This chapter argues for stricter civilian control over the resources, roles, and missions of the armed forces and the paramilitary (the national militarised police or Carabineros). The chapter offers evidence on the imbalance between capabilities and policy control and effectiveness for security under democracy in Chile. It sheds light on the bureaucratic challenges for civilians to manage the new financing mechanism that was introduced to replace the Copper Law, a controversial off-budget tool for arms acquisition and defence procuring. The chapter argues that a steady flow of monetary and physical resources led Chilean security forces to build a resourceful external defence in the case of conventional conflict. However, as unied recently, the chapter emphasises the abuses of military and police corporate privileges based on current episodes of institutional corruption and human rights neglects. The second section examines institutional capabilities, resources, and structures. It argues that the shrinking number of traditional and overseas roles has led to discussions in Chile on internal security deployment. This has exacerbated the need to rethink democratic security governance. The third section discusses issues of territorial and border control. It explores what are the perceived threats to national defence and public security and asks whether policy formulation and implementation can meet the standards of control and effectiveness. The fourth section identifies critical policy implications for democratic security arising from the above arguments.