Book contents
- Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities
- Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Puzzles in Criminal Law
- Part II Problems in Constitutional Law
- Part III Perplexities in Jurisprudence
- Part IV Paradoxes in Moral Philosophy
- Bibliography of Works by Larry Alexander
- Index
- References
Bibliography of Works by Larry Alexander
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 November 2018
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Book contents
- Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities
- Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Puzzles in Criminal Law
- Part II Problems in Constitutional Law
- Part III Perplexities in Jurisprudence
- Part IV Paradoxes in Moral Philosophy
- Bibliography of Works by Larry Alexander
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Chapter
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- Moral Puzzles and Legal PerplexitiesEssays on the Influence of Larry Alexander, pp. 441 - 452Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2018
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