Montesquieu is usually passed over in narratives about the rise of sovereignty. Indeed, there is no agreement among scholars about whether Montesquieu even articulated a theory of sovereignty. Many scholars have thus argued that Montesquieu was decisively opposed to the modern theory of sovereignty. This chapter aims to settle the debate over Montesquieu and sovereignty. It argues, first, that Montesquieu articulated a coherent theory of sovereignty, and, second, that it was a theory of profound historical significance. Montesquieu should be a far more important figure in narratives about the rise of sovereignty than he currently is. Montesquieu developed a theory of limited sovereignty – a theory in which the sovereign, even though the highest power in state, is not above the law. He took this argument from Pufendorf and radically expanded it. For Montesquieu, it was not only possible for a sovereign to be limited by fundamental laws, as was the case for Pufendorf. It was morally required. It was also tremendously advantageous, for limited sovereignty leads to a significantly more durable state than does absolute sovereignty. In the former there is a common passion for the perpetuation of security-preserving institutions; in the latter, a passion to tyrannise over others. Montesquieu further emphasised that sovereignty can be not only limited but also potentially divided, further protecting citizens from the greatest danger, despotism.