Critical Thinking and the Rejection of Unsubstantiated Claims

doi:10.1017/9781108684354.005

Chapter 4 - Critical Thinking and the Rejection of Unsubstantiated Claims

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 December 2019

D. Alan Bensley

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Robert J. Sternberg and

Diane F. Halpern

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Robert J. Sternberg: Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Diane F. Halpern: Affiliation:
Claremont McKenna College, California

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Summary

This chapter examines how critical thinking and a dual-process theory of thinking are related to endorsement of unsubstantiated knowledge claims. Rejecting unsubstantiated claims, such as psychological misconceptions and pseudoscience, is associated with being more inclined and better able to think critically. In dual-process theory terms, people who endorse more unsubstantiated claims tend to rely more on intuitive thinking and less on rational-analytic thinking. Helping people to resist making a rapid, intuitive response to unsubstantiated claims and instead to take a slower, more rational, critical thinking approach can help them reject such claims.

Keywords

conspiracy theory critical thinking critical thinking dispositions critical thinking skills dual-process theory metacognition paranormal claims psychological misconception pseudoscience unsubstantiated claims

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Type: Chapter
Information: Critical Thinking in Psychology , pp. 68 - 102

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108684354.005 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2020

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