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3 - Coercive Immigration Enforcement and Bureaucratic Ideology

from Part I - The Construction of “Illegality”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2013

Cecilia Menjívar
Affiliation:
Arizona State University
Daniel Kanstroom
Affiliation:
Boston College, Massachusetts

Summary

Information

3 Coercive Immigration Enforcement and Bureaucratic Ideology

Nestor Rodriguez
Cristian Paredes

This chapter analyzes the role of U.S. immigration enforcement agencies in constructing negative images of unauthorized immigrants, such as the image of illegality, and especially concerning migrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries. We take as our premise that U.S. enforcement agencies do not operate as objective, regulatory bodies, but as social actors that can, and do, promote negative perceptions of target populations for public consumption (see Chavez, Chapter 4; Nicholls, Chapter 10). As such, we view these practices of social construction as the production of ideology to advance organizational goals. We hold that these constructions and use of ideology are highlighted in bureaucratic functions where organizational personnel are involved in coercive or potentially coercive enforcement (including the possible use of lethal force) affecting large numbers of people. This is the nature of U.S. government bureaucracies involved in immigration enforcement, for example, the Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

The construction of images of migrant illegality has been a permanent ideological feature of U.S. border-control bureaucracies since the founding of the Border Patrol in 1924. In a manner that was not done at the U.S.-Canada border, the U.S.-Mexico borderline became a bureaucratic marker of illegality directed at Mexican migrants who entered the United States without visas. In the 1920s, this likely served more than a function for border control, because regions of the Southwest were still contested by Mexican American groups that made claims to territories taken over by Anglos after the end of the U.S-Mexican war in 1848. For example, less than a decade before the founding of the Border Patrol in 1924, Mexican Americans in the south Texas border region undertook an armed uprising against Anglos (Acuña Reference Acuña1981). From this historical perspective, the early social construction of illegality of the Mexican migrant served to de-Mexicanize the Southwest and to make Mexicans “illegal aliens” in a previous Mexican homeland. It was the beginning of a delegitimization of Mexicans that by the late twentieth century would impact even other Latina and Latino migrants in U.S. interior regions far from the border.

We take as a basic definition of ideology for our discussion the construction of a set of ideas by social actors to explain and promote a course of social action. Moreover, we identify the drive for the construction of ideology as emanating from the human property of reflectivity (Mead 1974) – that is, that humans are thinking beings whose cognitive and behavioral dispositions can be, and are, affected by the propagation of ideas in their social environments. We view bureaucracies as major purveyors of ideology in social environments (see Sjoberg and Vaughan Reference Sjoberg, Vaughan, Vaughan, Sjoberg and Reynolds1993).

Moreover, we see as the hegemonic ideology the constellation of dominant ideologies across institutional spheres (e.g., policy and economic) that serve the interests of elites and helps preserve the established social order. While ideology has been emphasized by some (Gramsci Reference Gramsci1971; Lukács 1971; Marx 1967) as an element of class domination in a capitalist society, we believe that it also has currency in other social arenas where ideas can affect courses of collective action.

In particular, we see our analysis as following points raised by Foucault (Reference Foucault and Elders1974: 171) that a critical task for understanding our society is to unmask the operations of institutions that appear to be nonpolitical in order to expose the functions of “political violence” they carry out. Furthermore, we believe the study of enforcement bureaucracies advances the understanding of Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” as it concerns “apparatuses of security” that are “essential technical means” in organizing governmental power (Foucault Reference Foucault, Burchell, Gordon and Miller1991: 102–3).

We divide this chapter into three parts. The first part lays out a conceptual description of the bureaucratic production of ideology to support coercive work. We argue that all bureaucracies produce ideology in some measure, but that it becomes particularly important for bureaucracies involved in coercive enforcement, such as in immigration enforcement. The second part of the chapter illustrates ways through which U.S. bureaucracies involved in immigration enforcement use ideological materials to support their programs of coercive enforcement. The third part of the chapter discusses the impact of ideology produced by immigration enforcement bureaucracies for the larger society.

The Coercive Bureaucracy and Its Production of Ideology

We start our discussion with some general observations about ideology and conflict in the social order. We distinguish two broad dimensions of the social order of a society: a material dimension and an ideological dimension. The former dimension is composed of the goods, assets, and resources unequally owned by the citizens; the latter is composed of sets of ideas, rules, and beliefs that validate the legitimacy of the order and serve as frameworks for an efficient management of the society. We define an ideology as hegemonic when it encompasses the ideologies that favor the prevalent social order in spite of how unfair or reliable its beliefs might be (see Eagleton Reference Eagleton1991: 29–30). Hegemonic ideology is spread at different levels (e.g., tastes, values, education, and politics) by the audiences (individuals and institutions) that identify themselves with these views. This dissemination is orchestrated (although not totally controlled) by those who have power to dominate the society, and by those who benefit from the social order.

Using Giddens’s (Reference Giddens1984) theory of structuration, we assert that the rules (the ideological dimension) and the resources (the material dimension) are recursively organized, making the structure of society dual, as the medium and outcome of the practices this structure organizes. This recursiveness also points at the inheritance of remaining traditional beliefs that conform to prevailing ideologies. Not only do several core ideologies evolve in the present, but they are also reinforced by unresolved past beliefs. Racial/ethnic ideologies belong to this group of core ideologies. They justify picturing Latinos as a threat or as inferior (see Chavez Reference Chavez2008; Santa Ana Reference Santa Ana2002; Chavez, Chapter 4). Although these ideologies are not examined here in detail, it is useful to link them with the construction of illegality to characterize undocumented Latino migrants because the illegal label strengthens old stereotypes against the Latino population, which keeps tarnishing the reputation and image of the Latino in the United States. From this perspective, the illegality of the Latino migrant conforms to the mainstream negative depiction of the Latino in news outlets and public debates (see Chavez, Chapter 4). As De Genova explains (Chapter 2), immigration laws have also played a key role in the construction of Latino immigrant illegality.

From this perspective, we view ideology produced by U.S. enforcement agencies as having an integral role in the social construction of the borderline between the United States and Mexico that sets Mexicans apart as “others” (Rodriguez Reference Rodriguez and Perea1997). The impact of this ideology is such that in everyday life the U.S.-Mexico divide appears more as a U.S. border than a Mexican one, as the Mexican concern for maintaining the border pales in comparison with U.S. enforcement concerns.

In consonance with hegemonic ideology, state-produced ideology deals with structural inequity not only by establishing laws and by targeting poverty as a problem, but also by promoting partially fictive inclusive discourses that intend to ameliorate potentially conflictive scenarios. Instead of separating the state-directed ideological beliefs as operating in relatively independent power networks that interact with tangible powers, such as economic, military, or political (see, e.g., Mann Reference Mann2005), we emphasize the interaction and overlapping of these beliefs (also including prevalent core ideologies that transcend the political realm) as a state-produced ideology that conforms to the hegemonic ideology with the purpose of efficiently managing the society. While the reification of ideologies carries the risk of misrepresenting reality by not identifying more specific causes, the lack of a better understanding of the importance of ideologies might lead to underestimating the effects that collective beliefs have on realities. Not only do ideological misrepresentations of reality become normal, but they also buttress claims that are perceived as legitimate. In this sense, it is useful to remember that state-produced ideologies also can serve as cultural capital, and that cultural capital is convertible into other forms of capital (Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu and Biggart2002) that empower individuals and institutions.

A coercive ideology is a state-produced ideology composed of beliefs that justify the official coercive force exercised by the state agents, including violence, to preserve the hegemonic social order. The prevalence of coercive ideologies depends on the degrees of violence in conflict areas: the greater the violence generated by the conflict, the greater the need of more justifications, which recursively strengthen the coercive ideologies. We can better identify the importance of coercive ideologies in conflict arenas where social actors are attempting to alter the social order. The most extreme conflictive realm is the one in which crimes against humanity are systematically perpetrated. Here the hierarchy of “abusers over victims” echoes in a radical fashion the material structural contradictions.

In the case of crimes against humanity, the state attempts to control the conflict by exterminating the opponents and those who are close to them. Moving from the realm of crimes against humanity to the realm of immigration enforcement programs in the United States, the exercised coercive force is justified by understanding the undocumented person as a threat without considering her or his human condition using more complex views. This ideological objectification also justifies the nature of the violence: it is necessary to deal with the threat at any cost. Not only does the coercive ideology recursively construct the image of the migrant as inferior, but it also distorts the understanding of the culture of the migrant, creating a distorted understanding which is accepted by many U.S. citizens and other legal residents.

In the arena of U.S. immigration, Mexican immigration has long been considered a threat to the very established U.S. social order. In 1978, for instance, the Central Intelligence Agency director described Mexican immigration as a national security threat even greater than the Soviet Union (Rodriguez Reference Rodriguez and Perea1997). This was a monumental claim given that the source was the chief U.S. intelligence officer at the time, and that the Soviet Union presented a Cold War threat that included a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. The claim was another example of what Leo Chavez (Chapter 4) calls the Latino Threat Narrative, in which some mainstream social actors view Mexican Americans as harboring the intention to take over the Southwest of the country. Even in the twenty-first century, leading social analysts continued to characterize Mexican immigration as a threat to U.S. society, as exemplified by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington’s writing on the dangers that Mexican immigration held for U.S. culture (Huntington Reference Huntington2004). While such alarming voices do not carry the day in all immigration debates and legislation, they do reinforce the ideology that migrants, especially Latina and Latino migrants, are a threat to the U.S. social order, as explained by Chavez.

The social context of contradictions, where groups face each other in contention over material or ideological claims, makes necessary bureaucratic ideological work to help legitimize the force and extensiveness of state enforcement. Bureaucratic ideological work transcends laws and rules; it is a tactical representation of what is considered illegal, with negative associations often portrayed as well founded and real (see Foucault 1995). This is especially true in societies with a democratic political system in which state bureaucracies are subject to regular parliamentary review and oversight. At a minimum, bureaucratic ideological work is intended to promote the view that the large-scale process of coercive enforcement is valid and necessary, and, at a maximum, that it is essential for survival.

Ideological work includes negative labeling of the target population (such as, “leftist subversives” and “illegal aliens”). The intended audiences of the ideological constructions are internal and external. Internally, bureaucratic agents have to be socialized into the cognitive set (values and behavioral predispositions) of the bureaucracy. While some new agents arrive already assimilated into the bureaucratic perspectives, other new agents have to be prepared for the daily handling of targeted persons in a manner that does not diminish the agents’ sense of their own humanity. In this way, agents can time and again process thousands and thousands of individuals (men, women, children, young and old) for removal from their families and communities. Procedural manuals, graphic mission designs, intraagency schedules, timetables, and so forth all also help to promote the enforcement activity into a dehumanizing process or one conceptualized as a corporate remedy to a social problem.

The display of corporate culture and efficiency overlays an organizational veneer on the management by force of human beings, producing a working atmosphere in which the highest priorities concern the operation of the agency and not the humane treatment of the persons under its control. By law, usually as a result of litigant pressure, enforcement agencies have to maintain minimal standards in the care of the persons in their custody, but the biggest concern of the agencies is for carrying out their coercive mission. The veneer of corporate culture manifests a business image furthering a sense of officialdom for agents.

Usually absent in the corporate business approach of enforcement bureaucracies are serious concerns about the humanity of the persons under their control, that is, how the bureaucratic processing affects the welfare of the persons being processed, especially beyond their physical health, such as their emotional status, self-esteem, and the anguish felt from being removed from one’s family. Concerns for the humane treatment of the targeted group are irrelevant for agencies intending to eliminate persons under their control, but some agencies involved in coercive enforcement maintain at least an image of concern, if only for public consumption. It is mainly an attitudinal image, however, rather than a behavioral one in which the agencies would undertake unsolicited action to improve the welfare of persons under their control.

Organizational rationality and business approaches promote bureaucratic ideological work in coercive enforcement agencies because they evoke sensate qualities among agents that have a confirming effect of the validity and value of the coercive mission. That is to say, within the context of a democratic society, something as rationally organized and primed as the officially designated agency can only be thought of as producing positive effects for the greater good.

The challenges of bureaucratic ideological work in coercive enforcement for external environments are several. Bureaucracies do not operate in social vacuums; they function in political environments, and this requires the social construction of reality to frame debates; promote agendas and funding priorities; and lessen or deflect opposition and criticism. In the U.S. political arena, this means that there are congressional funding and oversight committees to assure; constituencies to maintain; other public groups to win over or at least pacify; and opponents and critics to counter. In the bureaucratic context of democratic governments with periodical transitions of elected policy makers and appointed top administrative officials, second-tier and lower organizational managers of coercive bureaucracies have the constant task of ideological reproduction. Moreover, constant ideological work is necessary because bureaucracies never solve internal or external challenges in a “once and for all” manner.

In the case of immigration policy, U.S. enforcement bureaucracies face a host of opponents and critics outside the governmental sphere. These actors include religious and human rights organizations (e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union and American Friends Service Committee), and a long list of advocates in the immigrant rights movement, which stretches across the whole country (see Friedmann Marquardt, Snyder, and Vásquez, Chapter 12). Moreover, ongoing research on immigration continually supplies the public sector, particularly the media, with information that raises questions about the impacts of immigration enforcement activities. An example of this was the flurry of media attention on the deaths of migrants in border areas after sociological research brought this topic to public attention (see Verhovek Reference Verhovek1997). All of these reviewers and critics keep the immigration enforcement bureaucracies ideologically predisposed to defend their activities.

Ideological Themes of Immigration Enforcement

In this section we address and elaborate on three ideological themes used by immigration enforcement agencies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Two ideological themes concern the nature of the enforcement agencies as a high order of moral authority and as guardians of the nation. A third theme concerns the degradation of the target population it seeks to control.

Moral Authority

Bureaucracies involved in coercive enforcement in which force, or the potential use of force (including lethal force), is used in visible or detectable social environments must establish a principle of moral authority to validate their actions. The message of moral authority is that the bureaucracy is empowered by the population that it serves and that its actions are aimed at protecting the population and its state. As coercive as they may become, the enforcement actions of the bureaucracy should be seen as being conducted on behalf of the “national” population to promote its welfare.

The agency of Customs and Border Protection, which is the home bureaucracy of the Border Patrol, declares its mission statement and “core values” as follows.

We are the guardians of our Nation’s borders. We are America’s frontline. We safeguard the American homeland at and beyond our borders. We protect the American public against terrorists and the instruments of terror. We steadfastly enforce the laws of the United States while fostering our Nation’s economic security through lawful international trade and travel. We serve the American public with vigilance, integrity, and professionalism.

(U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2009; emphases added)

The litany of words and phrases underscored in the mission statement serves to establish the concept of a high moral order with which the bureaucracy has been charged and the high level of professionalism with which it will carry out its work. In the secular sphere of human relations, it is difficult to think of a higher moral authority than those proclaimed by state bureaucracies, such as the proclamation of the Customs and Border Protection.

One of the functions that this ideological posturing serves is to preempt or deflate criticisms against the coercive bureaucracy when enforcement activities, or actions of bureaucratic agents, become excessive and lead to the deaths of unauthorized migrants. Because the bureaucracy has constructed a strong moral image of itself, whatever goes wrong from enforcement activity – including the deaths of migrants – should never be thought to be a nefarious or malicious action, as the bureaucracy casts itself as incapable of such action. Examples involving this characterization include cases in which border agents have shot unarmed migrants, including some still on the Mexican side of the border (USA Today2012). The bureaucracy does not “work in the dark side” or in the “shadows.” Moreover, if enforcement activity appears extreme (e.g., when hundreds of poor workers are corralled and chained in workplace raids) it must be interpreted as collateral damage in carrying out essential duties.

As the deaths of unauthorized migrants grew into the hundreds annually partly as a consequence of being redirected (“funneled”) into dangerous desert areas by the U.S. border control operation “Prevention through Deterrence” (Eschbach et al. Reference Eschbach, Hagan, Rodriguez, Leon and Bailey1999), the high offices of the immigration control bureaucracy, of the then Immigration and Naturalization Service, displayed a position of ignorance and surprise that migrants would actually try to migrate across desert areas (American Public Health Association 2009). The officials of the agency also responded with the announcement of a border rescue program for migrants stranded in deserts. The program was called BORSTAR, an acronym for Border Patrol Search and Rescue, which responded to calls of migrants stranded in deserts and conducted rescues in swift waters. In a report later, the bureaucracy, now reorganized into DHS, maintained that the arrest of unauthorized migrants was the best way to prevent them from going into desert areas (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2006).

The relevance of collateral damage should not be disregarded. According to Mendelson, Strom, and Wishnie (Reference Mendelson, Strom and Wishnie2009), 73 percent of the individuals apprehended by Fugitive Operation Teams (FOTs), dispatched by the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP)1 from 2003 to 2008 had no criminal convictions. Moreover, nonfugitives, that is, those who have never been charged by an immigration judge, but whom Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) arrests on the belief that they are unlawfully present in the country, represented 22 percent of annual apprehensions from 2003 to 2005. This percentage increased to 35 percent in 2006 and to 40 percent in 2007, after ICE implemented a new arrest quota system (Mendelson et al. Reference Mendelson, Strom and Wishnie2009). Conversely, fugitive aliens with criminal convictions represented 32 percent of all FOT arrests in 2003, 17 percent in 2006, and 9 percent in 2007. Nonetheless, the NFOP has grown impressively over time, and has obtained a sharp increase in funding. Questionable targeting, unfair incarcerations, and bureaucratic inefficiency had no problem in being disguised and promoted as examples of efficient management on behalf of the security of the society.

From the perspective of symbolic interaction (Blumer Reference Blumer1969), the very material symbols of immigration enforcement bureaucracies (e.g., uniforms and patrol vehicles), which represent symbols of high authority, can have an intimidating, if not numbing, effect in some immigrant environments. Frequently, immigrants, especially the most marginalized, will go out of their way to avoid encounters with agents of immigration enforcement bureaucracies to prevent any form of interaction (Rodriguez and Hagan Reference Rodriguez and Hagan2004).2 In some cities with large unauthorized migrant populations (e.g., Houston and Phoenix) Spanish-language radio stations give reports to their migrant audience of the locations where immigration service agents are believed to be conducting raids (Menjívar and Abrego Reference Menjívar and Abrego2012). Migrants, especially the most marginalized, know that when they are approached by enforcement agents they are being approached by a source of considerable power that can be used against them to bear major consequences, such as arrest and deportation.

For immigration enforcement bureaucracies the sense of high moral authority flows from the top of the federal system, from Congress. In a hearing and briefing before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere on the topic of deportations to Latin America and the Caribbean in the summer of 2007, the chair of the subcommittee opened the hearing and briefing with a statement that included the following comment:

Before going any further, I would like to be clear about one point. The United States has the absolute right to deport any criminal or illegal immigrants. There is no serious debate about this point. The issues before this panel today are not whether we can remove these people or even, in general, whether we should. I think most if not all members of this panel will agree that America should not be absorbing criminal immigrants.

(U.S. House Committee on the Western Hemisphere 2007)

It is worth noting that the chair of the subcommittee was a liberal Democratic member of Congress. The comment demonstrates that even from a liberal perspective the claim of an “absolute right” to deport immigrants appeared to flow easily. The question from this perspective, however, is not whether the U.S. government has the authority or jurisdiction to deport immigrants (which it does), but whether it has an “absolute right.” An absolute right can be characterized as having extreme authority without question to undertake a course of action. In matters of absolute right, the state cannot be questioned, because there is no higher authority. But many times federal judges have ruled against deportation cases, instructing immigration agencies to end the deportation process of individuals. Note also that the words “criminal or illegal immigrants” were used in the same sentence as “absolute right.” This juxtaposed wording serves to support the logic of “absolute right,” that it is useful for removing threats from criminal sources.

Going beyond the political realm, the statement of the subcommittee chair also corresponds to ideological beliefs that conceptualize the immigrant as a being inferior to citizens, and whose fate can be determined by the primacy of citizenship. Citizenship is often understood as an ontological virtue justified by patriotic pride, the source of “absolute righteousness,” which supposedly fairly elevates those who can claim citizenship status over those who lack this cultural capital.

Perhaps taking into account that absolute right is not totally absolute and that levels of enforcement sometimes have to be negotiated with local communities (Dunn Reference Dunn2009), the enforcement bureaucracy Customs and Border Protection posted a statement of “Social Responsibility” on its website indicating a commitment to act responsibly and respectively regarding local environmental and cultural issues (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2011). The bureaucracy referred to this predisposition as undertaking environmental and cultural “stewardship.”

Enforcement Bureaucracy as Guardian

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Customs and Border Protection bureaucracy also began to add to its publicized objectives the enhancement of the quality of life in border regions. With the border “under operational control,” the bureaucracy claimed, economic vitality would increase in border regions as crime and social service costs decreased (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2004: 11). Through its publicized objective and its civic participation, the border enforcement bureaucracy projected its image as an ethical force of the community. From this assumed ethical perspective, enforcement becomes more than a duty; it becomes a morally defining activity, so much so that the bureaucracy equated it with community development. As a moral tool, enforcement could not be compromised, not even in the face of mounting, fatal effects, as in the case of migrants dying by the hundreds each year in desolate border areas.

Federal and state officials, as well as political candidates, have traveled to the Southwest border to use it as a backdrop from which to blame the “illegal invasion” of migrants for social problems, budgetary deficits, and the creation of a national security risk. These politically motivated depictions amounted to a social construction of the Southwest border as a lawless, out-of-control, and unsecured region, and it vilified unauthorized migrants as the principal transgressors (Rodriguez Reference Rodriguez and Perea1997; also see Chavez, Chapter 4; Heyman, Chapter 5). Through the production of a public relations video titled Border under Siege, Border Patrol officials played a direct role in casting the border as being “invaded” by “aliens” (Massey, Durand, and Malone Reference Massey, Durand and Malone2002). The actors of this social construction proposed strengthening the border enforcement bureaucracy of the Border Patrol to deal forcefully with illegal immigration.

In earlier decades, when the Border Patrol consisted almost exclusively of non-Hispanic white males, it was harder to sell the idea to local border Mexican American communities that this bureaucracy was their protector and guardian, given the harsh discrimination and racism faced by the many Mexican American residents of the border area (Acuña Reference Acuña1981). Nonetheless, over time as new Latino generations assimilated it is reasonable that some Latinas and Latinos began to sympathize with mainstream views against immigrants. Also, some Latinas and Latinos viewed the Border Patrol as a job opportunity with the federal government offering long-term job security and social mobility, especially in the historically poor counties of the Texas border area. By the twenty-first century, Mexican American agents could be found explaining to local Latino communities how their bureaucracy and local communities shared a common identity, that is, how Latinos were members of both the bureaucracy and Mexican American communities. Yet, large numbers of Latinos, especially new immigrants, remained fearful of new immigration enforcement policies.

Further research remains to be done regarding the increasing roles of Latina and Latino agents in the Border Patrol and ICE, but it is already clear that their roles are having dual, if not contradictory effects. On the one hand, for example, Mexican American agents help these two bureaucracies gain greater access to local Mexican American institutions (e.g., educational and civic organizations) in the U.S.-Mexico border region, but, on the other hand, some Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants in the region view these agents with mistrust, identifying them more as enforcers than as coethnics.3

Delegitimizing Migrants

It is not enough to advance ideas of high moral authority and guardianship for state bureaucracies to promote the actions of coercive enforcement targeting a large populace. Immigration enforcement bureaucracies also delegitimize the targeted migrants for public consumption. This involves promoting concepts of unauthorized migrants as beings inferior to persons worthy of respect and dignified treatment. The end result is to delegitimate the migrant as a decent, regular person, and to create the image of migrants as dangerous, illegitimate beings (see Chavez, Chapter 4). This can be done to such an extent that the migrants become dehumanized, stripped of their human qualities, and left only as bodies to be processed. All for the act of crossing a line on the ground without permission, which is normally considered only a misdemeanor administrative offense.

The importance of delegitimizing unauthorized migrants as regular people is not to punish them for crossing the borderline without permission, but to prepare for their processing by the thousands, that is, to be pursued, arrested, detained, and removed. For the bureaucracy, the assembly-line motion of this process works more effectively when the human qualities of the migrants are reduced through delegitimizing concepts and the remaining bodies amount to commodities to be shifted around. In his book Categorically Unequal, Douglas Massey (Reference Massey2007) elaborates how at a fundamental level of perception U.S. citizens perceive undocumented migrants as outsiders, which increases the tendency to treat these migrants with harshness and cruelty.

In the history of coercive border enforcement, delegitimizing concepts used against unauthorized migrants include such terms as illegal aliens, invaders, muds, and wetbacks (Langewiesche Reference Langewiesche1993). Even the term illegal aliens, the least pejorative of these terms, is far from having a neutral meaning. The term creates a criminal image of the migrants for having conducted an “illegal” act, although a crime has not been committed against anyone. As De Genova (Reference De Genova2005: 237) explains, the “illegality” stands only for a transgression against the sovereign authority of the nation-state (also see De Genova, Chapter 2). Yet, the term illegal alien is useful, indeed handy, for immigration enforcement bureaucracies to carry out the tasks of coercive enforcement in at least two ways. One way is that it marks migrants as “illegals,” if not criminals, enabling enforcement agents to handle migrants with a reduced sense of, and care for, the migrants’ humanity, which helps to expedite the processes of arrest and detention and ultimately removal. The message is that the agents are not handling community members (regular people), but “illegal aliens.”4

A second way in which the concept and label “illegal alien” helps the work of the immigration bureaucracies is that it helps to promote their work in the enforcement environment. It helps to promote the view that the bureaucracies must become energetic in their work of coercive enforcement because the presence of “illegals” in local environments requires a response by the state.

In an ironic twist, it is precisely the ideological labeling of unauthorized migrants by enforcement bureaucracies that promotes their attraction in the lowest rungs of the labor market – why they continue to be a sought-after workforce. The ideological branding of unauthorized migrants as outlaws and their running from coercive enforcement strips many of them of all resistance to exploitation – much to the benefit of the many employers who hire unauthorized migrant workers. Yet, many migrants take actions to counter the labeling and its negative effects (see the chapters in Part III of this volume). As coercive enforcement drives unauthorized migrant workers into the underground labor market, these workers are left to survive on whatever wages their employers are willing to offer, with little opportunity to resist even when employers refuse to pay at all – a condition now commonly called “wage theft.”5 Josiah McC. Heyman (Chapter 5) elaborates on how border enforcement can be seen as helping to shape an exploitable migrant labor force to the advantage of some categories of employers.

The production and maintenance of negative labels for persons who cross the border into the United States without official permission is all the more important on the Southwest border where large numbers of Mexican-origin persons reside. Most of these areas have concentrations of Mexican-origin people who have different identities and immigrant/nonimmigrant statuses. Many Mexican American households in border areas have mixed-status family members who are U.S. born and other household members who are immigrants, including some who do not have visas (Rodriguez and Hagan Reference Rodriguez and Hagan2004). Mixed-status households of Latinas and Latinos are also found throughout Latino concentrations in interior areas of the country, and is a reason why even U.S.-born Latinos and legally resident Latino immigrants express fear of deportations, a strategy which can remove vulnerable household members (see Pew Hispanic Center Reference Center2007).

Mixed-status households are so well established in many Latino communities in the border region, and across the country, that unauthorized migrants are not considered outsiders but insiders, that is, regular persons. These are migrants who have become accepted members of communities through their stable and long-term support of families and other social institutions in the neighborhoods where they live. In some cases, these migrants become business owners providing jobs to neighborhood workers and institutional leaders giving support to community development.

In border settings with mixed Mexican American households, border enforcement bureaucracies cannot assume that the local Mexican Americans share their concerns regarding unauthorized immigration or their interests in vigorous immigration enforcement. The use of negative labeling of unauthorized migrants, such as “illegal aliens,” thus helps to promote the view that the migrants not only do not belong but are also a menace that has to be removed for the welfare of the country.

Bureaucratic Ideology in the Larger Society

Ideological constructions of immigration enforcement bureaucracies reach the larger society through various means. The means vary from community forums and exchanges with local news media to regional announcements of new enforcement measures, and to national policy declarations by the high offices of the bureaucracies. Information released by the bureaucracies varies by specific theme, but the announcements are usually framed with statements regarding the high duty of the bureaucracies and the growing menace of unauthorized migration, which according to the bureaucracies must be confronted for the good of the society.

This ideological framing has been purveyed in roundups and repatriations of immigrants, of which there have been three highly publicized cases since at least the late 1910s. “Palmer Raids” conducted against foreign-born radicals during the Red Scare deported more than five hundred immigrants to Europe from November 1919 to January 1920 (Kanstroom Reference Kanstroom2007; Murray Reference Murray1955). U.S. deportation campaigns removed four hundred thousand Mexican immigrants and their U.S.-born children to Mexico during the Great Depression (Hoffman Reference Hoffman1974), and returned more than a million unauthorized Mexican migrants to Mexico during the late 1940s and early 1950s, culminating in the so-called Operation Wetback of 1954 (Hernández Reference Hernández2010). Finally, the U.S. government has deported some 3.8 million migrants from 1997 to 2011 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2012, Table 39), that is, since the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, which greatly enhanced the deportation process (Rodriguez and Hagan Reference Rodriguez and Hagan2004).

The massive level of deportations – primary of Mexican migrants – since the passage of IIRIRA has become a growing feature in the daily life of migrant populations in small and large communities, affecting a host of community institutions, for example, workplaces, schools, places of worship, and retail centers (Hagan, Rodriguez, and Castro Reference Hagan, Rodriguez and Castro2011). Moreover, the involvement of local police departments in immigration enforcement, which is promoted by IIRIRA and the new federal program Secure Communities, makes these local agencies additional sources of coercive enforcement of migrant populations. These developments require greater bureaucratic ideological work to keep pace with the growing enforcement in order to rationalize its extension.

One means through which this ideological rationalization (see Thompson Reference Thompson1990) is provided is through television programs of Border Patrol operations on the Southwest border. The television programs highlight the different ways through which migrants and their smugglers attempt to cross the border clandestinely, portraying the migrants as illegal actors (“illegals”) and the Border Patrol as an institution of national defense. This technique defines the moral quality of the migrant by the single act of an unauthorized crossing, which is usually considered a misdemeanor. What is not shown is the migrants’ side of the story, that is, their social backgrounds of struggles for survival and the conditions of poverty that drive them to the border region in the first place. Herbert Marcuse (Reference Marcuse1964: 8) comments on the ideological impact of media as follows: “Can one really distinguish between the mass media as instruments of information and entertainment, and as agents of manipulation and indoctrination?”

There is another impact of the ideology of immigration enforcement bureaucracies that plays out on the larger societal plane. The impact is the enhancement of hegemonic ideology in which core institutions provide social constructions of reality that diminish the reflective powers of individuals as they take on a greater identity with their society. As Marcuse explains in One-Dimensional Man (1964), the outcome of ideological change in advanced industrial society is not the end of ideology, but its penetration across mass production and mass distribution and consumption diminishes individual reflectivity and resistance. While Marcuse (1964) is concerned with the ideological power of industrial culture, one can propose that state institutions also contribute to the hegemonic ideology that combines economic, political, and societal concerns (see Thompson Reference Thompson1990), such as concerns of unauthorized immigration.

Finally, it is likely that bureaucratic constructions cause some Latinos to identify closely with the mainstream, including with its dominant white racial stock, and thus for reasons of racial identity differentiate themselves from Latino migrants who come to the United States to escape poverty. It is also possible that some Latinos, including some mixed-race Latinos, identify strongly with their white Latino heritage (in both phenotype and culture), becoming “honorary whites” (see Bonilla-Silva Reference Bonilla-Silva2006) and seeing themselves as racially different from the populations of Latino migrants.

Bureaucratic Ideological Prospects

Immigration enforcement bureaucracies will continue to produce ideology in their work as long as international migration continues to be a source for the reproduction of social relations in the advanced capitalist economy. As Saskia Sassen-Koob (Reference Sassen-Koob and Smith1984) has described, the economic restructuring that has promoted the growth of a highly skilled and professional labor force in the U.S. advanced industrial economy from the 1960s to the 1980s also has created a new labor demand for low-wage jobs in sweatshops, industrial homework, and other industries that attract immigrant concentrations. Even as aggressive immigration enforcement removes hundreds of thousands of unauthorized migrants annually from the country, many other unauthorized migrants continue to supply the labor power for this new labor demand that supports the workforces of core institutional sectors of society. In the absence of a new measure to incorporate unauthorized migrant labor into the formal sector, ideology will continue to be a means for coercive immigration enforcement.

Future Research

In this chapter we have outlined several aspects of coercive bureaucracies and used U.S. immigration enforcement bureaucracies for illustration. Yet, our discussion remained mainly at a conceptual level of analysis. Empirical research is needed to investigate how changes in the larger society may be affecting the coercive predispositions of enforcement agencies. We view three developments to investigate that may affect these predispositions. One development concerns the racial and ethnic makeup of Border Patrol and ICE agents. The research question from this perspective concerns whether the growing number of Latino agents since the 1990s, including the number of women officers, affects the treatment of Latino migrants, that is, whether Latino and women agents tend to be more considerate or abusive toward Latino migrants during their apprehension and detention. On the one hand, Latino agents have a closer ethnic link with Latino migrants than non-Latino agents do, which may produce an affinity with the migrants; but, on the other hand, Latino agents may act more aggressively toward Latino migrants than non-Latino agents in order to display their allegiance to the enforcement agency.

A second development to investigate concerns whether the decline in unauthorized immigration since 2005 affects the coercive predispositions of enforcement agencies. The falling numbers of apprehensions of unauthorized migrants in the Southwestern border area from 1,189,031 in 2005 to 340,252 in 2011 strongly suggest that unauthorized migration is dramatically slowing down (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2012, Table 35). This raises the question of whether the apparent decline in unauthorized immigration is lessening perceptions of a “Latino Threat” (see Chavez, Chapter 4) among immigration enforcement agencies, making them less coercive in their treatment of migrants.

Finally, a third development to investigate concerns the attitudinal change that occurred after the 2012 presidential election among several conservative political leaders regarding immigration reform. The reelection of President Obama due partly to the support of Latino and Latina voters signaled to some conservative leaders that they should be more considerate of Latino immigrant interests to get Latino political support. The research question to investigate from this perspective is whether the seemingly attitudinal change of the conservative leaders reverberates through state bureaucracies affecting their enforcement predispositions toward immigrant populations.

The overarching question that these research questions address concerns the extent to which contextual social changes may affect the coercive predispositions of enforcement bureaucracies. That is to say, do social, demographic, and attitudinal changes in the larger society affect the predispositions of coercive agencies or do these organizational bodies function more independently, operating with an ideology derived mainly within the social structure of the bureaucracy?

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1 Led by the ICE, which belongs to the DHS. ICE defines fugitive as a person who has been ordered deported, excluded, or removed by an immigration judge, but has not left the country; or one who has failed to report to DHS as required (Mendelson et al. Reference Mendelson, Strom and Wishnie2009).

2 We recognize that in some cases unauthorized migrants may seek to turn themselves in to Border Patrol agents to escape death or when injured in desert areas of the Southwest border.

3 This observation comes from decades of experiences of one of the authors (Rodriguez) in the Texas-Mexico border region as a Mexican American resident and as a researcher.

4 For additional discussions on the state’s use of the concept and term of illegal alien see De Genova and Peutz (Reference De Genova and Peutz2010).

5 Wage theft also refers to employers not willing to pay more for overtime work. A study by Valenzuela et al. (Reference Valenzuela, Theodore, Meléndez and Gonzalez2006) found that in their national study of day laborer sites about half of the day laborers (almost all immigrants) in their survey reported not being paid by employers on at least one occasion.

Footnotes

1 Led by the ICE, which belongs to the DHS. ICE defines fugitive as a person who has been ordered deported, excluded, or removed by an immigration judge, but has not left the country; or one who has failed to report to DHS as required (Mendelson et al. Reference Mendelson, Strom and Wishnie2009).

2 We recognize that in some cases unauthorized migrants may seek to turn themselves in to Border Patrol agents to escape death or when injured in desert areas of the Southwest border.

3 This observation comes from decades of experiences of one of the authors (Rodriguez) in the Texas-Mexico border region as a Mexican American resident and as a researcher.

4 For additional discussions on the state’s use of the concept and term of illegal alien see De Genova and Peutz (Reference De Genova and Peutz2010).

5 Wage theft also refers to employers not willing to pay more for overtime work. A study by Valenzuela et al. (Reference Valenzuela, Theodore, Meléndez and Gonzalez2006) found that in their national study of day laborer sites about half of the day laborers (almost all immigrants) in their survey reported not being paid by employers on at least one occasion.

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