This chapter contends that there is an overemphasis in the academic literature on the effect the Iranian Revolution had on shifting the dynamics of contentious politics in Bahrain. This has created a discourse in which belligerents are framed according to the contemporary transatlantic antipathy towards Iran, reifying a narrative that can contribute to the perpetuation of anti-Shi‘a and anti-Baharna prejudice. Using a closer reading of historical and modern sources, this paper argues that it was not solely the Islamic Revolution, nor the discovery of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, that shifted government policy towards Bahrain’s Shi‘a. Instead, ethno-religious discrimination is rooted in the Al Khalifa legacy of conquest, which was ossified by colonial intervention, but reinvigorated by Bahrain’s independence, growing Saudi influence, the Iran-Iraq war, and a historically-rooted Al Khalifa antipathy towards the indigenous population. Thus, changes in the modalities of repression are better explained by a multitude of interacting factors, rather than the totalising influence of Iran.

In the writing of history, certain tropes can attract a certain amount of importance, becoming uncritically accepted and embedded in the abridged histories or summaries of specific nations or places. For Bahrain, the Iranian Revolution and the attempted coup of 1981 by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) have become such tropes, and are often referred to as turning points in Bahrain’s history of contentious politics. This has been exacerbated by Bahrain’s limited sovereignty and reliance on foreign protectors, which have encouraged analyses of the role of transnational forces and links. Indeed, scholars, academics, and commentators, and I include myself among them, repeat the Islamic Revolution ad nauseam when recounting notable incidents of Bahrain’s history. Arguably such a trend reflects what Edward Said noted was a superficial reporting of Iran, conducted by ‘individuals connected to corporate or quasi-governmental institutions, or Middle Easterners known for their essentially antagonistic positions on the Iranian Revolution’. This coverage of the revolution and its immediate aftermath perhaps better reflects hurt sensibilities regarding the deposing of the US-backed Shah, rather than the complexities of the regional situation.