Short summary of deviance and inequality in Japan

Inequality and deviance was looked at focusing on two quite different subordinate subcultural groups in Japan with one crucial similarity: Japanese youth and foreign migrants were relatively powerless, subordinate to the dominant subcultural group. The degree and extent of inequality between and within both subordinate subcultural groups differed somewhat, still inequality was central to understanding the limited choices, opportunities and rights available to group members to realise their present and future life chances. Class stratification (and nationality for foreign migrant groups) within each subordinate subcultural group related to variations of inequality and different patterns of deviance. Special interest groups, acting on behalf of these subordinate subcultural groups, did not have any significant impact on changing the course of inequality nor did they make any difference in regards to their deviant behaviour. Conflict labelling theory was applied to elucidate on these observed patterns of inequality and deviance. Members of both subordinate subculture groups have invariably entered into an ascribed subordinate status that has affected participation and hence deviant behaviour in a replicating manner regardless of social change.

The study of conflict in Japan

The first in-depth study of conflict in Japan came out 26 years ago aptly titled Conflict in Japan (Krauss et al, 1984). The authors began by describing the study of conflict in Japan at that time: ‘A book that examines Japanese society and politics through the study of conflict will strike some as an unusual, and even perverse, approach to adopt, given most previous English-language studies of Japan’ (Krauss et al, 1984, p 3). While studies of conflict in Japan have received more attention since the early 1980s, the tendency remains to treat Japan as unique.

As this study proceeded, the ubiquity of power clearly showed itself. Issues after issues confronting youth and foreign migrants constantly came across with similar results. Power of the dominant subcultural group proceeded along rather unabatedly, with a march towards nationalism in educational law and fingerprinting of not just all new arrivals in Japan but also permanent residents. These crackdowns were justified by highlighting ‘deviance’ of youth and foreign migrants. Vulnerability to being labelled and treated unfairly was equally matched by working-class youngsters and working-class among all foreign migrant groups. All of this does not mean that power necessarily escalates in its control over the ‘powerless’.