The most sophisticated critics of primary right theories of secession raise institutional concerns: They contend that, no matter how compelling the moral case for political self-determination, the right to secede should not be institutionally protected. In the next chapter, I will survey concerns about designing international laws that permit unilateral political divorce; in this chapter, I consider arguments against creating domestic constitutions that honor a primary right to secede. In particular, I examine Cass Sunstein's arguments that institutionally recognizing the right to secede will corrupt democratic decision making by allowing minority groups to hold their compatriots hostage. The worry is that, by threatening to secede, groups will be able to coerce and/or exploit their fellow citizens out of more than their fair share of the benefits of political cooperation. In response, I acknowledge that respecting secessionist rights might well change the dynamics of political decision making, but I regard this largely as providing reasons in favor of constitutionally recognizing the right to secede. In my view, democracies are currently corrupt and stand to be improved by extending to groups the political leverage that would likely accompany having the right to exit.

This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I recapitulate Cass Sunstein's objection and suggest that one of his chief concerns is about secessionist groups potentially coercing and/or exploiting their compatriots. I then argue that, because coercion and exploitation are sometimes permissible, we must restrict our inquiry to impermissible coercion and exploitation.