The Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement), signed on April 10, 1998, brought an end to direct rule from London and is regarded as the de facto end point of the Troubles. Both the Republic of Ireland and the UK recognized that any arrangement excluding any of the relevant parties in Northern Ireland was destined to fail, as experienced in the earlier Anglo-Irish Agreement. Belfast Agreement provided a way to reconcile conflicting Unionist and Nationalist aspirations and to guarantee people's rights to be British, Irish, or both. It rejected violence. It provided local power sharing in government. At the local level, policy makers paid more attention to alleviating the growing rift between Nationalists and Unionists, focusing on social and economic policies. With the British support, new resolutions were introduced to ensure equality in education and employment.1
The talks that led to Belfast Agreement began much more inclusively than had the earlier ones; the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement had illustrated that excluding any major groups from negotiations would create a deadlock. Clergy members had learned that they needed to be more proactive in pushing for inclusiveness and in acting as the bridge between secular political arrangements and the Christian laity. Religious leaders continued their work on bringing the parties together and encouraging “sacrifice” if it meant an end to the conflict. Although they were cautious in their statements, their occasional involvement in political affairs came at the expense of their own place in their community and politicians continued to contest the idealistic views of the religious leaders. Gerry Adams, for example, writes in his memoirs that he had been in touch with religious leaders including Fr. Reid and Cardinal Daly throughout the conflict, and he had difficulty understanding what these religious leaders meant by their call to “peaceful struggle.”2 For a long time, the alternatives posed by the religious actors were not options for political leaders, some of whom regarded violent protests and postures as the most effective way to make their point. In their book, Brewer et al. report Fr. Reid's statement that “people would believe that the churches had no selfish interest in it and they were not following some kind of agenda; they were following the principles of the Christian faith, the principles of peace.”3 Later in his memoirs, when talking about the Good Friday Agreement, Adams concedes that “we were determined to do our best to take the gun out of politics, but this needed a collective effort. It was back to the template which had emerged from the discussion all those years ago with the Sagart [the Irish word for priest, used by Adams to denote Fr. Alec Reid] and later with John Hume.”4 John Major, former Prime Minister of the UK, states that during the peace process “for distinctive and dispassionate viewpoint,” he “turned in complete privacy to the church leaders.”5 Similarly, Albert Reynolds, former Prime Minister of Ireland, says in his memoirs that Archbishop Robin Eames “had a clear understanding of the Northern Protestant position, and gradually he helped me to a better understanding too, not in a party-political sense, but in comprehending their aspirations.”6 The public theologies of peace developed by the religious leaders and the templates they offered became increasingly visible to policy makers, including Adams, Reynolds, and Major, who continue to point to the influential role of these actors in conflict transformation.
The challenges of the 1990s were not entirely novel. Although there was an air of optimism, the violence continued, and initial political talks did not bring forth concrete arrangements. Religious actors also were concerned about the secularization trend and worried that churches were gradually losing their relevance. In a way, these challenges slowed down the epistemic progress, yet the challenge of secularism in particular brought churches together in a joint attempt to remain relevant. Religious leaders played a role in paramilitary groups’ disarmament and the removal of obstacles toward realizing a political arrangement. I focus on the effects of the Provisional Irish Republican Army bombings and the Drumcree deadlock on the political process in this chapter, in addition to the Belfast Agreement. Belfast Agreement heralded the potential realization of stability and inclusive Christian citizenship in the eyes of religious leaders. Given that even the most persistent actors, such as Paisley and Adams, involved themselves later on in the process, the Belfast Agreement represents the selection of a particular epistemic/discursive approach toward the issue of coexistence and citizenship. This selection was partly the result of the innovations religious leaders worked on throughout the Troubles. Toward the signing of the agreement, policy makers had started to take the suggestions of the religious leaders more seriously. The “peaceful struggle” expounded by the religious leaders became part of the mainstream political discourse, unlike the first two decades of the conflict when the political leaders did not regard conciliatory insights of the religious actors as viable options.
Initial Challenges: Political Deadlocks, Violence, and Secularism
The 1990s began much more auspiciously compared to other decades of the Troubles. Church leaders continued to condemn violence and, at times, engaged in ambitious attempts to meet with paramilitaries. When one looks at the newspapers and political/religious documents of the decade, it is clear that the actions of certain high-profile religious leaders went against the grain to such an extent that they were strongly criticized by their own communities. This disapproval served to drive the communications efforts underground, as it were, with a number of more ambitious communications with politicians and paramilitaries actually taking place in closed-door meetings.
One factor that contributed to the consolidation of ecumenical activities and a more rigorous faith-based agenda of conflict resolution was the concern about the increasingly secular approach to public issues. The secular arrangements created competition by posing alternative perspectives to the disillusioned members of society and they endangered religious leaders’ prestige. Therefore, in a number of instances, religious leaders stated that their greatest concern was secularization, rather than challenges posed by the “other”:
There is a sizeable group of Christians in the Protestant tradition who believe that the Roman Catholic Church is not a Christian church but a deception conceived by the devil himself. What we have here is basically a theology of hatred and a series of godly excuses for regarding fellow human beings with contempt. There is no justification for such an outlook. The opinions of anti-Catholic extremists do not reflect the beliefs of the vast majority of our Protestant fellow-Christians in Northern Ireland. We must be united in our common witness for the truth against the real enemy: the forces of nihilism, hedonism, secularism, and godlessness.7
Although the Northern Irish population retained its reputation as one of the most “religious” communities in Europe, the level of practice had fallen during the late 1980s and early 1990s.8 During this period, religious leaders advocated the superior epistemic status of religious precepts, and they were concerned about losing their voices in the society. This is understandable, since religious principles and insights are not regarded as being as authoritative as scientific knowledge in the Western world. This is one feature that differentiates religious epistemic communities from scientific ones. The threat of losing status in the community was one of the reasons why religious leaders felt the need to consolidate their role in advising political parties and guiding laypeople. However, this growing rift between secular and religious elements led religious actors to increase their efforts in reaching a unified voice that could compete with the secular alternative. In this spirit, religious leaders referred multiple times to bridge-building among faith traditions to overcome the conflict. Presbyterian Minister, and the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland in 1992–1993, John Dunlop touched upon the clash of secular and religious spheres and expressed the need to reach out:
The leaders of the largest four churches meet and travel regularly in order to demonstrate there is diversity in Ireland and that such diversity must be recognized and respected, and should find expression in cooperation and not in conflict. Since we are made in the image of the Trinitarian God, we must seek to reflect our true nature which takes unity and community seriously. This means that the peace of the people who live on the island of Ireland must never be marked by the domination of the few by the many or the exploitation of the weak by the strong…Ireland needs both realism and vision. We need to encourage forms of mutual cooperation which are marked by mutual respect, grounded in attitudes shaped by the worship of God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.9
With the concerns about secularization and the decrease in the level of religious practice, religious leaders drew attention to the symbolism of holidays, celebrations, and practices that they claimed to be of central importance for all Christians who were ready to revise their lives from a religious perspective. Methodist President, Norman Taggart, for example, noted St. Patrick belonged to Nationalists, Unionists, Protestants, and Catholics with a message of vision, prayer, purpose, and hope, yet he warned that however one identified himself/herself, there was a need to recognize the Christian identity first: “We today need relevant visions arising from our own circumstances. Political Protestant and political Catholics, secular Catholics and secular Protestants need to be truly converted to Christ.”10 A number of religious leaders also explored other Christian experiences in conflict transformation, such as the mending of divisions in South Africa.11 There was a conscious concentration on the prior peacemaking experiences as part of the diffusion of knowledge within the relevant spheres of public activity. Religious approaches and battles between inclusive and exclusive theologies are not just temporarily experienced and forgotten. As with every other type of knowledge, they become references that may shed light on similar future scenarios. We will explore cases of diffusion and similar experiences in other conflict settings in Chapter 7.
As expressed in Chapter 2, churches’ expectations were different a century ago, and church leaders could get away with appropriating the words of political leaders. However, in twentieth-century Northern Ireland, people expected the clergy to continue their pastoral duties and yet at the same time, inform their publics about existing political choices and prevent large-scale intercommunal conflicts from happening. Religious leaders tried to respond to these needs. The Bishop of Derry and Raphoe, James Mehaffey, for example, urged church leaders to take a more active role in stamping out sectarianism:
Church leaders needed to adapt to changing situations and the challenges of the future in order to survive. In the new Millennium, the churches will be challenged about their responsibility in helping to bring about mutual understanding and in promoting mutual respect for different traditions. People will demand to know and to be informed. Advances in the information technology field will need to be matched by far greater openness and by effective channels of information within the churches and outward to society.12
Ecumenical relationships developing in Northern Ireland caught the attention of the extremist factions on both sides, which continued to regard the “opening” of mainstream churches as a betrayal. A number of church buildings became the target of arsonists. As a response to these attacks, religious leaders maintained their unity, and offered material assistance to churches that were attacked, regardless of denomination.13 Interestingly, material assistance was not confined to these emergencies. Fitzroy Presbyterian and City Church both provided renovation funds for St. Malachy's Catholic Church, and leaders claimed that such solidarity was not a new phenomenon but had existed for centuries. In a joint statement, the three churches declared,
In the 1790s, Belfast Protestants gave generously to the building of St. Mary's Catholic Church. The parish priest warmly welcomed many Protestants to the opening service. By 1798, numbers of Protestants and Catholics shared a common vision, humanity was shared, and there was a common search for just relations in Ireland, which embraced freedom, fairness, and equality for everyone.14
This was a reference to the United Irishmen movement, which brought Catholics and Protestants together toward the end of the eighteenth century. As mentioned in Chapter 2, despite its failure to secure independence from England, this movement had brought a nonsectarian Irish identity to the forefront. This nonsectarian Irish identity had essential elements that church leaders wanted to achieve in the 1990s, but this time to keep it sustainable.
Arguably, the intensified interfaith cooperation of the 1990s also resulted from what religious leaders saw as continuing threat of secularism and the decreasing levels of church attendance, as mentioned earlier. In addition to discursive battles with secular ideas, mainstream religious leaders had to counter exclusive public theologies that related the conflict directly to a particular religion. For the most part, Ian Paisley and his Free Presbyterian Church represented this theology by continuing to blame the Catholic Church for all conflicts and problems throughout Irish history. Dennis Cooke, a Methodist minister, stated that Paisley remained convinced that Catholic Doctrine was a root cause of the violence in Northern Ireland, clear in his statements such as, “You teach people from infancy error, that error one day will surface, and there will be diabolical fruit from that rotten root which was planted in their hearts.”15 Paisley did not command majority support, and the support he gathered was more due to disillusionment with the existing political parties than to active support of his theology. However, he created a specific interpretation based on what he called the “errors” of the Catholic Doctrine and its negative influence on politics and conflict transformation. The existence of such extreme discourse facilitated cooperation among more moderate religious leaders, who could not afford to leave the stage to the Free Presbyterians.
Toward the Agreement: Cease-fires and Brooke-Mayhew Talks
In the early 1990s, developments in the public sphere contributed to the move toward a more egalitarian society, in which Catholics would enjoy the same rights as their Protestant counterparts. However, street violence continued unabated. Increasing Loyalist paramilitary activity in Nationalist areas surprised even the Republican movement, which continued to carry out its own operations.16 Between 1990 and 1998, 500 people died as a result of political violence.17 Church leaders repeatedly condemned paramilitary activity, steadfastly refusing to recognize extreme positions as representative of any tradition. Edward Daly, Bishop of Derry, stated that included in this category were not only the Republican paramilitaries, but also Sinn Féin, which was a political party thought to have links with the paramilitary movement:
IRA and Sinn Féin exercise an evil and sinister influence over young people. From the civil rights movement onwards, the IRA and Sinn Féin have only succeeded in destroying and corrupting and distorting and sullying every movement and every issue with which they have identified themselves. They have even destroyed and sullied the noble ideal of Irish Republicanism.18
However, this rejection of the representativeness of the paramilitary groups did not result in a political bypassing of these actors by the religious leaders. Although political party leaders kept avoiding any contact with paramilitaries, many religious leaders continued to advocate for their inclusion in the process and the need to understand the motives behind their actions, even as they refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of their interpretation of Republicanism/Loyalism. Finlay Holmes, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church wrote many people were “so conditioned to reject the IRA that they compared it talking to the devil,” continuing,
But obviously if one thought that they could be persuaded to follow a different path, one would be prepared to argue one's case with them…The message I am trying to put through to them is that apart from the error of breaking the law of God and being inhuman, their campaign is hardening people's hearts and is not likely to succeed.19
The statement of Holmes was condemned as “abject folly” by leading Protestant politicians. However, the Presbyterian clergy was not yet done with their ambitious attempts to reach out to the rival side. Former Moderators Jack Weir and Godfrey Brown, after talking with the Ulster Defence Association, also met with Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams at a time when other political parties ostracized them. Although Weir and Brown stated that their meetings were a “personal initiative,” they reported back to the Presbyterian Church, advocating the need for the cessation of violence on both parts:
Whatever political programs may be offered to remedy our situation, the first prerequisite is a cessation of the continuing violence. That was also the aim of their meeting with leaders of the Ulster Defence Association in February…We readily accept that a mere end to present violence will not itself secure a just and lasting peace but urge that a ceasefire now would enable the government and political representatives involved to give their undivided attention to the search for an agreement on which peace might be built.20
In a similar vein, an influential Dundonald minister, Roy Magee, secured a 20-day cease-fire from Loyalist militaries.21 That paramilitaries heeded religious leaders more than political leaders rendered the religious episteme and discourse more relevant in the context of the conflict. One can also argue that it was the integrity of religious leaders that led paramilitaries to communicate with the clergy. The inclusive nature of this moderate Christian discourse that emphasized both justice and order, along with the consistency of such a discourse among the members of clergy across denominations could be regarded as a theological innovation of major public significance.
The attempts to reach out went beyond meetings with paramilitaries. Some church leaders continued to broach theologically innovative approaches. The Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, John Dunlop, pursued a reconciliatory stance toward Catholics, angering the extreme Protestant parties who accused him of “pro-Romanism and ecumenism.” Dunlop replied,
In the last 25 years, since Vatican II, we have faced a new situation, which our parents did not face. We are being offered, unexpectedly, the hand of friendship by the leadership and many of the people in the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. Let us by all means maintain as a Reformed church, but let us cross that ancient frontier of animosity as warmhearted Presbyterians.22
Dunlop's statements are the continuation of the development of a public theology of inclusive governance. The news that the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland and the Northern Catholic Bishops would have a meeting was regarded as an important step, which exemplified the cross-communal power of religious leaders. Denis Faul stated that religious leaders had much to impart to political leaders in this type of meeting:
The bishops will be concerned with the absolute need to build peace upon confidence, trust, understanding, and hope: to see the good in other people and to promote neighborly relations. The bishops will point out that rights and political power involve duties and responsibility towards all the people. It is not a question of asserting one's rights over other people. It is a question of seeing how we can be of service to the protection and welfare of other people. The politicians, like bishops, must lead the people away from confrontation towards cooperation.23
Religious leaders protested the idea of equating religious identity with political party affiliation. They observed that the latter came at the expense of the principles of the former. No political party could claim that it represented Catholics or Protestants, so Christians, in the view of the clergy, should not regard that actions taken under a party banner counted as their duty to their fellow Catholics or Protestants. Church of Ireland Primate Robin Eames devised a statement of “Christian witness” summarizing this argument:
A person should be a Christian first and party-political adherent second…The history of Northern Ireland has been one of almost complete confusion and overidentification of religious and party-political labels and identities. This religious-political overlap, this failure to protect the autonomous freedom and identity of the religious from the identification of the party-political has lain at the root of so many of our problems.24
Between April 1990 and November 1992, a series of negotiations, which included the Ulster Unionist Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Social Democratic and Labour Party, Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, and Sinn Féin, along with representatives from both British and Irish governments, took place. This time, however, Unionists, while still not ready to consider full-fledged power sharing, welcomed the proportionality in new political structures.25 Although these talks, led by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Brooke and later, his successor, Sir Patrick Mayhew, did not end in a formal agreement, they enhanced the understanding of the parties and clarified the “minimum” expectations. The initial objective of the discussions was that the participants had agreed to work to secure an agreement that would replace the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The agenda of the talks was threefold: relations between the parties within Northern Ireland; relations between North and South (i.e., Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic); and links between Britain and Ireland. Once negotiations started, disagreements started to surface about procedures, the location of the talks, and the choice of an independent chair for the North-South strand of the talks. Negotiations came to a halt in July 1991.
The talks recommenced in April 1992. Unionist parties entered the talks, hoping to diminish the influence of the Irish Republic on Northern Ireland that had been consolidated by the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Nationalist side aimed to extend the scope of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and give the Irish Republic a stronger voice in Northern Irish politics. In July 1992, North-South talks took place in London, with the Irish Government participating. By November 1992, however, no agreement was in sight, and Mayhew ended the talks.
Religious leaders, who were focusing on issues of poverty and inequality, praised the effort yet underlined the deeper issues they believed mattered most.26 Between 1990 and 1992, religious leaders still did not feel compelled to become officially involved in the talks, which had taken on a life of their own. Following the agenda of the Brooke-Mayhew Talks that ended with no firm results in 1992, church leaders warned society of a possible surge in sectarian violence. In the interchurch summit in Newry, Catholic and Protestant church leaders worked on a report proposing systematic measures to counteract sectarianism. Recommendations for improving relations included a Bill of Rights, monitoring by government departments and public bodies regarding the impact of policies on the two communities, and the development of mixed-housing estates.27 Religious leaders also touched upon the changing realities and that Unionists needed to be ready for compromise.28 In general, religious leaders shared a concern over the constant interruptions of institutionalized meetings and urged politicians to come together again to keep alive the discussions:
There is a need to begin again the quest for an acceptable way forward for the province. The need is obvious. They have to mandate and experience to tackle this difficult, but surely not impossible task. What is of paramount importance is the will to succeed, the refusal to give up and the political acumen not to fence themselves around with so many safeguards and preconditions that they cannot make measurable progress.29
Numerous conditions dictated the interruptions. These stated requirements and preconditions, prerequisites to resuming the talks, such as a complete decommissioning of arms, were seen as unrealistic by clergy who thought these were matters to be gradually resolved during the negotiations. Whereas a Methodist leader, David Cooper, suggested that arms decommissioning should not be a precondition of Sinn Féin's entry into peace talks, the Church of Ireland officially expressed this concern in its publication:
It is important to acknowledge that mistakes have been made on all sides in handling the fragile chance of securing a just and stable peace. Too little attention has been paid to the fact that there is nothing mandatory about what happens when the parties get to the negotiating table. Once there, they may not agree; even if they do, the electorate has the final say. In these circumstances, too much emphasis may have been given to the conditions under which talks begin. New barriers have been erected from which it is difficult to retreat.30
Religious leaders were also concerned that some parties to the conflict would be excluded from the final arrangement. They pushed for cautious inclusion, drawing lessons from past accords that had failed largely due to such exclusionary tactics. For example, leaders of the four main churches called for the lines of communication to be kept open even if Sinn Féin was suspended from the talks. Protestant leaders were more vocal on the issue, whereas Catholic Primate Dr. Sean Brady, contrary to public expectations, stated he could not give a detailed view on the issue of Sinn Féin's suspension and concentrated on appeals for calm in the Nationalist community.31
The first step leading to the Belfast Agreement was Downing Street Declaration by John Major, then Prime Minister of the UK, and Albert Reynolds, then Prime Minister of Ireland, which recognized the self-determination rights of the Irish people. Northern Ireland could be transferred to the Republic of Ireland if (and only if) the majority of the population wanted it. In his memoirs, Reynolds writes how influential Archbishop Eames and Rev. Magee have been in drafting the text of the document. Reynolds remembers that throughout his communications with Major, the man they all trusted was Robin Eames, and they drafted the text “until finally he was satisfied” that the document addressed Protestant sensitivities.32 The declaration, issued on December 15, 1993, was followed by a Provisional Irish Republican Army cease-fire on August 31, 1994. Although Unionists initially remained skeptical concerning the terms and conditions of the cease-fire, the Combined Loyalist Military Command, consisting of the Loyalist paramilitary groups including the Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force, reciprocated by declaring a similar cease-fire six weeks later.
Although religious leaders welcomed the developments and hoped that the peace would ensue after the cease-fires, they also encouraged both sides to move slowly and cautiously. Religious leaders worked hard to erase the traces of historical traumas and myths, as laid out in Chapter 2. Church of Ireland Bishop, Gordon McMullan, drew attention to the need for mutual understanding in the peace process. He stated that he welcomed the paramilitary cease-fire and although caution is advised, it would be wrong to be cynical about the intentions behind such an action. “Protestants must show sensitive and sincere respect for Catholics at personal and political levels as partners of equal citizenship status and the equal responsibilities that citizenship entailed,” McMullan noted, “The Protestants also need to emerge from the ‘siege mentality’ and develop a sharp, intelligent, and not least an attractive approach to presenting their viewpoints, interests, and concerns.”33
Religious leaders encouraged ambitious political steps in search of a peace process. Political parties had never had the opportunity to work within the framework of a double cease-fire before, and religious leaders called upon churches in general to encourage ecumenism and to reach out to the community. The Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, John Ross, expressed the ecumenical need in the following words:
One of the reasons there has not been a civil war here is because so many good decent people tried to live by their Christian principles in trying and difficult situations. I would encourage the church to give a relevant message to contemporary society by preaching the gospel through meaningful, vibrant worship and in living a life, which reflects the radical values of the kingdom.34
Ross also added that he would be prepared to worship with Catholics. Vatican II caused him to realize that, while acknowledging theological differences, Presbyterians and Catholics shared much common ground. Recognizing the differences between the traditions once again, John Dunlop of the Presbyterian Church also highlighted the need to focus on the “good” instead of emphasizing the differences in a letter he wrote regarding the exclusive theology of the Orange Order and other possible inclusive interpretations:
For many Protestants, the words “Roman Catholic” and the associated words such as “Mass” and “priest” and “chapel” all carry a particularly heavy negative emotional charge which has been transmitted through the centuries, through family and ideology, theology and preaching, through threat and community conflict and through orders like the Orange institutions. There are differences between Presbyterianism and Roman Catholicism. It is possible to take these differences seriously without being “anti-Catholic.” However, when anti-Catholicism leads to hatred and precludes any appreciation of anything good in the Roman Catholic Church, fails to acknowledge any common ground, and prevents any appreciation of our Catholic neighbours and their history and contemporary experiences, then it has become a serious hindrance to understanding and reconciliation.35
Many in Northern Ireland criticized religious leaders for what seemed as merely engaging in theological discussions behind the scenes and writing statements condemning violence, but doing little else. The political atmosphere had become much more conducive to these declarations than it had been in the initial years of the Troubles, when church leaders were just beginning to explore a unified Christian discourse and interpretation. Ambitious theological innovations – such as challenging the exclusive church doctrines and emphasis on reaching out to other traditions – had commenced then, yet these discussions and interactions had not been fully publicized. Indeed, sensitive discussions occurred in the first two decades of the conflict, but religious leaders felt unready to share these debates with the general public at a time of rampant violence. In the 1990s, these concerns abated with the peace agreement, reports, and political discussions surrounding reconciliation.
One of the milestones in the peace process was the Mitchell Report, prepared by George J. Mitchell, a former member of the US Senate and Special Advisor on Ireland to President Clinton. On November 28, 1995, British and Irish governments announced “the launching in Northern Ireland of a ‘twin track’ process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations.”36 The two tracks were the political track and the decommissioning track. The political track comprised inviting “the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format, and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent.”37 The British and Irish governments endorsed the bulk of the report, but the Republican/Nationalist leadership accused the British policy makers of “binning the Mitchell Report” by applying its principles selectively and equivocating.38
The participation of all parties in talks and negotiations had been the core suggestion of religious leaders of the four churches throughout the years, yet the politicians had not selected these inclusive arrangements as a way out of the conflict. The religious epistemic community surrounding the conflict transformation, including religious nongovernmental organizations and leaders of the four churches, did not let this inclusive agreement option drop out of the public eye. Initially, politicians have been hesitant to voice inclusive solutions of the conflict because of the political costs of such a selection. This explains why religious leaders, and not the political ones, pushed for an inclusive agreement even when the public reacted adversely to it. Politicians selected that option only after seeing that exclusionary tactics failed and after the public had grown accustomed to the idea of reaching out to the other in order to attain stability. Religious epistemic communities, with their consistent discourse on inclusive political arrangements helped normalize the concept of all-party negotiations throughout the conflict.
The decommissioning track remained less ambitious, since it was clear that paramilitaries would not commit to relinquishing their weapons prior to a political arrangement. However, it addressed the concerns of political actors who stipulated decommissioning as a precondition to talks. Many religious actors had been against any preconditions for the political track, but that was not a viable option for the politicians. The commitment to decommissioning, later enforced with the help of religious actors in the following decade, facilitated “marketing” the agreement to the public.
Roadblocks and Challenges: Canary Wharf Bombing and Drumcree
Less than two years after its declaration, the Republican paramilitaries revoked their cease-fire. The air of optimism brought by the Mitchell Report vanished with the detonation of a Provisional Irish Republican Army bomb in the Canary Wharf of London's docklands on February 9, 1996. Sinn Féin tied the failure of the cease-fire to the UK government's insistence on not starting all-party negotiations until the Provisional Irish Republican Army decommissioned its weapons. The explosion killed two people, and injured many others. Despite causing great concern and fear in the international arena, however, the bombing did not destroy the peace process altogether. There was awareness that certain factions within the Provisional Irish Republican Army were unhappy with the unarmed approach and that it would take time to control them. The attack was followed by similar acts of violence, such as the Manchester Bombing, which destroyed a significant part of the city center on June 15, 1996. Former British Prime Minister, John Major, in his autobiography, expressed disillusionment with the Provisional Irish Republican Army:
Throughout the 17-month ceasefire, intelligence from all sources, overt and covert, had shown that much of the Provisional movement dissented from Adams’ “unarmed” strategy, and saw the ceasefire as no more than a tactic. Factions within the IRA did not want to be locked into the peaceful negotiations for which we were striving and had been gearing up for a renewed campaign.39
The bombing alarmed clergy as well. Presbyterian clergy organized a meeting to debate the implications of the Canary Wharf bombing.40 The Methodist Church, aware of the challenge posed by these violent segments to the conciliatory Nationalist movement, called on Unionist parties to talk to Sinn Féin, a move that was received with surprise and dismay by Unionist parties.41 Catholic clergy urged the Provisional Irish Republican Army to restore the cease-fire to allow Sinn Féin back into the talks.42 Even in the face of a public outcry against the Republican paramilitary violence, mainstream religious actors remained calm and encouraged further talks between parties.
Challenges were not confined to the paramilitaries and the possibility of future bombings by frustrated splinter groups. Both political and religious actors also faced the Drumcree conflict, which stemmed from the Orange Order's desire to march through largely Catholic neighborhoods on its way to Drumcree Church as part of a ceremonial walk. As detailed in Chapter 2, the issue of parades has roots that date back to the eighteenth century. This legacy was one of the reasons why it took so many decades to bring a long-lasting solution to the conflict. Unionist/Protestant fraternal organizations have celebrated the benchmarks of their history, such as the Battle of the Boyne, by holding parades. Since these parades commemorate the victories against Catholic political actors of the eighteenth century, the conflict was interpreted as a clash of values. Both sides contributed to the perpetuation of a centuries-old political narrative. Religious epistemic communities of peacebuilding recognized the symbolic importance of these events. David Stevens, the General Secretary of the Irish Council of Churches, stated,
Drumcree and the marching issue magnetize everyone. For many Loyalists, the right to march is the right to be. For many Nationalists, the need to resist is the need to be. Marching and the resistance to it symbolize the fight and rivalry between the two communities and will consume us all unless we find some other way.43
Although there had always been tension between Catholic residents and Protestant marchers, the 1990s witnessed large-scale protest and rioting on both sides. The first of these confrontations took place in 1995, ironically a period of relative stability, which did not stop the Orange Order from carrying out the ritual of marching with an increasing number of members. A possible explanation for the timing of this confrontation might be that on both sides, there was fear that the ongoing agreements would fail to bring practical solutions. Both sides felt the need to express their identities even more strongly, so that the other parties to the agreement would take their worries and identities into account. This is why periods leading up to peace agreements are often the most sensitive ones, and religious epistemic communities are expected to play a vital role in allaying the concerns of their communities.
The confrontations challenged the Church of Ireland because of its links with the Orange Order.44 Church clergy tried hard to put distance between themselves and the expressions of the Orange Order. These attempts are parts of an epistemic innovation, which aimed to recreate Christian interpretations devoid of extremes. The Church of Ireland had traditionally been affiliated with the Orange Order for more than two centuries, and until recently, that link had gone relatively unchallenged. The Anglicanism of the eighteenth century had brought together the church and Protestant fraternal organizations. However, seeing that the theological discussions focusing on reaching out, moderation, and the centrality of Christian stewardship in the public sphere did not coincide with the Orange Order's tradition-centered Protestant exclusivism, the Church of Ireland disengaged from Loyalist politics and the order's agenda.
Reflecting this distancing, James Mehaffey called the Orange Order to revise its agenda, and he noted that the order could not “wash its hands of civil disorder arising from Orange church parade.”45 Retired cleric Canon William Arlow, who took part in the 1974 Feakle Talks with the Provisional Irish Republican Army, wrote the Drumcree confrontations should never have happened:
Drumcree has now come to be perceived as a symbol of the Church of Ireland, at least the part of it which is in Northern Ireland. It is a symbol of a church which seems to be an adjunct of a particular political party that is too preoccupied with reflecting the political views of the majority of its members, that is clearly identified with an organisation regarded by many Protestants and most Roman Catholics as sectarian and divisive, and that it bends over backwards to be supportive of those who willingly use force to achieve their political goal.46
Church of Ireland Primate Robin Eames called for calm and warned against the threats Drumcree posed for the recently acquired stability of the society:
Drumcree is a part of a wider problem and it cannot be separated from it. The real question is how do we, as a community, reach a point in which there is a realistic recognition of the just rights to celebrate and observe religious and civic freedom on the part of both traditions. That point will never be reached through violence or destruction of lives or property. What we have witnessed overnight across this province can achieve nothing, but if continued will push us all back into the nightmare we prayed had been left behind. I understand the fears and resentment of the Orange Order members at Drumcree as well as the feelings of the Garvaghy Road Residents Association. I appeal to everyone to resist the temptation to fall into the trap of violent words or actions, which will delete the legitimacy of protest on either side.47
His attempts to bring an end to the equation of the Orange Order and Drumcree to the Church of Ireland challenged Robin Eames, who regarded himself as an agent of peace, rather than part of a traditionalist sectarian group advocating an exclusive understanding of Christianity. The Orange Order's actions threatened the reliability of the public theology religious leaders were jointly creating. Even if not as influential as a united Christian voice, the Orange Order had enjoyed control over some Protestant communities. As a representative of a discursive community (if not an epistemic one), the Orange Order had devoted supporters. Not surprisingly, Eames later revealed that he felt personally threatened by the response to his calls for an end to the Drumcree protest.48 However, at the time, he rejected the linkage of the church to the Orange Order:
There is not and never has been any official link between the Church of Ireland and the Orange Institution. The connection – if connection is the right word – is through membership of the Order by members of the Church of Ireland. This is their freedom of choice. In the constitution of the Order there is what could be termed a strong religious tone. In the support of Reformed Protestantism there is contained in the constitution of the Order reference to the Roman Catholic tradition. Such prohibitions as to contact with that tradition have led to the charge of sectarianism. As a churchman dedicated to building bridges in the community, I regret that situation deeply.49
Following the Drumcree walk in 1996, some Protestants blocked local Catholic churches. Religious leaders united in the face of ensuing boycotts (mostly Protestants who refused to buy from Catholics or the Irish Republic) and stalemates. Presbyterian Moderator Harry Allen, Catholic Archbishop Sean Brady, Church of Ireland Primate Robin Eames, and Methodist President Ken Best emphasized the rights of all people to worship in freedom and once again, they issued a joint statement.50 Church of Ireland clergy searched for solutions to the standoff, through direct talks with the Orange Order and through public statements, making clear that the theology of the Order did not necessarily51 coincide with that of the Church of Ireland.
The standoff resulted in property damage in Catholic areas. Violent protests on both sides threatened the intercommunal relationships and legitimacy of ecumenical communication. In 1996, a Presbyterian group – 25 members of the Presbyterian Church who said sins of rebellion, anger, and sectarianism had been perpetrated over the summer in the “supposed cause” of civil and religious liberty – asked for “forgiveness” for the violent protests that had desecrated Catholic churches. Catholic clergy took this opportunity to declare their own regrets over the violence perpetuated by groups associated with the Catholic faith:
We, for our part, wish to extend unreservedly the forgiveness asked for by our Presbyterian brothers and sisters. We in our turn publicly ask forgiveness from Almighty God and from our Protestant neighbours for our guilt by association in past wrongs inflicted on them as well as any personal guilt by action, omission, or silence that has contributed to the hurts, sectarian bitterness, and divisions.52
In the following years, church leaders continued to call for calm during the parades. James Moore, the Church of Ireland Bishop of Connor, stated that the burning of churches and halls, the continued picketing of mass-goers at Harryville had left Northern Ireland in a dangerous spiral of hurt and division.53 Presbyterian Moderator Sam Hutchinson called for action by the Portadown Orange Order or Garvaghy Residents’ Coalition to defuse Drumcree, asking one of the parties to nobly waive their rights for the good of the community.54 Sacrifice and forgiveness had been at the center of the joint Christian prescriptions and interpretation. The Church of Ireland tried to show that it was part of the epistemic community that produced those interpretations, not a ritualistic and exclusive discursive community that defined Christianity in narrower terms.
Prior to the agreement, church leaders continued working on ecumenical arrangements, meeting with various parties, and issuing joint statements. Church leaders became especially active participants in political reconciliation. For example, breaking with its established practice, Ulster Unionist Party met with the Catholic Church as part of a consultation process to determine if the party should go into talks with Sinn Féin, even though decommissioning was not a precondition to negotiations.55
On the way to a formal agreement, religious leaders intensified their efforts to consolidate the Christian vision of citizenship and peaceful coexistence they had advocated for years. They tried to come up with formal initiatives with concrete results. The four main churches in Derry, represented by James Mehaffey (Church of Ireland), Seamus Hegarty (Catholic), Gilbert Young (Presbyterian), and Fred Munce (Methodist) launched a strategy to heal divisions between the two traditions in the city. The new development strategy represented the most comprehensive attempt made by religious leaders of the two traditions to challenge sectarianism.56
Church leaders also established educational programs to spread the episteme they had been advancing. Five churches from three main denominations – the Church of the Resurrection Catholic Church, Fortwilliam Park Presbyterian, Rosemary Presbyterian, St. Gerard's Roman Catholic, and St. Peter's Church of Ireland – came together to offer what came to be called an “Alpha Course” on the basics of Christianity. One of the organizers, Rev. Tom Wilson, noted,
It is not focused on divisive issues but rather covers important foundational areas that many Christians, whatever their denominational background, share in common. It is not surprising, therefore that both Catholics and Protestants are interested in running Alpha here. Leaders from the small groups from the above churches have already been meeting for training and prayer. These meetings were characterized by open, warm relationships, by committed application to the task in hand, and by a strong spirit of Christian unity.57
In addition to these initiatives, senior Catholic, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, and Methodist actors participated in what was called the New Agenda political initiative involving business, trade union, and civil society leaders, though, once again, they stressed that their role was personal rather than institutional. Among the leaders were former Catholic Primate Cahal Daly, former Presbyterian Moderator John Dunlop, retired Church of Ireland Bishop Samuel Poyntz, and former Methodist President Ken Best. The nine-point program of the civic leaders furthered by this New Agenda included maximum autonomy for Northern Ireland “consistent with a decentralizing United Kingdom” and maximum development of relations with the Irish Republic “for mutual interest and reconciliation.”58 In this framework, the 1990s witnessed important changes in the ways people viewed and expressed their history in Ireland, and church groups took an active role in reinterpreting popular historical myths and educating public.59
New cross-community initiatives (resembling the Corrymeela, the Cornerstone Community, and the Currach of the 1970s and 1980s) were established to bring Protestants and Catholics together.60 A special center, for example, was opened on the grounds of Springfield Road Methodist Church aimed to bring together local Catholics and Protestants. It won grants from the European Union, the International Fund for Ireland, Making Belfast Work, and the Department of Environment's urban development scheme.61 These initiatives also showed that the Christian episteme of peacebuilding was capable of drawing secular attention. It was a kind of epistemic approach that defined what Christianity meant in public life, and clergy, as the political atmosphere became normalized, made sure that this knowledge was supported materially.
The inclusive yet ambitious theology the churches espoused led to tensions between the laypeople and the leadership as well. For example, a number of Methodists attacked church leadership for backing a new Bloody Sunday inquiry along with other churches and urging Unionists to talk to Sinn Féin after a Provisional Irish Republican Army cease-fire.62 Clergy did not back off from their inclusive theology and political activism. The Church of Ireland, despite protests of its conservative members, urged Unionist leader David Trimble to take political risks, agree to negotiate with Sinn Féin, and not use decommissioning as an excuse for not talking.63 The continuation of clerical initiatives despite opposition of laypeople also refutes arguments that church leaders carried out these actions to be “popular” on the political scene.64
The Belfast Agreement: Reclaiming the Peace
The prospect of the Belfast Agreement became the new hope of the Northern Irish people. At the same time, the failures of similar arrangements in the past concerned both society and policy makers; any hasty attempt to sign a half-baked agreement might have resulted in the loss of both rights and a community's voice in daily political affairs. Church leaders, including Church of Ireland Primate Robin Eames, Catholic Primate Archbishop Sean Brady, and Presbyterian Moderator Sam Hutchinson, praised the talks yet warned society about the need for everyone to read the settlement document before deciding what it meant.65 Expectedly, although they assumed a guiding role in political affairs by creating a theological framework into which a reconciliation agreement would fit, religious leaders did not want to take full responsibility for any political decision.
The agreement was signed on April 10, 1998, by British and Irish governments and approved by most Northern Irish political parties, with the significant exception of Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party. The agreement covered the following main issues:
Parties agreed that no major change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland could be carried out without the consent of the majority of citizens, and all parties would follow peaceful and democratic means; the citizens of Northern Ireland would be free to choose Irish or British citizenship (or both). A 108-member Northern Ireland Assembly was to be established, elected by proportional representation having legislative and executive power. Members of this legislative assembly would openly declare whether they were of Unionist or Nationalist orientation to allow cross-community voting and give a voice to both political views.
A Northern Ireland Executive – based on power sharing – was to be established.
A North-South Ministerial Council was established covering 12 subject areas of cooperation (Transportation, Agriculture, Education, Health, Environment, Tourism, Inland Waterways, Food Safety, Trade and Business Development, Special EU Programs, Language, Aquacultural and Marine Matters) between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
The Republic of Ireland's territorial claim – which dated to 1937 – was to be dropped by modification of Articles 2 and 3 in its constitution.
A British-Irish Governmental Council was established in order to promote “the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands.”
A Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission was established – the Northern Ireland Victims Commission was to be part of the reconciliation work.
A reform program was started for the police force led by the Independent Commission for Policing in Northern Ireland.
The participants were called to “use any influence they may have to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years” and within these two years, conditional release of paramilitaries would take place for members belonging to groups that observed the cease-fire.
In May 1998, there were separate referendums concerning the Belfast Agreement. The referendum in Northern Ireland was a direct vote on the agreement, while the vote in the Republic of Ireland was a vote to amend the Irish constitution in line with the Belfast Agreement. A large majority in both parts of the island favored the agreement. The agreement provided a way to get over the controversial national question, the question of the border, to the satisfaction of all parties. It acknowledged for nationalists the right of self-determination and for Unionists the right of consent. The border would remain as reflecting the wishes of the majority in Northern Ireland. If a majority later wanted a united Ireland this would be granted. In other words, the right of people in Northern Ireland to be British, or Irish, or both was guaranteed. All parties agreed to renounce violence. Also, the agreement set up specific arrangements about significant policy issues such as power sharing, the coordination of north-south and east-west bodies and policing.
For many Loyalists, the Belfast agreement still meant bringing the Irish Republic too much into Northern Ireland politics especially by the North-South ministerial council. For the Republicans who had been working for a “united Ireland,” the agreement meant there was no such possibility in the near future, and Ireland was withdrawing its official support from the idea. Despite these protests, church leaders continued to lend support and give advice to participating politicians. The Church of Ireland Archbishop of Dublin, Walton Empey, stated there could be no better time for peace and reconciliation, and accused “Orange and Green intransigence” of bringing Northern Ireland to the brink of disaster again.66 Church leaders continued to issue statements underlining the need for engaging all segments of the societies, including paramilitaries.
In the meantime, church leaders, for the most part, refrained from openly directing the public toward a “yes,” although they implicitly supported the talks.67 The Methodist Church stated it regarded the Belfast Agreement as “a genuine attempt to make a new beginning” in Northern Ireland.68 The Presbyterian Church expressed that “the Belfast Agreement does not represent defeat or assimilation, but is a political accommodation which could be a way out of the darkness of the last 30 years into a better future.”69 The Catholic primate, Sean Brady, noted that “Ireland's Catholic bishops will not be telling people how to vote in the forthcoming referendum on the Belfast Agreement,” although he added that he believed the Belfast Agreement offered “great hope for the future” and had the potential “to remove the nightmare forever.”70 One of the very few church leaders who publicly declared his position, Church of Ireland Primate Robin Eames, did so in a cautious manner, stating that he agonized over “almost every page of the document” before deciding to vote “yes” in the referendum.71
Right after the signing of the agreement, religious leaders boosted their joint activities. In May 1998, the four main churches came together to address the challenge of sectarianism in light of the agreement's provisions. The regular meetings, which had been previously known as Ballymascalon talks, were institutionalized under the name Irish Interchurch Meeting. An informal church leaders’ group, made up of the Catholic Primate, Church of Ireland Primate, the Presbyterian Moderator, and the Methodist President was to be established as well. The interchurch body would be equally divided between the Catholic and Protestant churches; Catholics would have 37 members, the Church of Ireland and Presbyterian 10 each, Methodists 5, and other smaller churches a total of 12.72 The documents drawn as a result of subsequent ecumenical meetings focused on “common understanding of the doctrine of justification through Faith Alone which has traditionally divided Protestants and Roman Catholics.”73 Even conservative evangelicals – who were not part of the Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church – joined the efforts to enhance cross-community understanding. Theological discussions conveyed the Christian bases of ecumenism from both Protestant and Catholic perspectives. John Dunlop, Convenor of the Presbyterian Church and Government Committee, noted, “It is gratifying that some paramilitary groups, which have visited such horrendous suffering and dislocation upon individuals, towns, cities, and communities and which have inhibited progress for so long, appear to be getting themselves out of the way.”74 After the signing of the agreement, Belfast was selected as a member of the World Council of Churches’ peace cities; it was connected to six other cities around the world in a new church initiative to combat rising violence.75
The Irish Interchurch Meeting covered the implementation of the peace agreement, about enhancing economic conditions for Northern Irish youth, and about integrating Northern Ireland into the global economy so that there would be no return to the violence. Almost 500 students from Northern Ireland and the border counties have been sent to American colleges for business training under a Presbyterian/Catholic initiative. John Carr of the US Catholic Conference and a member of the interchurch committee, stated that
churches can't simply stand from afar and issue grand statements or comment on the actions of politicians. They have to make their own contribution and in fact by standing up for fair employment, by pursuing investment, the churches move from words to some small action that can contribute to the process. The young people who come to the United States, they learn something about U.S. business practice but they teach about the realities of life in Northern Ireland. What most Americans know is about the Troubles and that is all they know.76
The Belfast Agreement constituted the official end of the Troubles. Although peace on the ground was still fragile, the parties to the conflict consider the Belfast Agreement the beginning of a new era. The violence on the streets continued, yet not with the same intensity as it had throughout the Troubles. The peace agreement was not signed merely because of religious leaders’ actions or changing governance theologies. However, the fact that religious leaders continued their efforts intensively helped legitimize reconciliation efforts in the public sphere and redefined Christian citizenship. This then helped political actors to come to an agreement that was acceptable to both the public and paramilitaries. These actions of the religious leaders sometimes negatively affected their standing among their communities, which was to be expected for those leaders engaging in ambitious outreach activities. Contrary to the arguments of some scholars, this proves that it was not the expectations of the congregants that defined clerical action, but a shared conviction and belief in particular theological premises that prescribed ecumenism and peaceful coexistence.
The range of activities in which religious leaders involved themselves continued to broaden in the 1990s. The condemnation of violence continued, and clergy did their best to help their counterparts in other denominations stand up to violence against their property. Ecumenical meetings became more common, as stability levels increased. Some members of the clergy, as detailed in the chapter, met with both paramilitaries and political parties to encourage their contribution to the peace process and to set the acceptable minimum that all parties would need to willingly come to the table. In terms of theological innovations, the 1970s and 1980s were richer than the 1990s. When one examines the trajectory of the conflict, the innovative perspectives advocated for, and furthered in, those years became the “actions” of the 1990s. Religious leaders, having created a theological framework in the earlier two decades, intensified their efforts to realize an inclusive Christian society that could collaborate for peace and welfare. They started to become part of the formal initiatives, applied for outside grants to realize Christian projects, and guided the laity in vital political arrangements such as the Brooke-Mayhew Talks and the Belfast Agreement. They also played a key role in defusing crises such as the Drumcree standoff and the interruptions in paramilitary cease-fires. In short, the religious epistemic communities of peacebuilding continued to create a particular interpretation and more importantly, they translated these interpretations into action and policies that enabled political parties to find common ground without expecting too much from the “other.”
