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  3. Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics
  • Cited by 214
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      05 April 2013
      15 April 2013
      ISBN:
      9781139506762
      9781107032613
      9781107567092
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139506762
      Dimensions:
      (234 x 156 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.78kg, 390 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (234 x 156 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.54kg, 390 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Economics, Economic Theory, Politics and International Relations, Comparative Politics
      Series:
      Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
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    • Selected: Digital
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    Subjects:
    Economics, Economic Theory, Politics and International Relations, Comparative Politics
    Series:
    Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
    Information

    Book description

    Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

    Awards

    Winner of the 2014 Levine Prize, Research Committee on the Structure and Organization of Government, International Political Science Association

    Reviews

    'Adolph has written a timely book for students of monetary policy, central banking, and comparative political economy. The main messages are accessible to a wide audience and have implications not only for economics, but also for law and sociology.'

    Anne-Caroline Hüser Source: International Journal of Constitutional Law

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