Introduction

The role of the civil service in the constitution, as set out in the Westminster Model (WM), is persistently reinforced despite constant pressure for change. This chapter examines how this is achieved and what effects it has. Some argue that the WM operates too loosely to have any meaning (Bevir 2008; Rhodes et al 2008; Russell and Serban 2021), its flexibility, ambiguity and slipperiness are attributes which the civil service favours and to which it returns after periods of disruption, through different political interventions (Richards and Smith 2016). However, can the WM survive, not least as it has failed to incorporate the growth of special advisers (SpADs), who are ignored in this narrative?

The rhetoric about the quality of the civil service and the way it differs from other countries (Greer and Jarman 2000) is located in its specialism of generalism. There have been successive efforts to change it by those in power (Lowe 2010; Lowe and Pemberton 2020; Maude 2023), through a range of methods including formal inquiries, critical speeches and the insertion of advisers. However, since its foundational reform (Northcote Trevelyan 1854), it role has been reinforced by Haldane on the Machinery of Government (MoG) (1918), Fisher's reform of the Treasury (Greenaway 1983) and Bridges’ view on the power of the generalist (1954). These have created a living tradition of practice (Bevir and Rhodes 2010). None of the proposed and adopted reforms have made lasting changes to civil service practices and powers. Sometimes, regaining lost powers can take time but the continuity and permanence of the civil service compared with shorter-lived governments and Parliaments provides punctuation points for resetting or returning these powers.