Dworkin’s Critique of Hart’s Positivism

doi:10.1017/9781108636377.029

29 - Dworkin’s Critique of Hart’s Positivism

from Part VI - Critique

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 January 2021

Dennis Patterson

Edited by

Torben Spaak and

Patricia Mindus

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Torben Spaak: Affiliation:
Stockholms Universitet
Patricia Mindus: Affiliation:
Uppsala Universitet, Sweden

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Summary

Patterson argues that Dworkin’s critique of legal positivism, specifically Dworkin’s critique of Hart’s positivist theory of law, went through two stages: first the critique put forward in Dworkin’s 1967 article ‘The Model of Rules’, which focused on the alleged inability of the rule of recognition to account for the existence of legal principles; then the criticism expressed in Law’s Empire concerning the alleged inability of the theory to account for the existence of so-called theoretical disagreement in law. Patterson’s conclusion, however, is that although Dworkin in his mature critique made a number of valid points, such as identifying the lack of a thought-out view on legal interpretation in Hart’s legal philosophy, he ultimately failed to undermine Hart’s theory. As Patterson sees it, although legal positivists lack a thought-out view of legal interpretation, there is nothing in the theory of legal positivism that stops them from developing such a theory, and he suggests three crucial criteria that a positivist theory of legal interpretation must satisfy, namely, minimal mutilation of existing law, coherence, and generality.

Keywords

Ronald Dworkin H. L. A. Hart model of rules pedigree thesis discretion thesis

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Type: Chapter
Information: The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism , pp. 675 - 694

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108636377.029 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2021

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