Communities of Expertise and Religion

Religious actors, in the context of this study, are experts and practitioners of a religious tradition who have background in studying the principles of the religion and engage in the application of these principles to public life. A religious actor can be a religious leader or any organization that overtly operates under religious principles. Religious leaders, by forming and advancing a specialized type of knowledge that shapes public understanding of religion, which I call public theology, constitute a community of expertise.³ This expert community has an influence on multiple policy fields. Before situating religious leaders as members of epistemic communities in conflict transformation, a brief look at the philosophical origins of the concept of episteme and epistemic communities is necessary.

Episteme means “knowledge” or “science” in Greek. It stands for theoretical knowledge, in the form of agreed-on rules, standards, and procedures. Practical knowledge, on the other hand, is conveyed by the word techne, which is used for Platonic models of knowledge.⁴ A coherent body of special knowledge qualifies as episteme. That body of knowledge does not need to be in the realm of physical sciences as we understand it today. To illustrate, episteme might define the knowledge framework that the scientist or the theologian works within, whereas techne would be more appropriately employed for crafts and applied science. Religious leaders and theologians create and influence episteme by employing textual analysis to make sense of religious sources and conveying the interpretation to the public. One area of such investigation, textual analysis and interpretation (also called hermeneutics), has its own specific methodology on which scholars agree and is designated as “a body of knowledge that deals with understanding what is said in a text.”⁵ It is a distinct area of expertise.

Foucault can be regarded as the intellectual father of politics of knowledge, and, not surprisingly, religion has its place in his frameworks. In a Foucauldian sense, religion has as much epistemic value – if not more – as science. I argue that Foucault's “Postmodern” episode would constitute a fourth episteme, after the three epistemes defined in Foucault's The Order of Things:⁶ the “Renaissance,” the “Classical,” and the “Modern.” Foucault's epistemes belong to periods that are marked by specific discourses and worldviews. These epistemes do not follow a linear progression, but they may have similarities and differences. The “Renaissance” period was marked by the interpretation of “signs” and the discovery of resemblances; that particular episteme had a very thin line between science, as we understand it today, and divination. The “Classical” episteme focused on identity, difference, and measurement; there was an increased value of man-made taxonomies and analyses with advancements in technology. In the “Modern” age, there was an implicit rejection of nature and divine as “the cause.” Nothing but “Man” is responsible for knowledge. The “Modern” episteme, in terms of its premises and its confidence in scientific theories and application, coincides with the strongly secular and materialist political views of the twentieth century. The liberal internationalist approach to peacekeeping, with its focus on bringing liberal democracy and market economy to every divided society, is a reflection of this Modern episteme. The next step in peacebuilding is culture-sensitive strategic peacebuilding that takes religion seriously.

As Foucault notes in various instances, the questions and discourses in each episteme might resemble or borrow from another episteme, but the categories still maintain an internal coherence. With the end of the Cold War and the continuing decline in state capacities and secular ideologies to respond to society's material and psychological needs, there is arguably a decrease in the unquestioned belief in science and secular forms of governance.⁷ This shift has led to the recognition of actors who could actually devise “answers” to people's needs. Recent examples include the rise of religious actors during and after the Arab Uprisings and the increasing role of religion in the relatively more secular American and European political scenes. Within the American context, Toft, Philpott, and Shah argue that the prevalence of religion forces the candidates for national office “to speak the language of religion.”⁸ The Postmodern episteme that we are currently influenced by, therefore, is the one that acknowledges scientific advances but focuses on human spirituality and how people can relate to the outside world without experiencing alienation. Expert communities of that particular episteme inevitably include faith leaders and other religious actors.

How does religion take its epistemological place next to science in this new era? Obviously, textual interpretation, no matter how rigorously it is conducted, cannot be numerically precise. However, the existence of policy debates regarding the interpretation of sacred texts renders the “absoluteness” of religious precepts open to question. Religion, in terms of practice and interpretation, evolves over time. There are multiple ways and methods through which one can give meaning to the religious traditions. Scott Appleby, a professor of history and expert on religious violence and peacebuilding, argues these dynamics make the sacred “ambivalent”; there is no final say when it comes to interpreting traditions.⁹ Similar to the scientific sphere, religious expertise is the product of certain systematic procedures. Religious attitudes change over time, as religious leaders reinterpret symbols, myths, and narratives in the face of contemporary challenges. Religious actors bring together multiple influences and sources to give meaning to world events, and they usually strive for a consensus to ensure consistency and clarity. De Silva, for example, notes that Buddhist political activism in Sri Lanka was defined by Burmese monks educated in India and sympathetic to Marxist ideals.¹⁰

Treating religious interpretation and analysis as a special form of expertise in public policy and diplomacy might raise questions. However, it is congruent with the development of the epistemic communities theory in international studies. The importance accorded to a specific area defines the classification of knowledge, as well as its permeation into practice. Emanuel Adler, a key scholar in the study of epistemic communities, asserts that depending on the historical context, “theories and policy proposals that previously did not make much sense to politicians may suddenly acquire a political meaning, thus becoming viable.”¹¹ This is true for resurgence of religion in the public sphere. With religion's reentry into the political realm and the questioning of the secularization-modernization arguments,¹² contemporary policy makers assign more credence to faith-related issues.

In the field of political science, an epistemic community is defined as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.”¹³ Peter Haas, a political scientist who has extensively written on communities of knowledge, states that “epistemic communities need not be made up of natural scientists; they can consist of social scientists or individuals from any discipline or profession who have a sufficiently strong claim to a body of knowledge that is valued by society.”¹⁴ However, scholarly investigations that employ the epistemic communities framework have focused mostly on the influence of scientific elites on political decision making. Examples include Mediterranean pollution control,¹⁵ the protection of stratospheric ozone,¹⁶ nuclear arms control,¹⁷ climate change,¹⁸ and AIDS control regimes.¹⁹ The only exception is the relatively recent treatment of diplomatic corps as epistemic communities by Davis-Cross.²⁰

This technocratic bias in the literature leads many to think that knowledge communities can exist only in the realm of science and that other forms of expertise, including religion, do not qualify as “knowledge.” However, those scholars who have initially theorized knowledge communities in global politics have clearly stated that an epistemic communities framework is a “vehicle for the development of insightful theoretical premises about the creation of collective interpretation and choice” and “methodologically pluralistic.”²¹ Given the character and the formation process of public theologies and the voluntary nature of religious affiliations and practice, faith-related debates and processes call for such a theoretical vehicle.

The success of epistemic communities is historically contingent.²² Post–Cold War systemic structures, identity debates, and political events, as well as their resonance in domestic contexts, have rendered implementation of religious policy proposals politically more viable than they were perceived in the past. In other words, as the focus has shifted from material capabilities to identity-related issues in politics, religious actors and their influence have become more visible in politics. This influence is not confined to conflict settings. Political debates on issues such as development and human rights included strong religious voices. To illustrate, James D. Wolfensohn (former president of the World Bank Group) and Lord George Carey (Archbishop of Canterbury between 1991 and 2002) established World Faiths Development Dialogue to foster understanding between faith-based organizations and the World Bank, thus tapping into the expertise of religious actors in local settings. We continue to witness the establishment of such interfaith institutes, initiatives, and issue-based religious organizations every day.

Religious actors satisfy the criteria for the communities of knowledge and expertise. According to Haas, a network of professionals should share a minimum of four conditions to qualify as an epistemic community: a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared norms of validity, and a common policy enterprise in the form of common practices associated with a set of problems to which professional competence is directed. Religious actors, albeit different in a number of ways from scientific communities, share those traits. In terms of their normative and causal beliefs, as well as norms of validity, there is a remarkable level of agreement, which is not surprising given that religious actors make reference to the same texts, usually by employing widely accepted methods of interpretation. Respect for life, a belief in a transcendent being, and the need for a just economic system are among the values that most – if not all – religious actors hold as an integral part of their “beliefs” and for which they advocate actively on national and international levels. Evidently, stated belief and practice may differ to a significant extent. However, this does not change the fact that theological discussions usually revolve around some common principles. Articles of faith are not created randomly; a practice or proclamation of faith is systematically traced to text and tradition. Only religious leaders and experts in theology can effectively undertake this step. People turn to their religious leaders when they want to know more about what insights their religious tradition provides on specific issues such as group membership, health practices, and public service. Religious actors sometimes lead activist networks, which perpetuate the interpretation and theological insights into a policy or concern.

One can argue that religious actors merely qualify as activists or communities of discourse and that religious knowledge cannot be treated like scientific knowledge, the type of knowledge that has been at the center of the epistemic communities approach so far. What counts as episteme (knowledge) at a specific time would be defined by consensus and the extent to which a body of knowledge would be regarded as authoritative. In this vein, the preaching of religious leaders and the communities that form around these teachings constitute “islands of epistemic communities.” The audience for these teachings takes this type of knowledge seriously, and its members regulate their public and private lives accordingly. For a significant number of people, religious knowledge has more relevance than scientific knowledge – actually, religious knowledge, at times, has the power to define the borders of science, as we have seen with the debates surrounding stem cell research in the US. This book does not claim in any way, however, that religious knowledge is or should be superior to its scientific counterpart. Yet ignoring religious actors’ influence in the politics of technology, conflict, and the economy is costly, and no investigation of peacebuilding, conflict transformation, or human rights can be complete without reference to the impact of religious interpretation. Religious knowledge can lead to violence or bring peace; it can have public manifestations in any direction. In either case, policy makers should take religion seriously.

The main argument of this book is that religious interpretation translates into a form of expertise, and religious actors are knowledge producers in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and human rights, among other issue areas. What makes the stance of a religious actor different from that of a layperson is the employment of exegesis and hermeneutics, sometimes acquired through intensive training. Exegesis is defined as the critical interpretations of an authoritative text, such as the Holy Scriptures, and as stated before, hermeneutics refers to the science of formulating guidelines, laws, and methods for interpreting a text's meaning.²³ This training and interest in exegesis and in the study of hermeneutics lend faith leaders relative credibility when it comes to religious approaches toward private and public spheres. While it is true that one might find “conflicting” textual evidence that advocates different positions, in many cases it has been possible to have a technical discussion of the context and the message in sacred texts. The existence of conferences, conventions, and peer-reviewed journals in the field of theology consolidates the argument that there exists a structured expert community that promotes the advancement of knowledge in textual analysis, interpretation, and application, all of which are subject to critique and refutation.²⁴ Epistemic communities are seeking and “marketing” not the “truth” but systematic new perspectives that have the capacity to influence the politics of the moment. In other words, the factors we should be interested in are the “values and visions that can catch the imagination of decision-makers who then, on the basis of their new understanding, may redefine strategic and economic interests so as to enhance human interests across national borders.”²⁵ In the fields of peacebuilding and conflict transformation, these values and visions are the religious perspectives that capture the subtleties of human security, trauma healing, and reconciliation.

The epistemic perspective toward conflict transformation and peacebuilding is interdisciplinary. It combines theology, sociology, philosophy, and political science, among others. In this book, I use the so-called Troubles period of Northern Ireland as a theory-building case, but the framework is applicable to any ethnically divided society or any setting that requires countering a violent discourse or practice. Production and dissemination of religious knowledge, when investigated rigorously, can help both scholars and practitioners explain the mechanisms of violence and peace. The framework also helps clarify the duties of the practitioners in multidimensional strategic peacebuilding.

Religious Actors as Epistemic Communities in Conflict Transformation

Twentieth-century peace-building efforts were dominated by liberal internationalism, which offered market economy and liberal democracy as a panacea for divisions and problems of unstable societies. This approach failed in many settings and destabilized societies even further. In Rwanda, Angola, Bosnia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, liberal internationalist peace-building missions “had the ‘perverse effect’ of undermining the very peace they were meant to buttress.”²⁶ Practitioners have gradually come to the conclusion that peacebuilding needs to be sensitive to the particular needs of the divided societies and that there is no magic solution that works in every conflict setting. The conflict transformation process requires the inclusion of multiple local and transnational actors in the process, which means bringing together diverse knowledge networks and relevant areas of expertise. Religion is one such critical area that peacebuilders ignored in the past but that has become increasingly recognized as relevant to peace processes.

Many contemporary conflicts and civil wars have a religious dimension.²⁷ This does not mean that the parties are fighting over religion or that the conflicts are religious in nature. There are diverse arguments when it comes to the effect of religion on conflicts and their resolution. Toft argues that religious civil wars are four times harder on noncombatants when compared to their nonreligious counterparts.²⁸ On the other hand, Svensson notes that religious difference does not make a conflict more intractable, unless parties are fighting for an overtly religious cause.²⁹ However, the religion dimension is too important to ignore altogether in conflict transformation and efforts for a sustainable peace, even in nonreligious conflict settings. In most societies, religion is a part of political identity and national narratives, and policy makers cannot underestimate its importance even when dealing with seemingly secular issues and tensions.

All religions have both inclusive and exclusive interpretations and practices, which I call public theologies; no faith tradition is intrinsically violent or peaceful. I define exclusive public theologies as perspectives and interpretations that discourage cooperation with the members of other denominations or religions and aggressively defend a particular religious view without being open to compromise or discussion. Inclusive public theologies, on the other hand, focus on possibilities of cooperation and agreement, recognizing that different faith groups can come together for a common purpose and that differences can be resolved or tolerated. Each of these theologies has its supporters and ways to influence politics. The settings where exclusive public theologies dominate are usually conflict prone. To bring stability to divided societies, religious communities that support inclusive public theologies must find ways to influence politicians and other parties to the conflict. These religious communities work to advance their public theology in ways that are similar to the ways scientific epistemic communities affect power politics. Accordingly, even in conflict settings such as Colombia, Uganda, and El Salvador, where religion was not the main issue of contention, religious actors played a constructive role in conflict transformation through their knowledge of local customs and expertise in theological approaches to conflict.³⁰

Especially since the end of the Cold War, religious leaders who are interested in representing their traditions in an inclusive manner have become more visible. In August 2000, more than 1000 representatives of transnational and indigenous religious traditions gathered at the United Nations for a Millennium Summit of World Religious and Spiritual Leaders, which indicated the level of international recognition of faith leaders as influential actors in global politics. What is surprising is not just how recent this focus on religious actors has been but how long it has taken to recognize that they influence politics both directly and indirectly. Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright criticized the George W. Bush administration for its lack of recognition of religious actors’ influence in an international context: “One of the many ironies of U.S. policy is that the Bush administration, for all its faith-based initiatives, is far more comfortable working with secular leaders than with those Iraqis for whom religion is central. This is true even when the religious leaders are moderate in orientation and generally accepting the U.S. goals.”³¹ One reason for such discomfort is that policy makers have not sufficiently recognized religious expertise in mainstream politics, including the dynamics of peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

Today's challenges show that even in places where a separation of church and state exists, such a legal divide is not necessarily equal to a diminished role of religion in the lives of individuals. Even if people do not experience and practice religion in their everyday existence, knowing that “the church” is there for them still matters, as do statements made by religious leaders.³² This understanding of “vicarious religion,” as observed by sociologist Grace Davie, can explain how religions might appear to be absent in the political and public scene yet might exert tremendous influence and meaning at the individual level. Davie draws attention to the Nordic populations, who are members of the Lutheran Church and pay “appreciable amount of tax” to their churches yet remain to be among the least practicing populations in the world on every comparable scale.³³ Vicarious religion is not the only framework that underscores the complexity of religion. Demerath developed the concept of “cultural religion,” which is “identification with a religious heritage without religious participation or a sense of personal involvement per se,” and among his examples are the Polish Catholics, Northern Irish Catholics, and Northern Irish Protestants.³⁴ Gans formulated “symbolic religiosity” that he defines as the “consumption of religious symbols, apart from regular participation in a religious culture and in religious affiliations – other than for purely secular purposes.”³⁵ These concepts indicate that even if people do not actively practice religion in their everyday lives, religious tradition, with its symbols and myths, still plays an important role worthy of investigation, and religious leaders and their public role remain highly relevant. In the context of Northern Ireland, for example, Bruce states, “What matters is not any individual's religiosity, but the individual's incorporation in an ethnic group defined by a particular religion.”³⁶ In short, even if the public does not appear to be “religious” in statistical tabulations or surveys, it is still likely to heed religious leaders and their public discourse.³⁷ This is especially noteworthy in conflict transformation and peace-building processes within seemingly secular societies.

Religious actors play multiple roles in conflict transformation, peacebuilding, and human rights, which we can subsume under the term “religious peacebuilding.” Professor of the practice of Catholic peacebuilding Gerard Powers defines religious peacebuilding as “the beliefs, norms, and rituals that pertain to peacebuilding, as well as a range of actors, from religious institutions, faith-based private voluntary organizations that are not formally part of a religious institution, and individuals and groups for whom religion is a significant motivation for their peacebuilding.”³⁸ According to Powers, interreligious peacebuilding has one or more of the following purposes: deepening relationships, improving understanding, finding common ground on beliefs and actions, promoting common action, and encouraging complementary action.³⁹ Everyone can participate in religious peacebuilding, but an epistemic community that can relate text and tradition to daily life and peace efforts usually leads this network. Sociologist John Brewer and his colleagues typify religious peacemaking as active and passive, the former living out commitments as a social practice, the latter an idealistic commitment but lacking in application. They also distinguish between social (related to societal healing) and political (related to negotiated deals) peace processes.⁴⁰ Professor of political science and peace studies Daniel Philpott argues that the central meaning of reconciliation is the restoration of right relationship, and “it is largely religious leaders and communities who have sponsored it, though not exclusively.”⁴¹ In short, scholars in multiple fields have recently pointed to the importance of religious expertise and religious leaders in conflict transformation and peacebuilding.⁴²

To be recognized as an epistemic community, a group should be seen as “experts” who are uniquely qualified to inform the public and policy debates. Citizens defer to the authority of experts not only in circumstances involving technical dimensions, but also in “all sorts of common decisions.”⁴³ Thus, religious leaders appear on the political scene as “heralds,” “advocates,” “observers,” “educators,” and “institution builders,” in addition to being citizens, public leaders, and activists.⁴⁴ With such power and authority, they can also legitimize or delegitimize political arrangements. One such example is the role of Catholic priests in the civil disobedience campaign in the Philippines. Religious actors under the leadership of Cardinal Jaime Sin along with the Catholic radio station Veritas played a crucial role in mobilizing the masses against the fraudulent victory of Ferdinand Marcos over Corazon Aquino in the 1980s.⁴⁵ Similarly, Buddhist monks played a leading role in the Saffron Revolution in Burma, fighting against government repression.⁴⁶ Another example is the transformative role of the Catholic Church in Poland and its influence in providing an alternative to Communism. The Catholic Church, which had been suppressed under Communist rule, became a mediator between the Communist government and Poland's nongovernmental trade union that the government tried to abolish.⁴⁷

Faith leaders have the potential to employ “a well-established and pervasive influence in the community, a reputation as an apolitical force for change based on a respected set of values, unique leverage for reconciling conflicting parties, including an ability to rehumanize relationships, and the capability to mobilize community, national, and international support for peace process.”⁴⁸ Religious institutions have acted as “protective fortresses for threatened people” in many conflict settings.⁴⁹ Many faith leaders and faith-based nongovernmental organizations have provided training in conflict resolution and play mediating roles.⁵⁰ To illustrate, the Community of Sant'Egidio, played a major role in hosting and mediating the negotiations that led to the end of civil war in Mozambique.⁵¹ Similarly, civil society actors like Corrymeela Community brought Protestants and Catholics together in Northern Ireland, creating safe space and discussion forums for possible solutions to the conflict.

Clearly, not all religious leaders support peace processes or can reconcile conflicting parties. Accordingly, this book does not claim that the epistemic communities framework always works inclusively and peacefully but instead argues that there are resources and traits only religious actors can employ in changing the politics of divided societies. Religious interpretation, expertise, and knowledge can influence conflict transformation in multiple ways, which is why we should introduce a novel approach that can account for both positive and negative influences of religious actors.

How do religious actors contribute to conflict transformation? Professional training, prestige, and reputation for expertise in an area such as religion provide faith leaders with access to the political system, and legitimize or authorize politicians’ activities. Beyond the elite level, religious congregations are hubs for the forming of political views that cannot be simplified as the aggregation of the congregation's membership.⁵² In terms of conflict transformation, Professor of International Peacebuilding John Paul Lederach states that such midlevel and grassroots groupings and, consequently, leadership that can be provided by clerics, are much more effective than elite-level transformation attempts.⁵³ Churches and other places of worship can provide individuals with “civic skills,” enabling them to mobilize and actively participate in political life.⁵⁴ This kind of leadership by religious actors distinguishes them from scientific epistemic communities that usually have little direct access to the public. Unlike traditional scientific epistemic communities, the clergy possess resources that can have an immediate impact on society. However, research also shows that religious leaders feel constrained by theological factors when it comes to playing an active role in the public sphere.⁵⁵

The capability and, in a way, obligation of faith leaders to translate complicated textual interpretations into everyday language and daily practice adds to the effectiveness of their message when it comes to influencing high-level policy makers. The message and expectations that are created locally are conveyed to policy makers via public announcements or through individual meetings. The political elite, at a point in which such expectations would work best for their political prospects, choose to follow the strategies recommended by local experts (in our case, faith leaders) and promote the “knowledge” at their disposal to their adversaries and other actors in international settings. One such example is the role of Father Alec Reid in influencing prominent Irish politician Gerry Adams’ views throughout the Troubles period.⁵⁶

Religious leaders, like other epistemic communities, have their shared normative and principled beliefs. Among many of these beliefs is a conviction regarding the fundamental unity of the human family; a sense of the sacredness of the individual person and his conscience; a sense of the value of the human community; a recognition that human power is not self-sufficient and absolute and a sense of obligation to stand on the side of the poor and the oppressed against the rich and the oppressors.⁵⁷ The strongest disagreements among religious leaders do not stem from the rejection of any of these principles, but from the “exceptions” such as the admissibility of harming another as a form of self-defense, which could (or not) be made under certain circumstances.

Despite the fact that many religious traditions share a number of core principles, specific rituals and practices involved in individual traditions may significantly differ. This is not in itself an obstacle to achieving common ends. These traditions, embodied in groups or states, may form purposive associations, defined as a relationship among those who cooperate for the purpose of securing certain shared beliefs, values, and interests, who adapt certain practices as a means to that end, and who regard such practices as worthy of respect only to the extent that they are useful instruments of the common purpose.⁵⁸ An observant Protestant, for example, might have more in common with an observant Catholic, than a Protestant who is not seen as living up to the tenets of their tradition. Although this phenomenon is not investigated in depth here, there are “religious communities” that define their identities primarily against “nonbelievers,” as opposed to believers in other traditions. Such a reinterpretation of “the other” may not always be the best way to create a stable political environment, but it shows that the borders of self and the others are fluid and open to interpretation by religious actors.

How do we apply the epistemic communities theory to religious peacebuilding? Adler introduces five variables within the context of the traditional epistemic communities research agenda that are useful for explaining the relationship between religious interpretation and politics: Units of Variation, Innovation, Selection, Diffusion, and Units of Effective Modification. Scholars have used these five elements of knowledge politics to investigate the degree of influence scientists may exert over politicians. For the purposes of our analysis, I adapt this framework to investigate the mechanisms by which religious leaders and communities engage with political issues, especially those of divided societies. To explain the impact of religious discourses, public theologies, and the religious actors on the politics of divided societies, I expand these dimensions as follows:

• Units of Variation: “Units of variation” stands for new conceptualizations, interpretations, meanings, the units of change that are influenced by the epistemic communities in question. Units of variation in religious peacebuilding are exclusive public theologies (religious perspectives that regard one tradition superior to others) and inclusive public theologies (religious perspectives that do not regard one religious tradition superior to others).

Public theology is the reflection and implications of a religion in the activities that take place in the common space, including political and social life. It is not necessarily what is stated in the relevant scriptures; it includes human interpretation of what is relevant and to what extent particular religious premises are experienced in the public arena. Every religion contains observable and influential currents of issue-based public thinking that are contingent on time and space. It is usually the interactions and clashes of these currents that interest policy makers on the ground, not the conflict of religions or civilizations. A number of works have investigated the dynamics of public theologies, especially within the context of the US.⁵⁹

Unlike civil religion, which denotes the employment of myths and symbols to support the practices of a country or group, public theology, as a term, is normatively neutral.⁶⁰ McElroy states that public theology has the component of “acknowledging God's participation in the life of the nation, while at the same time using religious truth to critique the policies and direction of the nation.”⁶¹ Even in contexts wherein the separation of church and state is affirmed in key foundational documents, public theologies still exist; individuals who practice their religion reflect their perspective and translate their beliefs to public actions in one way or the other.

A politically engaged understanding of Christianity is theologically communal (as opposed to agentic or individual-focused) and horizontal (concerned with ethical matters, rather than individual salvation or “vertical”).⁶² There are exceptions to this rule. In the context of Northern Ireland, evangelical Protestants under the Free Presbyterian Church and the Democratic Unionist Party played an overtly political role, as opposed to mainstream churches. They represented an exclusive public theology for many years; they claimed superiority over other denominations, and demonstrated an inflexible attitude toward communication with “the other.” Similarly, other fundamentalist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the Army of God in the US, extremist Jewish organizations such as Kach in Israel, and political groupings like the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh represent exclusive public theologies. Inclusive public theology, on the other hand, is the web of religious perspectives that claim no superiority over other visions, and those who support such a theology remain open to communication. Both interfaith initiatives and ecumenical cooperation become possible, because actors subscribe to an inclusive public theology that respects the others’ right to their own rituals and beliefs. As this book demonstrates, the approach of a religious actor toward different issues and other religions may transform over time. We should treat public theologies as “variables” that are prone to change, rather than constants that can be easily judged or categorized by policy makers.

• Innovation: Innovation denotes the processes by which the units of variation are packaged and the process by which they are transformed. To be accepted by society, theological innovation must be introduced gradually, usually in the form of framing issues in a way that creates positive rather than negative identities. Innovation is critical to any knowledge process. I integrate political scientist Ted Jelen's four categories of clerical activities – conversion, agenda setting, reinforcement, and empowerment – to this stage of epistemic politics as components of a theological-political innovation in conflict transformation.⁶³ In other words, theological innovation may come in the form of conversion (theologically justifying the embrace of the other), agenda setting (suggestions of alternative political arrangements that do not need to be public), reinforcement (representing the perspective of one's congregation without creating an “other”), and empowerment (giving the laity political tools to further their peaceful interests). In the peacebuilding process, each of these four components is crucial, and they are visible in settings where religious actors have an impact.

• Selection: This stage refers to the political processes that determine the policies religious actors develop or suggest, and subsequently are adopted by the policy makers. Selection processes in religious peacebuilding occur only when politicians see them as feasible in realizing the agenda of religious actors who support an inclusive public theology. In other words, political leaders cannot reach a compromise if a country's religious leaders do not create a discursive space and legitimize peace moves. In cases ranging from South Africa to Sierra Leone, stabilizing agreements have been possible only after the theological basis has been established. In order to build this theological basis, religious leaders need to consistently formulate conciliatory interpretations of religion. This theological basis may not be sufficient for a peace agreement, but as this book argues, it is a necessary condition.

• Diffusion: Diffusion denotes the spread of ideas to other communities or relevant groups. In the context of the traditional epistemic communities framework, diffusion means the replication of peacebuilding practices and norms in different divided societies. Religious ideas can diffuse across ethnic groups, churches, and even traditions. In the religious sphere, actors compete with each other, as they continuously develop and lead public theologies. However, religious leaders also need to maintain their credibility along with preserving their tradition's established mythology and history, which restricts the extent of novelty that can be meaningfully introduced. It is therefore critical to investigate which elements of religious tradition and identity remain constant and which components religious leaders can modify to form a more consistent, coherent, and useful public theology.

As an example, one cannot analyze the Presbyterian discussions of revising the Westminster Confession of Faith of 1646 that regarded the Pope as “the Antichrist, the man of Sin, and the son of damnation”⁶⁴ without examining the Second Vatican Council that affirmed an individual can be saved regardless of religious status. In this case, Catholics first changed the definition of “the other” and then moved toward a more inclusive philosophy of salvation. In a way, the Second Vatican Council recognized that the Catholic component of individual identity was not the one that determined the individual's status. The Council recognized other religious traditions as legitimate, if not fully equal. Such a perspective increased the quality and the frequency of interfaith communication globally. Catholicism was perceived less of a threat by other traditions. This does not mean that all other religious traditions changed their boundaries as a response to the change in Catholic public theology. However, the Catholic opening has led to introspection in many other traditions such as that of Presbyterianism.

To illustrate the transnational diffusion, one can point to many instances of international workshops and connections among the religious actors that change the way they interpret religious knowledge. David Stevens, former General Secretary of the Irish Council of Churches and former leader of the prominent religious peace organization, Corrymeela Community, states that these connections and diffusion of knowledge matter in peacebuilding. Stevens remembers how Roel Kaptein, who had retired from a senior position in the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa, changed the way he understood the biblical message by bringing in ideas on rivalry, scapegoating, conflict, violence, and the birth of culture as well as introducing him to the work of philosophers like René Girard.⁶⁵ Diffusion can be intimate and personal like Stevens’ experience or structural and institutional. Especially in conflict transformation and peacebuilding, one can trace the diffusion of one experience to another case by looking at the number of conferences, conflict transformation workshops, meetings, and personal experiences.

• Units of Effective Modification: These “units” indicate the change in the patterned behavior of two or more parties as a result of the innovation, selection, and diffusion processes. Under this category, policy makers investigate how the public theologies actually transformed politics and whether this variation was strong enough to form a normative base for future interaction. Public theologies are modified over time. For successful conflict transformation and peacebuilding to take place, theologies and policies that represent the other as the enemy must be modified by or through the influence of religious actors, and the possibility of peaceful coexistence should be situated within a theological framework.

Investigating Religious Epistemic Communities: The Case of Northern Ireland

Before investigating the influence of religious actors in Northern Ireland and other conflict settings, clarification of key terms that are used throughout the book is necessary. I define “religious actor” as experts or practitioners of a religious tradition, who have background in studying the principles in the religion and engage in the application of these principles to public life. In the context of this book, religious actor means a religious leader, or any organization that overtly and systematically operating under religious principles, that takes an active role in the public debates. “Churches,” unless otherwise stated, mean the Roman Catholic, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, and Methodist Churches, which are unofficially described as “the four main Churches” in the Northern Irish politics literature.⁶⁶ Religious leader (used interchangeably with “faith leader”) is an individual who was trained to be clergy and who played a leading role in his church (including bishops, moderators, influential priests, and pastors). I use the term “religious leaders” to denote the leaders and public representatives of the four main churches in Northern Ireland.

Another term, “conflict transformation,” in Lederach's words, is “a way of looking and seeing, and it provides a set of lenses through which we make sense of social conflict.”⁶⁷ Within this framework, conflict transformation perspective approaches peace as a constantly evolving concept rather than as a static outcome. Conflict transformation is a part of peace-building activities, which comprise negotiations, reconciliation, consolidation of postconflict stability, and human rights. In order to build peace, we need to transform the conflict. Throughout the book, although I recognize that there is a subtle difference between the two, I do not strongly distinguish between these two terms, as peace is constantly built through efforts of ambitious individuals, and conflict is constantly transformed thanks to new interpretations and practices. I use whichever term is the most appropriate for a specific action, though I concede that, within the context of this book, which focuses on the transformation of conflict to a set of stable and peaceful relationships, there is no clear-cut difference between a conflict-transforming activity and a peace-building one.

Between Chapters 2 and 6, the book investigates how religious actors contributed to a change in public theology in Northern Ireland between the 1960s and 2000s and how this change contributed to conflict transformation. For both scholars and practitioners of conflict transformation and peacebuilding, the Troubles is a widely used representative case of the ethnoreligious conflict, mostly because it has a relatively clear-cut beginning and end. To understand the public role, discourse, and actions of the religious actors throughout this period and its immediate aftermath, I use four Northern Irish newspapers published between the years 1968–2009, the Belfast Telegraph, the News Letter, the Irish News, and the Irish Times. These four newspapers have been among the most-read papers in Northern Ireland during the Troubles period. The Irish News is perceived as Irish nationalist and the Irish Times is Ireland's major newspaper that is also widely read in Northern Ireland. The News Letter is strongly Unionist and the Belfast Telegraph is mostly regarded as moderate Unionist.⁶⁸ Scholars have extensively used newspaper data in studying social movements and identity.⁶⁹ In this specific context, newspaper data is especially critical because we are interested in the public statements and actions of the religious leaders throughout the conflict. Since there are no systematic records or databases of such speeches, reactions, and actions, newspapers become indispensable. Although interviews provide insights into reasoning of certain behaviors and actions, it is impossible for any individual to remember all speeches and events. That is why newspaper data, consolidated with interviews, provide a reliable resource to trace the changes in discourse and behavior. In addition to a review of newspapers for the declarations, speeches, and actions of religious actors, I have conducted more than 50 interviews between 2008 and 2010 with religious actors and civil society members who have played important roles in the conflict transformation, including prominent figures like the former Methodist moderator Harold Good, Gerry Reynolds of the Clonard Monastery and the former Presbyterian Moderator John Dunlop. I triangulated the interview and newspaper data with pamphlets and other primary documents (brochures of churches and organizations) that are either personally collected or were part of the Linen Hall Library collection.

The conflict in Northern Ireland is both local and international, due to the involvement of the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Between 1966 and 2006, the conflict cost 3720 lives, 2087 of which were civilians.⁷⁰ Among the main local parties to the conflict were Republican (predominantly Catholic) and Loyalist (predominantly Protestant) paramilitary organizations. To put it crudely, the predominant Republican paramilitary organization, the Provisional Irish Republican Army which inherited most of the traditional Irish Republican Army structure and agenda in 1969, was working toward the establishment of a single independent Republic of Ireland. The Loyalist paramilitary organizations, such as the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force held that Northern Ireland should remain a constitutive unit of the UK, and they were willing to use force to counter Irish Nationalist political ambitions.

At this point it is necessary to clarify that, whereas Republican is used to describe the militant ideology that tried to achieve complete independence from Britain, the term Nationalist/Nationalism is employed to denote using constitutional means to achieve political, national, and cultural rights. Similarly, Loyalist is not always interchangeable with Unionist; the latter implies the attachment to the union of Britain and Northern Ireland as well as supporting the cultural tradition of such unionhood. As a term, however, the latter does not include in itself the forceful meaning the former term carries. Nationalists are usually Catholics and Unionists are overwhelmingly Protestant in the Northern Irish context. There are shades of these political views and the corresponding religious affiliation, but there are “clear trends for Protestants preferring the union with Britain and Catholics preferring Irish unity.”⁷¹ In short, political affiliation and religious identity are very much intertwined to the extent that the lack of religious affiliation came to mean a lack of political identity.⁷²

Despite the correspondence between religious identity and political attitude in Northern Ireland, there is no clear agreement as to what extent the conflict was religious or political. Hickey and Bruce argue that the conflict is more about religion, whereas McGarry and O'Leary disagree with that notion, claiming instead that religion was only an ethnic marker and the conflict was ethno-national.⁷³ MacDonald claims the conflict was essentially colonial, while Smith and Chambers trace the main causes to economic inequality.⁷⁴ Ruane and Todd conclude that the conflict has the elements of all aforementioned aspects; economic and religious factors mutually reinforce each other and have important implications in national identity.⁷⁵ In short, there is no consensus as to the conflict's key cause.

Due to the contested nature of not only the Northern Irish conflict but many others, the project confines its claims to the category of divided societies and does not use the qualification of “religious conflict.” In the Northern Irish case, although scholars cannot agree on the main cause of the conflict, they all acknowledge that religion was an important element of the Northern Irish identity and a dimension of the Troubles period. This is not surprising given that Northern Ireland has traditionally been a highly religious society in terms of both beliefs and practices.⁷⁶ Societal divisions coincided with religious differences, which have been perpetuated by the respective institution of each tradition. Churches played a key role in shaping the power structures of the two historical blocs in Ireland.⁷⁷ It is contested to what extent the churches are actively responsible for the perpetuation of the divisions, but at the very least, leaders of the four churches, who have often condemned the violence publicly, were blamed for staying inactive for a long time. Countering this argument, Appleby states that in Northern Ireland, church leaders “challenged the complacency and prejudice of their respective faith communities” and parachurch and ecumenical movements brought Protestants and Catholics together in economic and social projects.⁷⁸ Claiming that Appleby's positive portrayal overlooks the leaders’ conservatism, Brewer et al. situate the religious actors in Northern Ireland within the civil society framework and they assess “the usefulness of the idea of spiritual capital in settings where religion is itself wrapped up in the conflict.”⁷⁹ Similar to Brewer et al., Fitzduff argues that the churches in Northern Ireland failed to provide transformational leadership during the conflict.⁸⁰ Although it agrees that the churches fell short of “providing transformational leadership,” this book shares Appleby's positive perspective by pointing to the existence of a religious epistemic community in Northern Ireland that consistently provided inclusive alternatives and understandings of responsible citizenship. The mere existence of such a religious community of leaders and organizations that constructively engage the public debates contributes significantly to stabilizing arrangements. This book traces such underemphasized constructive engagements starting with the beginning of the Troubles period.

Structure of the Book

In an edited volume on strategic peacebuilding, Philpott states that the building of peace is “far wider, deeper, and more encompassing” than the traditional liberal approaches to peacebuilding recognizes.⁸¹ The literature on conflict resolution and peacebuilding has focused primarily on activist networks, with scholars neglecting the role of religious knowledge networks for the most part. In that same book, Appleby and Lederach state that “the skills needed for strategic peacebuilding are increasingly honed and named as such, by a range of professionals in one or more of a variety of disciplines and areas of expertise,”⁸² and Powers draws attention to the agency of religious actors in peaceful social and political transformations. This book is an attempt to bring together these points of view through a framework that recognizes the role of religious expertise and systematic knowledge in strategic peacebuilding.

The overall argument of the book is that there have been prominent religious leaders and religious civil society members in Northern Ireland that helped transform exclusive public theologies into inclusive ones, which ultimately contributed to the peace process. These religious actors acted as an epistemic community in promoting inclusive public theologies of governance and belonging. There is a focus on news pieces to trace the messages religious actors were conveying to public between the 1960s until the resolution of the conflict. Personal communications, primary documents, memoirs, and secondary sources complement the picture.

The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 is dedicated to a brief pre-Troubles account of religion and politics in Northern Ireland. In order to help the readers understand the role of religion in the Northern Irish political sphere, historical context and a brief description of the four main Churches are provided. The following chapters focus on four decades of the Troubles and investigate innovative steps religious leaders took. The fact that each decade witnessed an important political arrangement (the Sunningdale Agreement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the Belfast Agreement, consecutively) makes the cross-temporal analysis more meaningful and serves as a basis for comparing the behavior of clergy and politicians. Chapter 3 explores religious communities’ standing in the late 1960s and 1970s, around the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, and the “innovations” introduced. The 1970s are significant for the purposes of this study, since this was the time period when religious leaders started to acknowledge the conflict's theological and religious dimensions. Furthermore, these leaders began to see the role they could actively play more clearly during these initial years. The transformation of existing perspectives started around relatively uncontroversial issues such as a condemnation of violence. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the 1980s were the years during which religious leaders grew emboldened, engaging in ecumenical discourse and activities. In the end, however, another political arrangement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, failed as well. During those years, the basis for religious leaders facilitating a future peace process was established. Chapter 5 focuses on the peace process and how, by this time, religious leaders’ direct efforts influenced policy makers. I also examine why the “selection” process, the adoption of the policies religious actors had been advocating for years, finally took place in 1998, and not before. Chapter 6 discusses both the postconflict epistemic status of religious actors in Northern Ireland. The concluding chapter, Chapter 7, looks at how we can observe similar dynamics of religious conflict transformation in different cases such as Sierra Leone, Colombia, South Africa, and the Philippines; policy makers and scholars can apply the epistemic communities approach to any context in which religious actors devise alternative interpretations of the public sphere and disseminate it to influence political attitudes.

Due to space restrictions, these chapters focus mostly on the leadership of four main churches in Northern Ireland, but this does not mean that there were no other prominent religious actors who were influential during the Troubles period. One such actor is the late Ian Paisley. Although there are frequent references to Ian Paisley, his Free Presbyterian Church, and Democratic Unionist Party, the four episode chapters do not discuss in detail the creation and transformation of their theology or their epistemic status. This omission stems from the assumption that religious epistemic communities are not directly involved in politics; otherwise, the knowledge they create will be based on political interests rather than religious expertise with policy implications. This assumption is inherent in the epistemic communities framework, and my argument does not challenge the main assumptions of this theoretical perspective. Given the increasingly active involvement of religious actors in politics, however, future research will need to engage politics of knowledge in new and further ways.