Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- A Note on the Use of Language
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 The Manipulation of Political Opposition
- 2 Structures of Contestation
- 3 Playing by the Rules: The Inclusion and Exclusion of Political Oppositions
- 4 Dynamics of Opposition in Unified SoCs
- 5 Opposition Dynamics in Divided SoCs
- 6 Formal SoCs and Informal Political Manipulation
- Conclusion
- Appendix: Political Forces in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - The Manipulation of Political Opposition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- A Note on the Use of Language
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 The Manipulation of Political Opposition
- 2 Structures of Contestation
- 3 Playing by the Rules: The Inclusion and Exclusion of Political Oppositions
- 4 Dynamics of Opposition in Unified SoCs
- 5 Opposition Dynamics in Divided SoCs
- 6 Formal SoCs and Informal Political Manipulation
- Conclusion
- Appendix: Political Forces in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
It hath been always her [Catherine de Medici's] custome, to set in France, one against an other, that in the meane while she might rule in these divisions.
M. Hurault, Discourse Upon the Present State of France, 1588For a prince … is a sure axiome, Divide and Rule.
J. Hall, Meditations I, 1605Politics is rarely, if ever, a two-player game. Multiple opponents vie with one another, as well as with the state, over power and resources. They are motivated by competition as well as by the need for cooperation – keeping a careful eye on each other while simultaneously attempting to gain support and assistance through a combination of cajoling and compromise, threats and personal intrigue. This insight is not new; in 1588 Hurault recognized the state's ability to “divide and rule” with respect to Catherine de Medici in France. Similarly, Aristotle wrote that one of the strategies by which a tyrant could preserve his rule was to keep his subjects preoccupied with fighting each other. Clearly, determining when opposition elites are willing to mobilize the masses and make sustained demands for political change requires an examination of three factors: the relationships between opposition groups and the state, the relationships between competing opposition groups, and state elites' ability to manipulate these relations.
Yet, in the wide and disparate literature that examines “contentious politics,” the incumbents' ability to divide and rule, creating competition between the opposition groups, is not examined adequately.
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- Information
- Structuring Conflict in the Arab WorldIncumbents, Opponents, and Institutions, pp. 22 - 35Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005