public perceptions of law, and of public attitudes towards law – with varying degrees of religiosity. Most of these perceptions or attitudes were measured by offering either two alternatives or a four-point scale; and only those unprompted answers in the categories of “both/depends”, “neither”, “other/don't know/no answer” are, as usual, excluded from the calculation of correlations. (The very few questions where more meaningful answers were also excluded from the calculation of correlations because these answers did not fit into a one-dimensional scale are discussed in detail later.)

Across 168 indicators of legal culture, the correlation with religiosity (measured on a four-point scale) equals or exceeds 0.10 on only 36 of these 168 indicators of legal culture in Poland, on 29 indicators in Norway, 25 in England, 19 in Ukraine and 14 in Bulgaria. More narrowly, the correlation with religiosity equals or exceeds 0.15 on just 14 of these indicators of legal culture in Poland and Norway, just eight in England and Ukraine, and only four in Bulgaria. (All of these correlations – and more – exceed statistical significance at conventional levels, but here we are more concerned with substantial significance, which requires a higher standard.)

On these calculations, religiosity therefore does not have a strong impact “across the board” on most, or even on very many, aspects of legal culture. But religiosity does have a strong impact on some limited but substantial aspects of legal culture in every country, though this impact is most widespread in Poland, and least in Bulgaria.

Each of these 168 indicators fall naturally into one of three categories: (1) “religious authoritarian” or “strictly religious”; (2) “secular authoritarian” and (3) “other”. This classification suggests that where religiosity has its strongest (and most complex) impact is in the explicit defence of religion, or explicit support for religious authority in relation to law. Where religiosity has a detectable, but clearly lesser, impact is on more general, “secular authoritarian” issues.

On the top 10 issues where legal attitudes correlate most strongly with religiosity, all but one has a clear and direct connection, specifically with religion, and none are linked to secular authoritarianism. (The one remaining issue is linked to the EU.) Of the next 10 issues where legal attitudes correlate most strongly with religiosity, eight are linked to secular authoritarianism and none are explicitly linked to religion. (The two remaining issues are linked to attitudes towards the EU; see Table 10.2.) And beyond this top 20, there are very few legal issues where attitudes correlate with religiosity at 0.15 or more in any country except Poland. Altogether this reveals a very sharp division between the impact of religiosity on “religious authoritarianism” and purely “secular authoritarianism”.

So across the very wide-ranging investigation of the public attitudes and perceptions that together constitute popular legal culture, the evidence suggests that religiosity has: (i) a very strong impact on issues of law that are specifically and explicitly religious, (ii) a clear but lesser impact on some essentially “secular authoritarian” issues of law, and (iii) little or no impact on any of the remaining large majority of legal issues included in the survey.

The weaker second decile: religiosity and ‘secular authoritarianism’

In descending order, the strongest correlation in the second decile is between religiosity and positive attitudes towards the police: the more religious are more inclined than others to regard the police as “more law-abiding than ordinary people” and, in general, they tend to feel “overall more positive” than others towards the police. The more religious are also more inclined than others to feel there is a “real threat of terrorism”, and more inclined to prioritise “combating terrorism” over “individual freedom”. They are less likely than others to support basing laws on “current lifestyles”, and more inclined than others to say that “when public attitudes and behaviour changes” the law should “remain unchanged as a fixed standard of acceptable behaviour” rather than “be changed to reflect changes in public opinion”. They are also more inclined than others to feel that “European and International Standards” privilege sexual minorities. And the more religious are more inclined to feel that crime is increasing.

All of these correlates with religiosity could be categorised as issues of ‘secular authoritarianism’ with no essentially religious content. So there is evidence in the survey of some degree of correlation between religiosity and these indicators of secular authoritarianism. But the range of issues is limited, and the correlation between religiosity and secular authoritarianism is much weaker than the correlation between religiosity and more specifically religious issues.

The stronger first decile: religiosity and specifically religious attitudes to law

Within the wide range of our 168 indicators of popular legal culture, only a few questions raise specifically religious issues, but religiosity correlates much more strongly with these issues than with secular authoritarian issues – and most strongly with the simple issue of whether “the law should be based on religion”.

Basing law on religion? Not entirely surprisingly, religiosity has its greatest impact on public support for “basing law on religion”. Across the five countries the correlation between religiosity and support for basing the law on religion averages 0.35 with only a small variation between countries: 0.36 in England, 0.42 in Norway, 0.37 in Poland, 0.30 in Bulgaria and 0.32 in Ukraine.

However, in every country the pattern depends not so much on the positive impact of strong religiosity as on the much greater negative impact of “strong irreligiosity” on “strong opposition” to basing law on religion. Amongst those who feel religion is “not at all important” to themselves, 79

On an average across the five countries only 20 per cent of those for whom religion is “very important” strongly agree that the law should be based on religion, but 68 per cent of those for whom religion is “not at all important” strongly disagree. On the issue of basing the law on religion therefore, the most secular are very strongly opposed, while the most religious are only moderately favourable if at all (Table 10.3).

Do “truly European” countries have a “Christian history and tradition”? The correlation between religiosity and the assertion that “to be truly European” a country must have “a Christian history and tradition” averages 0.25 across the five countries (though it is particularly high in Poland at 0.39, and particularly low in Bulgaria at only 0.11). “History and tradition” incorporates law even though it is not explicit about details of the law, and that correlation with religiosity suggests that the more religious are more inclined than others to want Christian traditions to be preserved even though they do not go so far as to demand that the law be openly and explicitly based on religion (Table 10.4).

Local religious leaders as mediators Support for avoiding courts and using a “local religious leader” as a mediator correlates with religiosity at 0.24 on an average across the five countries – somewhat less in Bulgaria and Ukraine but more everywhere else. There is no evidence of great enthusiasm for religious leaders as mediators: outside England, where only 25 per cent even amongst the most religious, say a religious leader is often better, on an average across the other countries, a mere 12 per cent even amongst the most religious, say that a religious leader is often better. But in every country, the irreligious are far more sceptical than the religious of any mediation by local religious leaders. The irreligious are on an average 33 per cent more inclined than the most religious to say that such mediation is “never better” than going to court.

There is of course nothing authoritarian in the concept of mediation – quite the opposite. It is very much an example of “soft law” rather than “hard law” – depending as it does on voluntary agreement between the two contending sides in the dispute. So here it is the irreligious, not the religious, who recommend taking the more “authoritarian” option of “going to court” and letting the court impose its law (Table 10.5).

European and International Standards versus the views of local religious people For the general public, both “European and International Standards” and “religious people in this country” might seem somewhat outside the mainstream – the one with an increasingly liberal agenda, the other with perhaps more conservative views. Agreement that law should be based on the views of “religious people in this country” rather than on “European and International Standards” correlates strongly with religiosity – at a high of 0.32 in Poland though at 0.22 on an average across all the five countries. Even amongst the most religious, however, a narrow majority in England and Poland – and a large majority elsewhere – would defer to “European and International Standards” rather than defer to the views of “religious people in this country” (Table 10.6).

Perceptions that the very religious are more law-abiding When articulated by religious people themselves, the claim that “very religious people, irrespective of [which] religion, are more obedient to the law than others”, it is a claim – and possibly a proud claim – to be observant of the law. But it is not a demand to impose a tougher legal regime on others. It is about religion and religious people, not an authoritarian demand by religious people that others should be forced to become more law-abiding.

In England and Norway the correlation between religiosity and perceptions that “very religious people” are more obedient to the law averages at a very strong 0.32. But in Poland, Bulgaria and Ukraine the correlation is weak – not, however, because the religious fail to claim that they are law-abiding, but because a majority of even the irreligious in these countries are so generously willing to concede that very religious people tend to be more law-abiding (Table 10.7).

Perceptions that “religious and ethnic minorities are more law-abiding than others” On an average, the most religious are 21 per cent more inclined than the irreligious to say that “religious and ethnic minorities” are more law-abiding than others. The correlation between religiosity and perceptions that “religious and ethnic minorities” are more law-abiding than others correlates on average at 0.17. On this issue, the more religious are clearly more tolerant rather than more authoritarian: they are more than averagely tolerant of “minorities” – albeit in the context of a specific reference to “religious” minorities along with “ethnic” minorities (Table 10.8).

Basing law on “customs and traditions” Finally, the more or less religious are not so sensitive to basing the law on “customs and traditions” as they were with basing the law explicitly on “religion”, or recognising as “truly European” only those countries that had an explicitly Christian history and tradition.

Nonetheless, on the issue of whether the law should be based on a country’s “customs and traditions” – which in the European public imagination probably includes their Christian heritage along with other traditions – the correlation between personal religiosity and support for basing the law on heritage and traditions averages at 0.13 across the five countries. It is particularly weak in Norway and Bulgaria, but rises to around 0.16 in Poland and England, and to an even stronger 0.24 in Ukraine (Table 10.9).

Conflict between church and state Across the five countries the correlation between religiosity and feeling that religious people should obey their religious leaders, rather than the law, in circumstances of conflict correlates on an average at only 0.12. Though the correlation may not be very strong, it shows that in a conflict between church and state the most religious are the least willing to simply obey the law. This is also one of the questions where correlations are a somewhat inadequate measure of the complexity of the potential alternatives to simply obeying the law; it merits further discussion (see Table 10.10).

On the issue of whether ‘to be truly European there must be a secular system with complete separation of church and state’, in England, Norway and especially in Poland, the most religious are the least willing to agree. But in Bulgaria, personal religiosity has little or no impact. And perhaps surprisingly, in Ukraine, where the “very religious” were so favourable towards merging law with “national customs and traditions” (see PQ41a) the most religious are nonetheless the most favourable towards a “complete separation of church and state”.

At first that is surprising, but it is unlikely to be a statistical blip. A much more plausible and substantive explanation is that in West European countries a close relationship of church and state has been seen for a long time as giving the church access to some influence over the state; on the other hand, in the history of the USSR, as in its predecessor, a close relationship of church and state was seen as continuing to give the state excessive influence and power over the church. So rightly or wrongly, a separation of church and state could be seen as giving more freedom to the state in the West, but more freedom to the church in the East, and consequently the separation is most popular with the irreligious in the West, but with the most religious in the East (Table 10.11).

Conflicting authoritarianisms: church versus state

So on a range of legal issues in the “second decile”, including public attitudes towards legal-insiders such as the police and judges, the most religious are somewhat more authoritarian than the irreligious – but what the most religious display is a somewhat greater degree of “secular authoritarianism”, confined as it is to issues that do not focus explicitly on religion.

But in the “first decile”, where the correlations with religiosity are much stronger, the more religious are not necessarily more willing to obey the laws of the state. For religious people in particular, authority does not always mean the state: for them there are two, potentially conflicting, authoritarianisms. It is an age-old problem. As the King James Version of the Gospel of St. Luke puts it (in chapter 20, verse 25) ‘render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God's’. Provided there is no conflict between state and church, the deeply religious appear to be a little, but only a little, more authoritarian than others – as commanded by the first part of this text. But if there is a conflict between state and church, the deeply religious may be the least law-abiding – as also commanded by the second part of the text. At the extreme, it is worth recalling that terrorist campaigns have often been linked to religion.

Obedience to the law depends on the law as well as on the citizen. In many cases the citizen has a clear duty to obey the law. But in some cases the citizen may feel a duty to protest against an unjust law, evade it, or simply reject it. The survey investigated public support for obedience – and for justified disobedience – towards various kinds of unpalatable laws. It is worth looking at public attitudes towards these laws in more detail than one-dimensional correlations permit. In particular there are a variety of possible responses to an offensive law: so the options include more than simply ‘obey’ or ‘disobey’. The correlation analysis has been based only on those who advocated obedience or disobedience to the laws of the state – those who opted for answers such as ‘both/depends’, ‘neither’, ‘other/don't know/no answer’ were, as usual, excluded from the calculation of correlations.

On one important sequence of questions about obedience to the law, however, it was necessary to exclude those who opted for all but two of the answers in order to calculate correlations with religiosity because the excluded answers did not fit into a meaningful one-dimensional scale; they were multidimensional alternatives. One set of these alternatives were (1) “obey the law”; (ii) “ignore or evade the law”; (iii) “offer a gift or bribe to officials or the police, so that they do not enforce the law” and (iv) “protest against the law”.

Troublesome laws If Parliament passed a law that “some people felt was unnecessarily complicated and troublesome” a clear majority in England and Norway say that people should “protest” against that law rather than meekly “obey it” – but very few say people should “evade” the law, or offer a “bribe” to officials or the police to avoid enforcing it. But, most important, there is little difference between the very religious and the irreligious on this issue: in both countries, the very religious are a mere 5 per cent more in favour of simple obedience than the irreligious – that is the limited extent of their (secular) “authoritarianism” on this issue.

In Poland, and more especially Bulgaria, there is less support for “protest” but the impact of religiosity is greater: the most religious are on an average 12 per cent more inclined than the irreligious to advocate simple obedience to troublesome laws. But in Ukraine the most religious are 9 per cent more inclined than the irreligious to advocate protest rather than simple obedience.

Overall, however, the impact of religiosity on attitudes towards merely “troublesome” laws is weak. The more religious people do take a slightly more “authoritarian” attitude on this issue, but it is only very slightly: on an average across the five countries, the impact of religiosity increases support for simple obedience by 5 per cent and reduces support for protest by 4 per cent. In short the impact of religiosity is weak on this issue (Table 10.12).

Unfair and unjust laws If “some people” felt the law was “really unfair and unjust” – rather than merely “troublesome”, however, general public support for them to protest is considerably greater. But on an average across the five countries, the impact of religiosity only increases support for simple obedience by 3 per cent and reduces support for protest by 2 per cent. Again, the most religious are only slightly more authoritarian than the irreligious (Table 10.13).

If a “large majority” of people – rather than just “some” people – felt the law was “really unfair and unjust” public support for protest is greater still, especially in Eastern Europe. A reference to a “large majority” in the question gives a degree of democratic credibility to the argument that the law is unjust, and ultimately a greater threat that the weight of opposition may force a change in the law.

But once again the very religious are, on an average, a mere 2 per cent more than the irreligious in favour of simple obedience, and 3 per cent less inclined than the irreligious to advocate or support protest. (On an average, the most religious are also under 3 per cent less inclined than the irreligious to advocate “ignoring or evading” the law; and under 2 per cent less inclined than the irreligious to advocate “offering a gift or bribe”). So once again, the very religious are scarcely any more authoritarian than the irreligious on this issue – contrary to the claims that religious people are generally more authoritarian and more willing than others to simply obey the law. In these situations, the most religious simply hold “mainstream” attitudes (Table 10.14).

Laws that conflict with religion But if “religious leaders oppose a law passed by Parliament and declare it is contrary to their religion’, the impact of religiosity is no longer negligibly small and positive. Now it is large and negative.

Across the five countries, those for whom religion is “very important” are 19 per cent less likely than the irreligious to agree that religious people should simply obey the law; they are only 6 per cent more likely to say they should “follow the advice of their religious leaders”, but 13 per cent more likely to say they should “follow their own conscience” (and no more or less likely to say religious people should emigrate).

The consequence is that amongst the most religious, only in Bulgaria is there a clear majority who advocate obedience to a law that has been declared to be contrary to religion. But amongst the most religious, only half in Ukraine, slightly less than half in Norway, and only one-third in England or Poland advocate simple obedience to such a law. In these circumstances, the religious are the very opposite of secular authoritarians. Authoritarians they may be, but their “authority” is their religious leadership, not the state (Table 10.15).

Attitudes towards secular protest If some religious leaders persuade Parliament to pass laws that require everyone to obey the principles of their religion, what should non-religious people (or those belonging to other religions) do? No examples were given in the interview, though one classic example might be the ban on Sunday shopping which remained in force until 1994 in England, though other examples might include laws on abortion or euthanasia. On an average the most religious are no more likely than others to say the non-religious should obey such laws, but they are 10 per cent less likely than the irreligious to say the non-religious should “protest” against such laws, and 10 per cent more likely than the irreligious to say the non-religious should “follow their own conscience” (Table 10.16).

Adjusting the law Religiosity has very little impact on public support for adjusting the law to suit the needs of ethnic and religious minorities – either by ensuring the law is “sufficiently tolerant of individual freedoms that it does not offend minorities”, or by “not enforcing some laws on minorities provided that does no harm to other people”. Only in Bulgaria is there a large majority in favour of requiring strict obedience to the law by minorities, and very few support non-enforcement. But religiosity has little or no impact on these attitudes in Bulgaria. In England and Norway there is a narrower majority in favour of requiring strict obedience to the law by minorities – with Norwegians relying on tolerance of individual freedoms and the English on a mixture of tolerant laws coupled with non-enforcement. To an even greater degree, Poles would rely on a mixture of tolerant laws coupled with non-enforcement, and only a minority would insist on strict obedience to the law.

In four of the countries, however, degrees of religiosity have little impact. But in Ukraine the irreligious differ sharply from other Ukrainians: they are 17 per cent more insistent than others that the law must be obeyed by ethnic and religious minorities, 10 per cent less willing to have tolerant laws and 8 per cent less willing to avoid enforcing laws which offend minorities. What is very significant, however, is that it is the irreligious, and not the most religious, who take the most authoritarian position.

In fact this same pattern – of relatively tolerant religious people and relatively authoritarian irreligious people – is visible in all the other countries, though the differences between the religious and irreligious are very small. Overall those differences do not suggest a strong liberal tendency amongst the most religious, but they refute any expectation that the most religious would be more strongly authoritarian (Table 10.17).

Special laws for minorities Going beyond tolerance or non-enforcement, there is the issue of special laws for minorities however. Should there be “some special laws that apply only to ethnic or religious minorities – on marriage, divorce, or inheritance, for example?” On this issue, the differences between the attitudes of the most religious and the irreligious are small and not entirely consistent. But on an average the most religious are 4 per cent more favourable than the irreligious towards such “special laws” (and more than twice that in Bulgaria and Ukraine). Of course these numbers do not suggest great support for such special laws. But they clearly refute the proposition that the most religious might have a particularly authoritarian, one-size-fits-all attitude, on this issue of law (Table 10.18).

Conclusions

This chapter has focused on the impact of mainstream religiosity, based not on small numbers of zealots, but on the broad numbers of the general public who declare that religion is at least as “important” or even “very important” to them. Across the five countries – Norway, England, Poland, Bulgaria and Ukraine – almost two-thirds regard religion as at least as “important” and a quarter regard it as “very important” – somewhat less than average in Norway and England, but more than average in Poland and Ukraine. With only a slight exception in Bulgaria, the religious are overwhelmingly Christian, though they vary from primarily Protestant to Catholic to Orthodox.

An extensive literature cites religiosity as correlating strongly with authoritarianism, but the analysis here shows that religiosity correlates only moderately with aspects of purely “secular authoritarianism”, and correlates much more strongly with specifically religious aspects of law, even when these conflict with “secular authoritarianism”. To describe religiosity as exerting an influence towards “authoritarianism” in legal cultures is therefore only a misleading half-truth.

For deeply religious people, authority cannot and does not always mean the state. Provided there is no conflict between church and state, the deeply religious appear to be a little – though it is only a little – more authoritarian than others. But if there is a conflict between church and state the deeply religious suddenly become the least law-abiding. In these circumstances, the very religious are much less likely than the irreligious to automatically advocate obedience to the law, and much more likely to advocate following the advice of religious leaders or more especially their “own conscience”, even if that breaks “state law”.