1.1 Introduction

A scientific journal reported the discovery of seven-million-year-old footprints of elephants, the world's oldest elephant tracks, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Paleontologists say the area had much more water, vegetation, and animal life, and its biodiversity resembled what was present in wet parts of Africa and Europe. “The region then was home to a great diversity of animals, including elephants, hippopotamuses, antelopes, giraffes, pigs, monkeys, rodents, small and large carnivores, ostriches, turtles, crocodiles, and fish. These were sustained by a very large river flowing slowly through the area, along which flourished vegetation, including large trees. The animals resembled those from Africa during the same time, though there are also similarities with Asian and European species of that period” (Livescience.com, 2012). The image of a tropical paradise teeming with biotic life is today a polar opposite of what it used to be.

Social stability and economic prosperity rest on regular access to sufficient amounts of potable water. Many areas of the world may have hit “peak water,” which explains the growing talk about a water crisis, and why this resource, long taken for granted, is now being called the “new oil” or “blue gold.” Throughout history, humans have always been well tuned to nature's rhythms that helped them harness and secure the resources they needed for their survival. They devised new ways for identifying water sources, and for harvesting, transporting, and storing water so to meet their then-simple and basic needs. How will technological advancements affect water security of future generations?

Water security is a complex, multi-dimensional concept. Water insecurity is a relative concept because, at one level, it is an imbalance between water “supply” and “demand” and is affected by spatial, temporal, and economic conditions (Jägerskog et al., Reference Jägerskog, Swain and Öjendal2014; Swain, Reference Swain2012). It is also a dynamic process because it is aggravated by higher human demands, varying supplies, degraded quality of the resource, and by poor governance and inadequate policy response. A recent report by the World Economic Forum (2014) ranked the water crisis as the third most important challenge facing the world. This measure by prominent political and economic leaders from around the world helps focus the attention of governments, businesses, and civil societies on this issue that has been rising in importance. Water security is affected by physical availability and technological ability to produce potable water, and by a government's ability to develop institutions and build the infrastructure necessary to ensure a reliable supply of water.

People and governments increasingly view water as a resource of strategic importance, one that affects human and national security. Fearing an interruption of the supply of critical resources appears to be a common human concern that is unrelated to geography or culture. A recent survey on “British attitudes towards the UK's international priorities” revealed that for most people (53 percent) in the country the biggest future threats to “the British way of life” were terrorism, followed by interruptions to energy supply (37 percent), and “long-term scarcity of essential natural resources, such as water, food and land” (30 percent). Climate change (18 percent) was the fourth and final item on the list of apprehensions (Chatham House, 2011). In another poll, most (48 percent) opinion leaders and decision makers in Britain said that the main focus of their country's foreign policy should be to ensure “the continued supply of vital resources, such as oil, gas, food and water [tied with terrorism]” (Evans Reference 146Evans2011). The British fear appears irrational when you consider that the average annual precipitation for the United Kingdom is 1,222 mm (World Bank Data, n.d.). On the other hand, the Gulf states have an average annual precipitation that is well under 125 mm (World Bank Data, n.d.), are void of perennial rivers, and, for the last few decades, have experienced much higher levels of economic and population growth than many countries, including Britain. This, along with their rapidly improving quality of life, have resulted in an astronomical rise in their total and per capita water consumption. As devoid as they are of water, their significant endowments in hydrocarbon wealth has made it possible for them to overcome their physical scarcity of water and food.

The Arab world, from Iraq to Egypt and all the way to Morocco, is one of the most arid regions on the planet. Within this large cultural region is the geopolitical sub-region known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. Although Yemen and Iraq are non-members, the turmoil and wars they have long experienced pose serious security challenges to the GCC. It has been trying to contain the socio-political spill-over effects of these and other wars on their countries. Since 1980, Iraq and Yemen have experienced wars and violent insurgencies. Iraq, for example, invaded Iran in 1980, triggering an eight-year war, and then invaded Kuwait in 1990. Kuwait's desalination plants were thought to be within the range of Iraqi and Iranian missile placements and therefore “easily targetable” (Cordesman, Reference Cordesman1997, p. 58). The United States’ 2003 war on Iraq led to the collapse of the nation state and its institutions, which in turn fueled waves of insurgency and terrorism that continued well into 2014. When the once-divided Yemen was united in 1990, many people in the northern and southern parts of the country did not buy into the social and political integration, leaving the country in the throes of perpetual turmoil. High unemployment and political instability drive many Yemenis to seek a better life in the wealthier Gulf states, and some profit from illegal activities such as smuggling people, weapons, and drugs into Saudi Arabia. Finally, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is based in southern Yemen.

The natural environment is the original culprit in the hydrological conditions that Arabs contend with. The Arab world is located in a generally arid to very arid region where environmental conditions have gradually worsened for the people. The renewable water resources available in 1950 were over 4,000 m³/capita per year, declined to 1,312 m³/capita per year in 1995, and slipped to 1,233 m³/capita per year in 1998; they are projected to reach 547 m³/capita per year in 2050 (Arab Water Council, 2009). Yemen, one of the most water-deficient countries in the world, has an annual per capita water availability of only 125 m³, compared to the global average of 2,500 m³ (WWAP, 2012). The freshwater that is available for the people of Yemen or for the GCC countries is significantly lower than the global average, which underscores the severity of the situation in this region. Scholars classify a country as experiencing “water stress” when its annual renewable water supplies fall below 1,700 m³ per person, “water scarcity” when they reach 1,000 m³ per person, and as having “absolute scarcity” when they dip below 500 m³ per person (WWAP, 2012). All of the Gulf states suffer from an acute case of absolute water scarcity.

Over the past five decades, these countries have experienced a dramatic increase in population and in the quality of life that strained their natural water supplies so much that they looked for alternative sources that would supplement their aquifers; they chose to desalinate seawater to meet their domestic freshwater needs. Furthermore, since the 1960s, the Arab Gulf states have experienced dramatic increases in population sizes due to high natural growth rates and, more importantly, due to the very high influx of foreign workers. This, together with the fast pace of modernization and urbanization have rapidly inflated the size of primate cities like Dubai (1.9 million), Riyadh (5.5 million), Jeddah (3.6 million), and Kuwait city (2.4 million) (CIA, 2011). Current research predicts that the availability of renewable freshwater resources will continue to decrease with changes in precipitation and recharge rates of groundwater resources. By 2050, renewable water resources in many Middle Eastern countries – including those in the GCC – will decrease between 25 and 40 percent (FutureWater, Reference Immerzeel, Droogers and Terink2011).

Among the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have the largest population sizes, and therefore experienced the largest net increases. Yet, even though Bahrain only has 1.3 million people (2013), the country's population has increased by over 700 percent since 1960 (Table 1.1).

With the significant increase in population and the demand for water, the natural water resources of the Arabian peninsula have been stretched and are not enough to support the population. For all Gulf countries, the total renewable water resources per capita have decreased dramatically (Table 1.2). Since the 1960s, the renewable water resources per capita in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait have decreased by 82, 84, 86, and 89 percent, respectively. The biggest decreases were in Qatar and the UAE where population growth skyrocketed and their renewable water resources per capita have fallen by 97 percent and over 98 percent, respectively.

The Arab Gulf states share largely similar climatic conditions but there are some important variations between them. Except for a few areas, most of the peninsula is either classified as desert or semiarid mountains. Although the Oman Mountains and Asir Mountains in south and western parts of the Arabian Peninsula enjoy higher rates of precipitation and runoff, there are no perennial rivers or lakes in any of the GCC countries. Rain generally occurs in the winter months, is unpredictable, and often results in flash flooding, temporarily filling wadis. Topographically, much of the region is flat. Combined with high evaporation rates, the topography makes it difficult to harvest rainwater and little of it recharges groundwater before it is evaporated (Al-Rashed and Sherif, Reference Al-Rashed and Sherif2000). Average annual rainfall (Table 1.3) can be misleading because of the intense evaporation and the significant variation in precipitation between the hyper-arid deserts and the mountainous areas which receive much higher levels of rainfall.

The sporadic and meager surface water resources of the GCC states are minor compared to the large but diminishing fresh groundwater resources throughout the region. Alluvial groundwater aquifers tend to be shallow, recharged by rainwater, and their water of better quality. Non-renewable deep aquifers are not fed by infiltrating rainwater. Groundwater resources in the deep aquifers are estimated at 2,330 billion cubic meters and over 30 percent of the groundwater reserves are located in the Wasia-Biyadh aquifer (one of the largest in Saudi Arabia). Depending on the geological composition, the quality of water varies significantly from one aquifer to another. Overuse due to irrigation has affected the quality and productivity of aquifers. In areas along the coast of GCC countries, saltwater intrusion into freshwater aquifers is a problem (Al-Rashed and Sherif, Reference Al-Rashed and Sherif2000; Al-Hajri and Al-Misned, Reference Al-Hajri and Al-Misned1994).

The smallest of the countries, Bahrain, has an arid to hyper-arid environment with high temperatures, erratic rainfall, and high evaporation rates. Rain only supports the most drought-resistant vegetation. The principle source of water is from the Dammam Aquifer, only a small part of the larger Eastern Arabian Aquifer. However, the aquifer has suffered severe degradation and salinization from multiple sources: (1) brackish-water up-flow from underlying water zones below the aquifer, (2) seawater intrusion, (3) intrusion from saline aquifers, and (4) return flow from irrigation (FAO, 2008; Musayab, Reference Musayab1988). Over-exploitation of groundwater has also damaged what few wetlands existed and has resulted in the drying of all natural springs (UNDP, 2013).

Most of the soil in the Gulf states does not retain moisture and is made up of many “hard pans,” referred to by locals as “gutch,” which prevent water from infiltrating into aquifers. This, high evaporation rates, and the over-drafting of aquifers for irrigation have been depleting these mostly non-renewable resources and degrading their quality. The meager rainfall is unpredictable and insufficient to support rain-fed irrigation, but it is the main source of recharge for the few renewable aquifers in the Gulf. Freshwater aquifers in the Gulf states usually lie above saline groundwater and their over-use has caused saline water to up-flow into the aquifer (Lloyd et al., Reference Lloyd, Pike, Eccleston and Chidley1987). This mis-management has caused a lowering of the water table and deeper, brackish water to up-flow into freshwater sources. Many of the aquifers are composed from limestone, which has led to severe seawater intrusion and increased salinity of groundwater (AQUASTAT, 2009).

There are groundwater resources in the Bajada region. These aquifers contain water from alluvial fans along the base of the Oman and Ras Al Khaymah mountains. Dams have been built in areas where water infiltrates through permeable streambeds, hence replenishing groundwater (Murad et al., Reference Murad, Al Nuaimi and Al Hammadi2007).

While many of the GCC countries are similar in climate and have few options concerning water resources, both Oman and Saudi Arabia are much more environmentally diverse and have more natural freshwater resources than other Gulf states. Oman, for example, is divided into three regions. The coastal plains consist of vital agricultural areas and are hot and humid throughout the year. In the southernmost reaches, monsoons occur during the summer. Even though there are wadis with intermittent surface runoff, internal groundwater is the main reliable source of renewable freshwater. There are several important aquifers in the northern and southern areas and the soil easily allows precipitation to infiltrate into the groundwater. Some of these aquifers are a part of the larger system that extends throughout the peninsula. In addition to these, most other sources of groundwater are brackish to saline. There are also large amounts of freshwater reserves in aquifers that were filled a long time ago when climate conditions were different. These non-renewable resources have a very low recharge rate and have been designated by the government as a reserve for future use (World Bank, 1988), and are being increasingly treated as reserve for future use

Saudi Arabia also has significant water resources and varied climates. The Western Mountains, or “Arab Shield,” consists of high peaks, deep valleys, and enjoys the heaviest rainfall in the region. East of these mountains are the central hills and further east of that is a sandy, hot, desert region. The government of Saudi Arabia has constructed dams in different parts of the country to trap water from the short-lived flash floods, which is used for groundwater recharge, and irrigation. The quality of groundwater varies from area to area but most of it is classified as brackish (Gutub et al., Reference Gutub, Soliman and Uz Zaman2013).

Climate change exacerbates prevailing hydrological stress. A study commissioned by the World Bank reviewed the results of nine global climate-change models and reported that the gross recharge between 2010 and 2050 is expected to drop sharply in “almost all” the Middle East and North American (MENA) countries, where the largest declines for that period are expected in Oman, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The models reveal that the largest decreases in internally and externally renewable water resources in the Gulf will be in Oman (–46 percent) and Saudi Arabia (–36 percent) (Immerzeel et al., Reference Immerzeel, Droogers and Terink2011, p. 57).

Freshwater, already a scarce resource, is becoming harder to find due to population pressure, mismanagement, and climate change. Desalinated water is critical to the well-being of people of the Gulf and to the modern economies that they have come to depend on. Enduring sustained water-supply disruptions could have serious ramifications on the social and political stability of a country. Therefore, a better understanding of threats to water supplies would gauge the social resilience of affected countries, provide useful information to the business sector, and deliver respective government agencies an early warning, encouraging them to consider preventative or mitigating measures that would ensure water security for all.

Water security has been a dominant concern in certain transboundary water negotiations (Mekonnen, Reference Mekonnen2010), and has been adopted by major international aid agencies such as those of the German and American governments (BMZ, 2010; USAID, 2014). It has also been linked to economic growth and human development (Liu et al, Reference Liu, Mei, Li and Yang2007), and associated with sustainable development (Vörösmarty et al., Reference Vörösmarty, McIntyre and Gessner2010). One of the early definitions of water security was given by the Global Water Partnership (Reference Gleick, Yolles and Hatami2000), which viewed it as every person having “access to enough safe water at affordable cost to lead a clean, healthy and productive life, while ensuring the environment is protected and enhanced”. This ministerial-level meeting at the World Water Forum at The Hague stated that despite the huge diversity of circumstances around the globe, all nations desire a future that includes the goal of water security. The forum had a very broad understanding of this notion: “This means ensuring that freshwater, coastal and related ecosystems are protected and improved; that sustainable development and political stability are promoted, that every person has access to enough safe water at an affordable cost to lead a healthy and productive life and that the vulnerable are protected from the risks of water-related hazards.” It then outlined a seven-step roadmap to achieving water security:

1. 1. Meeting basic human needs: this would be achieved through access, water quality and quantity, sanitation services which affect quality, and about participatory water management where the people, especially women, are empowered (Figure 1.1).

2. 2. Securing the food supply: this would be achieved through more equitable allocation and efficient use of water, a process that is assumed to benefit the poor and vulnerable in society.

3. 3. Protecting ecosystems: this would be achieved through sustainable water-resources management.

4. 4. Sharing water resources: this would be achieved through cooperative “sustainable river-basin management or other appropriate approaches” at all possible geographic scales, the local, transboundary, or regional, by identifying synergies between different water uses

5. 5. Managing risks: this would be done through protection from all water-related hazards ranging from pollution, to floods and droughts.

6. 6. Valuing water: this would be achieved by gradually moving towards pricing water in a way that reflects the full cost of its provision, while respecting equitable access of the poor and vulnerable in order that they too can meet their basic human needs.

7. 7. Governing water wisely: this would be achieved through the participation of all stakeholders in the management of water resources.

These understandings of water security are centered on people and ecosystems, with some being more explicitly eco-centric. The forum's definition, the most comprehensive of those reviewed, is so broad that makes its noble goals harder to achieve where, for example, people are expected to shed their human-centric view of water. In recent years, Grey and Sadoff (Reference Grey and Sadoff2007, p. 545) crafted the most quoted conceptualization of water security, which is, “the availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems, and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to people, environments, and economies”. Grey et al. (Reference Grey, Garrick and Blackmore2013, p. 4) later framed water security in terms of a “tolerable level of water-related risk to society”. For Tindall and Campbell (Reference Tindall and Campbell2010, p.1), “water security is the protection of adequate water supplies for food, fiber, industrial, and residential needs”. After explaining the notion, the same sentence explains that the goal “requires maximizing water-use efficiency, developing new supplies, and protecting water reserves in the event of scarcity due to natural, [manmade], or technological hazards” (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.1 Hierarchy of water needs

Figure 1.2 Conceptualization of water security

This book investigates the national security implications of the Gulf states’ reliance on freshwater produced by desalination plants. This is done by assessing threats to their water and food security, and by suggesting ways to mitigate them. Since the early 1990s countries around the world have recognized that a multitude of national and transnational forces threaten their security and livelihood, and these threats include environmental degradation, disease, and climate change. Hence, the concept of security was expanded beyond traditional military threats against the nation state, and the notions of human and environmental security were developed (Jägerskog et al., Reference Jägerskog, Swain and Öjendal2014; Swain, Reference Swain2012). The Arab Human Development Report (UNDP, 2009, p. 2) defines human security as “the liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable”.

These threats range from political instability in and around the Gulf states to environmental threats to desalination plants on the scale of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill which caused an environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. Additional threats include major terrorist attacks on water or energy infrastructure disrupting supply for an extended period, or attacks that target skilled guest workers leading to mass emigration. While most of these are low portability scenarios, if any one of them were to occur, it would have catastrophic impacts on political stability of the affected country.

1.2 Water and insecurity

A recent United Nations World Water Development Report (WWAP 2012, p. 10) highlights a well-known aspect of water insecurity, namely that war interrupts water supply. It notes “violent conflict has also destroyed water infrastructure at different times in Beirut, Kuwait and Lebanon, requiring rehabilitation instead of expansion of delivery.” Another form of water insecurity was discussed in 2012 by the US Government Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), which focused on, among other things, the use of water as a weapon of terror. This thoroughly researched assessment (ICA, 2012, p. 3) found that by 2022, “water problems will contribute to instability in states important to US national security interests”. Here, one can surmise that this covers the Gulf states. The report had a narrow scope focusing primarily on transboundary watercourses. The classified and declassified portions of the 26-page report did not offer “a comprehensive analysis of the entire global water landscape”; instead it “focused on a finite number of states that are strategically important to the United States and transboundary issues from a selected set of water basins”, which are “sufficient to illustrate the intersections between water challenges and US national security” (ICA, 2012). Because the assessment's main focus was on transboundary watercourses, it paid cursory attention to aquifers and critical water infrastructure. For example, it found that until 2022, water in shared basins will be used by some states as leverage over neighboring ones. After that time, water shortages will become more severe, and water will increasingly be used to “further terrorist objectives (ICA, 2012, p. iii)”.

1.3 Potential threats to water supply in the Gulf states?

Beyond 2022, violent extremists and rogue states will likely threaten to inflict substantial harm by targeting high-publicity physical infrastructure. The ICA assessment adds the following critical observation: “Even if an attack is less than fully successful, the fear of massive floods or loss of water resources would alarm the public and cause governments to take costly measures to protect the water infrastructure.” It goes on to state that desalination plants and supply networks are likely targets for terrorists (ICA, 2012, p. 4). The assessment reduces factors that contribute to water-related destabilizations to:

1. (1) countries with inadequate water supplies, and which do not have the financial resources or technical ability to solve their internal water problems;

2. (2) some downstream states who have unresolved water-sharing issues and are “further stressed” by substantial reliance on water from upstream riparians;

3. (3) wealthier developing countries, which “probably will experience increasing water-related social disruptions but are capable of addressing water problems without risk of state failure”(ICA, 2012, p.3).

The assessment states that by 2022, “water problems – when combined with poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership, and weak political institutions – contribute to social disruptions that can result in state failure” (ICA, 2012, p. iii). The report adds that the intelligence community has “moderate confidence” in their judgment partly because effective mitigation measures such as pricing mechanisms and infrastructure investments are available to these countries.

In discussing the MENA, the intelligence report argues that, “Increasing water shortages and rising food prices will present growing challenges for all but the wealthiest countries in these regions who can afford – typically with fossil fuel revenues – to subsidize food” (ICA, 2012, p. 8). The US Department of State requested the intelligence community's answer to this question: “How will water problems (shortages, poor water quality, or floods) impact US national security interests over the next 30 years?” The resulting assessment relied on previously published research and reports by intelligence agencies, and on “consultations with outside experts”. The principal author of the report was the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), with contributions from other governmental agencies.

While governments can always choose to increase water tariffs, such a measure is widely seen as being politically dangerous for any Gulf state to undertake. Furthermore, the assessment appropriately acknowledges the inter-relatedness of social, environmental, governance, and water issues. However, the phrase “water-related social disruptions” implies social unrest that results from water issues such as chronic deficiency of freshwater supply that either makes it harder for the people to meet their basic needs or significantly erodes their quality of life. The report focuses on the government-to-people relationship and does not say much about the people-to-government side of the equation. Meaning, governments that fail in providing freshwater supplies to the masses would be viewed as having committed a significant breach of their social contract. Wealthier countries, the intelligence report finds, are well positioned to deal with water-supply challenges. Since desalination technology was introduced to the Arab Gulf states, governments’ emphases have exclusively followed supply-side management where they invested huge sums of money to establish new water and related infrastructures that are appropriate for a briskly modernizing economy and society. This development drive occurred just as these states were rapidly losing their mostly fossil groundwater reserves due to the introduction of modern, fuel-powered pumping technologies, largely unregulated water use, and mostly because of a heavy subsidy of the agricultural sector. Most fossil water in the Arabian Peninsula is 10,000 to 30,000 years old. Furthermore, aquifer water withdrawal in the Gulf states, mostly for irrigation purposes, is currently about six times faster than that of the natural renewal rate (Kumetat, Reference Kumetat and Scheffran2012). This move by the Gulf states towards greater irrigation is somewhat similar to the global trend; the frequency of irrigation of cultivated lands around the world have more than doubled between 1961 and 2009 (Table 1.4; FAO, 2011a). In the Gulf states, most of the land that was irrigated had never been cultivated before.

1.4 Historical overview

The economic geography of production is such that countries tend to have a “home bias” during their early phases of development. When the Arab Gulf region came under British colonial rule in the early years of the nineteenth century, the population was small and primarily nomadic, and the economy was based on fishing, date-palm farming, and some trading. Until a few decades ago, the Arab Gulf region was the sleepy backwaters of the Arab world. The discovery of commercial quantities of oil in Bahrain by the Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) in 1932, and in Saudi Arabia in 1938, were the first, early indicators of the massive social and economic change that would soon descend on the people. The oil fields in the Arab Gulf were developed at different speeds. While Abu Dhabi began to export oil in 1962 and Oman in 1967, Kuwait developed its fields the fastest, which made it the largest oil producer in the region by 1953 (Metz, Reference Metz1993). Kuwait was the earliest (1940s) to reap significant revenues from oil, which it used to vitalize the national economy, while Oman and Qatar (1980s) were late economic bloomers. In other words, by the early 1970s, the infrastructure of the Gulf states was minimal, embryonic, primitive, and wholly unsuitable for a modern economy. Therefore, as the oil wealth started to trickle in, leaders undertook the mammoth task of building an infrastructure for modern economies – almost from the ground up. Along with this came rapid improvements in people's quality of life, including rapid urbanization with all the services associated with that, and higher rates of water consumption; these necessitated building more desalination plants at larger scales. Kuwait's early endeavors towards economic development amount to a microcosm of other experiences in different countries in the region.

An essay with the title “Kuwait: a super-affluent society” (Shehab, Reference Shehab1964) might lead one to think that it is a commentary on current socioeconomic conditions; it is a five-decades-old essay, published in Foreign Affairs. It lists grand trade statistics, exorbitant expenditures on social services and on the country's economic infrastructure, and says that all this is “in sharp and dramatic contrast with the austerity of former times”. Here, the timeline refers to the preceding two decades during which “the whole face of Kuwait has changed beyond recognition”. The government spends more than $140 per person to provide freshwater and electricity, and “every tree and shrub that decorates her [Kuwait's] thoroughfares and public squares costs an average of some $250 a year”. The government's expenditures on health, education, and other social services has “placed this tiny state on a higher level than some of the most sophisticated societies in the world; for in the fiscal year 1961–1962, it reached some $240 per inhabitant as compared with $210 in the UK and slightly less in Sweden”.

The sudden explosion of hydrocarbon wealth upon the sleepy Gulf states has had profound and unprecedented impacts on every aspect of their society, economy, and environment. Even in the early 1960s, one key question that “has always been asked” by Kuwaitis is: how long is the spectacular wealth going to last? (Shehab, Reference Shehab1964). This same question continues to bear on the minds of all Arab Gulf states whose socio-economic condition was rapidly transformed from a state of poverty, stagnation, and obscurity to being regional and global actors in a dynamic and complex world economic order. They, like Kuwait, have been feeling the need to build social and physical infrastructure, develop an industrial base, and set up public and financial services – all in a short window of time.

1.5 Lateral pressure

Pressure on natural resources available within a country fuel its outward expansion. The hydrocarbon boom that the Gulf states have been experiencing gave rise to gigantic development ambitions, which necessitated leaders to initiate sweeping and comprehensive development and modernization projects. They required these states to import labor, technology, and know-how from different countries around the globe. This is germane because domestic water consumption is affected by factors such as population size, frequency of water supply, and people's consumption patterns. The latter is affected by the quality of life, per capita incomes, and urbanization in the Gulf states (Table 1.5).Footnote ¹ Urban population grew at a much faster rate than the national population, reflecting the rapid rural-to-urban migration, and the high levels of international immigration to the Gulf states. The vast majority of the latter ended up in cities. The Gulf states decided to invest in farms in other countries where they produce food crops to be imported to the investing state. They deployed the tools of globalization to boost their food security by expanding their foodshed beyond their national borders. This has also allowed them to conserve what is left of their groundwater supplies, and to treat them as a strategic resource to be used in times of emergencies. Will this approach meet its desired objectives? The test will come when food prices skyrocket again, or when there is a period of political instability in the wider Gulf region or a major food-exporting country. Either way, food security is likely to remain a high-priority item on the political agenda of the Gulf states.

In his famous (1968) book, Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel P. Huntington argued that modernization and economic development generate intense social change, and that “societies in the throes of dramatic social transformation … tend to be unstable and even violent. Positive outcomes are likely to emerge only where healthy political institutions capable of channeling and responding to such changes exist – and building such institutions is an extremely difficult and time-consuming task…” (Berman, Reference Berman2009).

If and when countries develop such functional institutions, they can act as threat minimizers (Renaud and Wirkus, Reference Renaud, Wirkus and Bigas2012). Gulf economies have long outgrown their human and natural resources. Different forces converged to create demand-induced scarcities, which pressured them to expand their resource capture beyond their national borders. For example, for decades before the advent of desalination plants, Kuwaitis imported water from southern Iraq. Conceptually, the lateral-pressure theory foresees a clash between countries experiencing resource scarcities. It argues that individuals and societies have a tendency to extend their reach and influence beyond known boundaries, whether they are economic, political, scientific, religious, or otherwise (Choucri and North, Reference Choucri and North1975; Gleditsch, Reference Gleditsch, Diehl and Gleditsch2001). Lateral pressure is similar to what had been referred to as “economic expansion” (Sorokin, Reference Sorokin1957) or “outward expansion” of countries (Kuznets,Reference Kuznets1966). When domestic capabilities are (or become) insufficient to meet demand, they generate lateral pressure where people, governments, or firms seek new capabilities beyond the national borders. Territories in which a state develops a “stake” could be perceived as falling within its sphere of national security and, therefore, worth defending. This outward expansion to capture or influence markets and natural resources, especially if it is combined with unequal access to resources (structural scarcity), increases the likelihood of hostile interactions with other competitors if actions are perceived as being dangerously competitive, threatening, or coercive (Choucri and North, Reference Choucri and North1975; Gleditsch, Reference Gleditsch, Diehl and Gleditsch2001). The expanding states that are most conflict-prone are those with high populations, high levels of technology, and inadequate resources (North, Reference North and Choucri1984; Choucri and North, Reference Choucri, North and Midlarsky1989).

1.6 Cultural norms and water management

The familial monarchy political systems in the Arab Gulf have similar social contracts, where the central government shares revenues of oil largesse, and people enjoy tax-free incomes and cradle-to-grave social welfare systems in return for political acquiescence (Davidson, Reference Davidson2012; Barrett, Reference Barrett2011). For example, by 1994, the Kuwaiti government was subsidizing water and power to the tune of $1 billion a year (Cordesman, Reference Cordesman1997, p. 58). Consequently, such a generous welfare system has nurtured a cultural mindset, in just a few generations, that views free or subsidized goods and services as the citizens’ share of the hydrocarbon wealth, with no incentives to conserve. Why should an environmentally conscious citizen reduce water consumption if others in society will continue their wasteful usage? To be sure, assigning a single economic value to water is a tough challenge because desperate people will pay a lot to acquire a small amount of water.Footnote ² Therefore, developing a framework for assigning value to freshwater “requires a clear statement of what the policy decision aims to achieve. The economic value of water measures the contribution of that water to accomplishing that decision's aim” (Ward and Michelsen, Reference Ward and Michelsen2002, p. 443). Broadly speaking, the economic value of water is affected by its quantity as well as quality, and by its location and the time when it is in demand. One should also consider the different perspectives on the value of water, and account “for the difference between total, average, and incremental values of water” (Ward and Michelsen, Reference Ward and Michelsen2002, p. 423) (Table 1.6).

If unchecked, the current wasteful behavior in the Gulf states could lead to some version of the tragedy of the commons. Furthermore, some aspects of water issues in the Arab world continue to be misunderstood even at the highest levels of government and academic circles in Western countries. Islam, the region's dominant religion, is often misconstrued. For example, a recent best-selling book on water (Solomon, Reference Solomon2010, p. 378) contends that because Islam views water as a free resource, “many Muslim countries charged little or nothing except partial delivery costs in some of the driest parts of the world.” This position assumes that Muslim-majority countries apply Islamic law which they do not. Of the 1.7 billion Muslims worldwide, only Saudi Arabia and Iran are theocracies. Their combined population size is around 115 million. On the same point, a US intelligence report claims that, “In some portions of the Middle East, generation of financial revenue to make investments for basic water needs is limited by moral beliefs that water cannot be sold and only treatment and distribution costs may be recouped” (ICA, 2012, p. 10).

While revenue generation is in fact “limited” in some countries, this is unrelated to “moral beliefs,” a phrase that is used here as a code for Islam. Islamic jurisprudence offers detailed, nuanced water management guidelines for many different circumstances. For example, a person may obtain surface and subsurface water from the source at no charge if there are no associated costs (i.e. this does not apply to desalination) and as long as this does not impede the access of others in the community. Furthermore, all people have the right to quench their thirst, and therefore Muslims are required to share excess water to save fellow human beings. After people, priority should be given to meeting the needs of animals and then to plants. This ordering offers a roadmap on how to allocate water resources in times of water stress (Farouqi, Reference Faruqi, Faruqui, Biswas and Bino2001). Faruqui (Reference Faruqui2003, p. 210; see also Sadr, Reference Sadr, Faruqui, Biswas and Bino2001; Wickström, Reference Wickström and Luomi2010) argues that Islam views water as a community-owned social good and a fundamental human right, and views the natural environment as having considerable rights to water. He also concludes that Islamic law (sharia) supports water tariffs for the purpose of cost recovery, and supports involvement of the private sector in “service delivery, and up to full-cost recovery for water and wastewater services” as long as it falls short of private, exclusive “ownership over significant public water resources, or even long-term water use right”. Jonathon David Walz (Reference Walz2010) concludes that all four schools of Islamic jurisprudence allow the sale of water supplies; the Maliki and Shafi'i schools allow for sale of unlimited amounts, while the Hanifi and Hanbali schools allow the sale of limited volumes. In addition to the theological principles, Muslims practiced water trade as recently as in the twentieth century. From 1925 to 1950, Kuwaiti corporations used fleets of dhowsFootnote ³ to import freshwater from Shatt al-Arab in Iraq, some 100 km northwest of Kuwait city (Woertz, Reference Woertz2013; Crystal, Reference Crystal1995). In short, Islam views water as both a commodity and a common good which society must protect and preserve for current and future users. Furthermore, Gulf governments heavily subsidize freshwater supply and consumption, but for reasons that are related to social contract and governance – not to Islamic law. These governments have been willing to forego short-term losses for the long-term benefits of building politically, economically, and socially stable nation-states.

Commenting on the social contract in the Arab Gulf states, Raymond Barrett (Reference Barrett2011) describes the flow of oil wealth to society as “river to the people”. However, if it fails to satiate the needs of most or dries up, then the people may revolt. For him, Bahrain's popular uprising of 2011 was not so much a sectarian or freedom-based revolt as it was a result of the ruling family's inability to uphold its side of the social contract.Footnote ⁴ The kingdom's small population base had benefited from petrodollars. However, its net oil exports had dropped from 41,000 barrels per day in 1980 to 12,000 barrels in 2013. Also, since 1980, its proven reserves have been cut in half to reach 0.124 billion barrels in 2014 (EIA, n.d. b). Given Bahrain's political upheaval and waning economic prospects, the GCC governments moved to assist it (and Oman) with $20 billion in short- and medium-term financial aid (El-tablawy, Reference El-tablawy2011). In a similar preemptive move during the Arab Spring, the UAE's central government allocated $1.55 billion to help upgrade the electrical grid and water connections in the poorer, less developed emirates in the federation (El-tablawy, Reference El-tablawy2011). Subsequently, it added that it does not plan to raise its heavily subsidized rates for water and electricity, despite soaring consumption (Utilities ME, 2013a). The government of Kuwait gave $3,500 to every citizen and increased civil-servant salaries by 115 percent, and the government of Saudi Arabia invested over $130 billion in job creation, salary increases, and in building some 500,000 units of subsidized housing, as well as many other services (Vidino, Reference Vidino2013; Knowledge@Wharton, 2011). For its nationals, Saudi Arabia offered a loan forgiveness scheme and established its first-ever program to provide unemployment benefits. Finally, the government of Qatar announced a 60 percent increase in salaries and social benefits for state civilian employees, and 50 to 120 percent increases to military staff, depending on rank. It also decreed a 50 to 120 percent increase in pensions for retirees, whether civilian or military. These benefits will cost the treasury $8.24 billion (Reuters, 2011a).

This use of government largesse to appease and placate the population is somewhat similar to the wheat self-sufficiency program that Saudi Arabia had from the early 1980s until 2008, a period when politically connected investors set up wheat and alfalfa farms that were heavily subsidized by the government. The Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC (n.d.) asserts that, by 1984, the kingdom “had become self-sufficient in wheat” after which it “began exporting wheat to some thirty countries, including China and the former Soviet Union”. This, the Embassy's website claims, is one of the country's “agricultural achievements”. In the psyche of most Saudis, food (i.e. wheat) self-sufficiency is a worthy goal and one that enhances their overall sense of security. This policy, however, had overlooked the environmental and hydrological impacts as dwindling groundwater supplies, a byproduct of this policy, have in fact undermined the country's water security. Neighboring Iran has been going through a similar experience. Bozorgmehr (Reference Bozorgmehr2014) paints a detailed and tragic picture of Iran's water shortages and related problems, and argues that they are “largely of its own making”. She places part of the blame on the country's meager and poorly distributed precipitation, but argues that the vast majority of the country's problems are related to its rapid population increase, industrial growth in arid areas, and general mismanagement. An Iranian government official is quoted as saying “mismanagement has been far more damaging than drought”. The author argues that “the biggest problem is a system of generous subsidies that has encouraged wasteful use” of water where people, especially farmers, do not have incentives to conserve it.

A government report by the Abu Dhabi Environment Authority (ADEA) stated that the current domestic water consumption in the emirate “surpasses natural water supply by nearly 26 times” and, assuming a business-as-usual approach, its ground resources will be totally depleted in less than 40 years (Emirates247, 2012). Saudi Arabia's policy reversal of 2008 amounts to an admission of failure and mismanagement. Although renewable water resources are very low in Saudi Arabia, the country uses fossil water to sustain its agricultural sector and burns a lot of energy to produce freshwater from saline sources. These measures, argues a Deutsche Bank report (Heymann, Reference Heymann2010, p. 10), do not make environmental or economic sense, but continue to be practiced partly because of security considerations: “a country does not want to have to rely on food imports if at all possible. But the acute scarcity of water in Saudi Arabia has brought about a change of heart. Officials say that the only source of wheat up to 2016 will be imports.”

Saudi Arabia decided to take advantage of the forces of globalization which facilitates international trade and long-range food transport by globalizing its (virtualFootnote ⁵) water-resource capture. This reliance on the international trading system is a profoundly daring policy measure for a security-minded country, one that is known for cautious political maneuvering. In addition to domestic policy recalibrations of this sort, most Gulf countries have been purchasing or leasing (potential) farmlands abroad, a practice that its critics refer to as “land grabbing.” Such practices are evidence of change in how human societies manage their water-dependent sectors (Falkenmark et al., Reference Falkenmark, Rockström and Savenjie2004; Hoekstra and Chapagain, Reference Hoekstra and Chapagain2008). These investments are theoretically consistent because when a country loses its comparative advantage in producing a certain good, it would be better off economically if it embraces a policy reversal to become a net importer of that same good (Hubbard and O'Brien, Reference Hubbard and O'Brien2012). A few decades ago, Rothschild (Reference Rothschild1976, p. 302) predicted the outward push (i.e. lateral pressure) that food security would produce. He wrote that in the longer term, wealthier Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries are likely to place a higher priority on food self-sufficiency, expand their own agricultural sector, or “to develop new sources of supply”. In the mid 1970s, he also stated that the oil-exporting state of Iraq will import Egyptian peasant farmers and have them farm in the Tigris and the Euphrates watershed, and that “the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development proposes to invest at least a billion dollars to make the Sudan … into an agricultural hinterland for the Middle East.” In other words, farming abroad is an old idea, and its original scope was water-rich countries in the Arab region – not beyond it.

As a response to lateral pressure, some Gulf states have been making technological adaptations such as installing efficient faucets and irrigation systems. Furthermore, since the early 2000s, they have started exploring the possible future roles that nuclear technology may be able to play in their economic development. The UAE's Foreign Minister, Shaikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, said that his country's peaceful nuclear energy program is intended to reduce the growing demand for energy, which is rising at 9 percent annually. It would also help the country produce freshwater from nuclear-powered desalination plants (KhaleejTimes, 2011).

The lateral pressure to which the Gulf states responded allowed them to expand their resource capture to ensure their food and water securityFootnote ⁶ – all the while, national policies allowed for a significant increase of residents’ water and energy consumption thereby creating an unintended, boomerang effect of new sources of insecurity. In addition, there are other local and regional security risks that may destabilize the Gulf states, in turn threatening water-supply infrastructures.

1.7 A Gulf Spring?

The Arab Spring refers to the grass-roots peaceful uprisings by the people against their authoritarian leaders that were started in Tunisia in December 2010, and then spread into Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and other Arab countries. There were, for example, smaller, short-lived protests in countries such as Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The people of Bahrain also rose up but were quelled by the security services who received military support from fellow GCC states. Until today, Bahrain experiences low-intensity agitation, which turns violent at times. While these region-wide uprisings turned violent in Yemen and descended into a protracted and very bloody civil war in Syria, they produced a success story in Tunisia where the people drafted a new constitution and democratically elected a new government. They also generated political jitters among the ruling families of the Gulf states.

The massive deployment of financial resources starting in 2011, the first year of the Arab Spring, and the use of “an extensive patronage network” helped in containing social pressure, hence stabilizing the Gulf monarchies, and placating the people (Vidino, Reference Vidino2013; Kamrava, Reference Kamrava2012); at least for the time being. In addition to this, the subsidization of utilities has created excessive use of water resources and by extension, of energy resources. The dilemma is, however, that a recent Chatham House report concluded that “the systemic waste of natural resources in the Gulf is eroding economic resilience to shocks and increasing security risks” (Lahn, et al., Reference Lahn, Stevens and Preston2013, p. vi).

The effectiveness of the material and symbolic resources that sustain the Gulf states may be short-lived; they may be eroded by market forces or by technological change. A sustained drop in oil prices would weaken governments’ abilities to co-opt reform-minded nationals, especially the youth. Furthermore, people increasingly feel empowered by the social media because it allows them to circumvent censorship and access unfiltered news. The youth in particular are emboldened by independent, reform-minded imams who are sympathetic to their causes.

Al-Faisal (Reference 141Al-Faisal2011) argued that the turmoil in Arab countries, the regional aggressiveness of Iran during President Ahmadinejad's reign, the slow burning Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and “the creation and exploitation of terrorist enclaves” have had a profound influence on security and stability in the Gulf, which is inextricably linked to the issue of global energy. He also stated that Saudi Arabia is experiencing a “rising tide of nationalist sentiment that is binding the country together ever more firmly”, so much so that a call for widespread protests against the monarchy, the “Day of Rage,” fizzled, and effectively did not materialize. The former intelligence chief, however, did not mention the strict measures that were taken to preempt the protests: security forces who were deployed in huge numbers, blocked roads leading to the designated public square where people were to gather. The hundreds who dared to show up were harassed, fired upon with rubber bullets, and many were arrested. The protesters called for “increased democracy” in their country (Birnbaum, Reference Birnbaum2011). Also, the “rising” sense of nationalism is a backhanded acknowledgement of the weak sense of national identity where, for some, allegiance to a prominent Muslim theologian sometimes takes precedence over those of national leaders. This is part of the unresolved tension in the Middle East and North Africa between state-centric (nationalism) identities and those that are transnational (Islamism).

The Gulf states have been stable mostly because their native population tends to be small hence easier to manage (or co-opt), the rentier system allows for lucrative government employment and massive patronage opportunities, and the monarchical systems cast a shadow legitimacy on the ruling families. This situation has been referred to as “Gulf exceptionalism” because it appears to dissuade the people of the Gulf from embracing the popular uprisings. However, some leading Gulf officials and members of ruling families cast doubt on this assumed exceptionalism. Kuwait's prime minister, Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah, warned that his government would have “zero tolerance” for anyone threatening Kuwait's security. A few weeks later he acknowledged that reform in all the Gulf states is a crucial step because “It is not possible to realize growth and stability in any country without economic and political reforms and to realize welfare of the peoples.” (Reuters, 2011c). Similarly, the prime minister and foreign minister of Qatar, Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabr Al Thani, said in 2011 that relations between the people and their rulers are stronger in the Gulf states than in other countries in the region, and yet he observed that “I can't say that GCC countries are hundred per cent immune” to the currents of the Arab Spring (The Peninsula, 2011b).

Marc Lynch (Reference Lynch2011) observed that during the Arab Spring, the GCC was able to drive the regional agenda because its surplus of petrodollars buys its leverage. He, however, argues that the organization's “power rests on much shakier foundations than is generally recognized” because “its internal divisions will likely re-emerge, its domestic political stability likely won't last” the ongoing turmoil in Yemen, and Bahrain's bloody suppression of its domestic opposition, its “sectarianism, and ongoing repression will continue to poison the Gulf from within”. Lynch doubts the GCC countries’ ability to maintain their regional leadership. Given that the eruption of the Arab Spring surprised almost everyone, Gause (Reference Gause2011) argues that regional analysts overestimated “the stability of Arab authoritarianism”. For many in the Middle East, “political freedom outweighed economic opportunity”. It was widely assumed that beneficiaries of authoritarian regimes would support them. The reality was very different, “the state-bred tycoons either fled or were unable to stop events and landed in post-revolutionary prison. The upper-middle class did not demonstrate in favor of Ben Ali or Mubarak. In fact, some members became revolutionary leaders themselves” (Gause, Reference Gause2011).

The Arab Spring has had a profound and transformational effect on the people of the Middle East and North Africa. It shattered, for example, the long-held perception that heads of state and their security apparatus are too powerful to topple, and more citizens are calling for the right to participate in their own governance. For example, the political beliefs of Salman Al Awda, one of Saudi Arabia's most prominent imams, have evolved over the years and he is currently a populist promoter of democracy and civic tolerance. Al Qaeda's violent attacks in the kingdom between 2003 and 2005 along with the Arab Spring uprisings appear to have shaped his intellectual and theological ideas into what they are today. Although this is consistent with “the slow liberalization in Saudi society”, the Saudi political system has largely remained static and unresponsive (Worth, Reference Worth2014). Al Awda asserts that the “Gulf governments are fighting Arab democracy [in Egypt], because they fear it will come here” (Worth, Reference Worth2014). They spent billions of dollars to subvert the popular, anti-regime uprising in Egypt and turn it into a “Gulf project” causing the “Saudi government to lose its friends and potentially lose its own people and invite disaster” (Worth, Reference Worth2014).

In light of the Arab Spring, Al Awda wrote a book in which he invoked Islamic jurisprudence and history, as well as ideas of leading Western intellectuals such as Machiavelli and Rousseau, to argue that (1) the only appropriate and rightful form of government is democracy, (2) theocracy is un-Islamic, (3) the separation of religious and political powers is mandatory, and (4) “the worst form of despotism is that practiced in the name of religion”. In the conservative Gulf states, the values that Al Awda's arguments uphold are certainly uncommon, some would consider them to be radical, and perhaps even revolutionary. While his book is banned in his country of birth, it is widely available on the internet. Furthermore, it is believed that the imam's popular MBC television program was banished because he supported the anti-regime protesters in Egypt and Tunisia that led to the successful removal of the heads of states there (Worth, Reference Worth2014).

Religious scholars in Saudi Arabia led major anti-regime public protests that called for radical reform in the early to mid 1990s after the first Gulf War. They formed the Sahwa (or Awakening), the “Kingdom's largest Islamist movement, which blends the political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood with local Wahhabi religious ideas” (Lacroix, Reference Lacroix2011). Government forces arrested hundreds if not thousands of the protesters who were calling for radical reforms. This became known as the “Sahwa insurrection” (Lacroix, Reference Lacroix2011).

The fact that charismatic imams like Al Awda are willing to take positions known to irk the government is not new in Saudi Arabia. In 2013, the kingdom cracked down on guest workers who had failed to renew their work permits. This triggered harsh measures by the authorities and multiple race-based confrontations between the foreign workers, natives, and security forces. Imam Al Awda criticized state's treatment of foreigners and called for greater tolerance, compassion, and for a more inclusive vision (Worth, Reference Worth2014). This refreshingly new perspective is alien to many of the privileged Gulf natives who view low-skilled guest workers as socially inferior. The point here is that citizens, even ones from prominent social, religious, or political circles, are willing to speak their minds even if they contravene the government's official position. They, especially the youth, are technologically empowered and much better educated and informed about regional and global affairs than previous generations. This critical development is worth monitoring and investigating further because it could be an indicator of just how turbid and muddy contemporary socio-political currents are, a dynamism that has implications for security and stability for the Gulf states. Despite the upheavals and the peoples’ pronouncements about their need for greater space for freedom, the social contract in the GCC countries was not fundamentally rewritten during the Arab Spring. This risky political gamble reflects unyielding political vision and rigid institutional frameworks that have served ruling families – thus far.

1.8 Conclusions

The Gulf states have deployed their hydrocarbon wealth to create countries that now boast modern infrastructures and social services that are mostly on a par with those in developed countries, and to ensure water and food security for the people. Their ambitious development plans have meant that the Gulf states have needed to import armies of skilled and unskilled guest workers. The perceived ill-treatment of the latter has led many of them to harbor grievances against their employers and host governments; this social pressure could erupt and escalate, or could be exploited by national and sub-national actors. This situation could become a potential threat to water security in the Gulf States. Chapter 2 discusses this as well as the potential threat to water security that socio-sectarian cleavages may engender, especially in countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

A study by D'Odorico et al. (Reference D'Odorico, Laio and Ridolfi2010; see also Walker and Salt, Reference Walker and Salt2006) finds that international trade amounts to an optimization of eco-hydrological resources worldwide; however, it also reduces the resilience of say, food-importing countries as it erodes the redundancyFootnote ⁷ of domestic systems. This is because it weakens the importing countries’ ability to absorb shocks such as a stupendous crop failure in the producing country, political turmoil that may interrupt supplies, and domestic changes in available resources. International food trade also disconnects consuming societies from the natural resources upon which they, and producing societies, depend (D'Odorico et al., Reference D'Odorico, Laio and Ridolfi2010). The authors advocate an alternative to virtual water trade that is “based on the notion of water solidarity, whereby (1) long distance transport of food occurs mainly in times of crop failure and food shortage, and (2) it does not let the available resources exceed the carrying capacity that the region would have in periods with no drought”. Furthermore, trade in virtual water is increasingly threatening water security of food-exporting countries (Vos et al., Reference Vos, Boelens and Mena2014).

Gulf governments used their oil rents to also reduce the level of social dissent through coercion or co-optation, which appears to bolster their hold on political power. Energy endowments allowed these water-deficient countries to import additional food stuffs that allowed them to artificially increase their population base and their overall human carrying capacity (Hoekstra and Chapagain, Reference Hoekstra and Chapagain2008). Natural wealth also helped governments overcome water and food insecurity, primarily by building large desalination plants, subsidizing the farming sector at home, importing food products, and, more recently, by gaining access to arable land abroad. The effects of farming abroad on local populations, especially their food security, and on their natural environment have been sources of extensive public pressure on agricultural investors from countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The international news media and some non-governmental organizations portray these investments as “land grabs,” and often focus on the adverse socioeconomic and agricultural impacts on local populations. Although land abroad was intended to be farmed and most of its yields shipped to investing countries, Chapter 3 shows that this plan is proving to be more complicated and less promising than was first anticipated. Sustainable security occurs when both actors become more – not less – secure as a result of their economic engagement.

Since around the mid 1990s, the Gulf states have been, to varying degrees, addressing water consumption in open and sometimes aggressive ways by taking some concrete steps to conserve water, a scarce natural resource that is expensively supplemented by desalination. Chapter 4 discusses such efforts and finds that the approach has focused on technological fixes and voluntary conservation messages; that is, they have largely steered clear of using conservation pricing as a mechanism of public policy. Finally, Chapter 5 outlines potential demand management opportunities and argues for the need to introduce gradual and incremental pricing steps that would eventually approach full water cost recovery. Furthermore, it argues that marginalized guest workers who speak neither English nor Arabic may well hinder responses to disasters at times of major, extensive emergencies. For Gulf societies to be stable and secure, governments need to develop creative laws that are inclusive of guest workers and give them civil and political rights. This will enhance the stability and cohesiveness of these societies, and bolster their abilities to respond to national emergencies such a major water-supply disruption that may take days or weeks to restore. Countries like Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait, where guest workers make up over 50 percent of the population, would be major beneficiaries of more enlightened expatriate policies.