Introduction

This chapter examines changes in the EU's foreign policy towards Russia by assessing their gradually increasing contentions over Ukraine in two phases: First, from the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 until November 2018 when Russia was shelling Ukrainian vessels in the Kerch Strait. Second, since this incident in the Sea of Azov until January 2025. The chapter considers Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the shelling of Ukrainian vessels in the Sea of Azov in 2018, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 as critical junctures, demonstrating Russia's increasing threat towards Ukraine and shaping the EU's changing policy paradigm towards Moscow since 2014. In line with this book's main objective, the chapter examines paradigmatic and strategic shifts in the EU's policy goals and instruments (Hall, 1993) since 2014 in the context of power transition, Russian aggression and the spread of anti-Liberal ideas (see Chapters 1 and 2 in this volume). This chapter demonstrates that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the EU to adapt its foreign policy and reconsider its underlying liberal-international principles in its relations with Russia. The study of this change in the EU's response to Russia's aggression since 2014 is embedded in a historical institutionalist framework, an approach in political science assuming that political decisions are shaped in a respective context but open for change, for instance following shocks or policy failures (Hall, 1993; Steinmo, 2016).

To further conceptualize the EU's abilities and constraints in its foreign policy towards Russia, this chapter applies Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler's concept of ‘actorness’.