Clientelism in Decentralized States

doi:10.1017/9781108615594.010

10 - Clientelism in Decentralized States

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 February 2019

Gianmarco León and

Leonard Wantchekon

Edited by

Jonathan A. Rodden and

Erik Wibbels

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Jonathan A. Rodden: Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Erik Wibbels: Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina

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Summary

Clientelistic networks and decentralization share common organizational features and interact in different ways. They are both multi-tiered structures plagued with agency issues. In this chapter we study these links, reviewing the current scholarship and emphasizing how the different features of political decentralization affect clientelistic politics, and point to avenues for future research. In particular, we emphasize the role clientelistic networks and upward and downward accountability play in undermining programmatic politics. We finally provide a brief analysis of the role local bureaucracies can play in counterbalancing the efficiency losses introduced by clientelistic politics in decentralized states.

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Type: Chapter
Information: Decentralized Governance and Accountability
Academic Research and the Future of Donor Programming
, pp. 229 - 247

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108615594.010 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2019

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