The architecture of policing is changing, leading to fundamental alterations in the structure, culture, functioning and accountability of the police. Yet this is occurring without any debate on policies and principles. This should be a matter of grave concern.

When the first ‘bobbies’ walked out on to the streets of London in 1829, they conveyed a highly symbolic message. In essence, the police agency they represented was benign and accountable: and its unarmed officers were ordinary citizens in uniform who would police by consent, for ‘the public are the police’ (Critchley, 1978). Sir Robert Peel had politically shaped this ‘consent paradigm’ to avoid association with the despised and feared French model of spies and a military-style gendarmerie under direct political control. The British model became based largely on local control and constabulary independence, with the notion that the government could not give direct operational orders while every constable was an independent law enforcement officer. From the 1960s, with the Home Office as partner, this model became known as the tripartite system. There is scope for a long debate about the validity of the image this portrays, and the reality of its workings in practice, but it is not the intention to do this here. What is clear, however, is that the domain assumptions underpinning this model have been under attack for at least two decades. Unrelenting pressure from the centre has eroded the independence of the police and brought it increasingly under government control. This is happening without a discussion of the ‘big picture’ – the fundamental issues driving this fundamental change. In fact, sceptics say there is no big picture.

Tighter fiscal control, a battery of directives from the Home Office and structural change are irrevocably altering policing. The contours are clear: the creation of national agencies outside of the police (for example, the Serious Organised Crime Agency, SOCA); external agencies to enhance quality (the National Policing Improvement Agency and the Policing Standards Unit); closer cooperation between the police, military and security services; national specialised policing units; possible amalgamations of forces; lateral entry; and workforce modernisation.