On a cold and snowy day in March, I met Isaac Levi (1930–2018) in his New York City home. Their friendly dog welcomed me exstatically when I entered their Upper West Side apartment near Columbia University. While he had long passed his eightieth birthday, Levi was still attending talks and seminars at the philosophy department when we met and was known as an active and provocative discussant with strong opinions. I met Levi a few months before his eighty-fourth birthday. He accompanied me into the living room, offered coffee, and then we started talking. Levi was extremely sharp and critical but also very funny and witty; three hours passed so quickly, I had not even noticed that the batteries of my recording had given up. Our conversation confirmed that he has been one of the most important formal epistemologists and decision theorists in philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. Notably, Levi had turned slightly cynical, however, obviously affected by the fact that decision theorists might not have given his contributions the attention that he had sought for throughout his career.