Abstract: This chapter examines the system of remedies applied in WTO dispute settlement, sometimes called ‘prospective’ or ‘forward-looking’. This system integrates remedy repetition and remedy escalation, with remedies being issued sequentially: initial rulings (Mere Adjudication and Declarations of Breach) are followed by the possibility of compliance adjudication, and, where this is insufficient, the prospect of escalation through authorised trade retaliation (Permissible Responses). While authorised retaliation is often seen as the key WTO remedy, the practice shows that it is rarely implemented. Instead, the system’s strength lies in mobilising the deterrent effect of remedy escalation together with the reputational costs of declared non-compliance. The chapter considers the historical evolution of remedies applied in international trade law, from the GATT 1947 to the current Dispute Settlement Understanding, analysing their central components and practical applications. The design of the WTO’s system of remedies, which seeks to mobilise the various layers of pro-compliance forces of international law, provides an analytical framework for the subsequent chapters assessing the remedial practice of international courts in the face of non-compliance.