Introduction

The previous chapters mainly concentrated on aspects of prevention and corruption hindering police forces despite SSR and post-conflict police efforts. An examination of the structural conditions of corruption due to external intervention and the institutional legacy of patronage and conflict in Afghanistan ensued. The book has generated a theoretical framework, consisting of political, economic and cultural drivers (with the debate on the social construction of corruption), to analyse corruption in war-torn and developing societies. This chapter provides an analysis of the main drivers of police corruption within Afghanistan. It specifically refers to data collected with the lower ranks of the uniformed police and elites who specialised in security and judicial reform in Afghanistan. We begin with a brief outline of the methods.

The research methods included 70 semi-structured interviews conducted with representatives of Afghan ministries that include the MoIA, Ministry of Justice and Attorney General's Office. Rule of law and anti-corruption organisations were interviewed. The respondents included the Justice Sector Support Programme (JSSP), Afghanistan Rule of Law Project (ARoLP), DFID, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Max Planck Institute and HOOAC. Moreover, a variety of NGOs assisting with peace, justice and human rights were interviewed. A snowball sampling network was used to establish additional contacts at the end of the interviews. Each interview lasted for approximately 60–90 minutes and was conducted predominantly in Kabul in 2010, 2012 and 2016. Questions were based on SSR, with a particular focus on reforms of both the police and judicial sectors, human rights, corruption and anti-corruption.

The lower levels of the Afghan police were subsequently surveyed. A 10-minute survey was conducted in January–March 2012 with 100 participants, mainly NCOs and some lieutenants (76 patrol officers, 16 first lieutenants and 8 second lieutenants). Twentyminute structured interviews were subsequently conducted with 50 participants in April–May 2016, namely with soldiers (lowest ranked NCO below third patrol officer) consisting of 31 of the sample as well as some lieutenants and sergeants.

The survey and structured interviews were mainly conducted in Kabul, Nangarhar and Logar due to insecurity in conducting all in Kabul, and so numbers are low.