Expertise plays a substantial role in American policy making. The variety of it available to decision makers is enormous, having expanded considerably since 1970, over the same period as the number of think tanks has grown. In their 1974 reforms, Congress established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and expanded the roles of already existing research agencies (e.g., the Congressional Research Service and General Accounting Office). These congressional agencies counterbalanced the proliferating numbers of trained experts staffing the Executive Office of the President and bureaucratic agencies. In more recent years, both have been complemented by growing numbers of for-profit consulting firms (e.g., the Advisory Board) and research groups within traditional interest groups (e.g., the Public Policy Institute of the AARP). The expanded presence of experts reflects a realization shared by many in Washington that “you can't really play in the policy game unless you have a study.”

But what is the added value of expertise? And, even more, given the volume of its purveyors, how do its producers affect the chance of particular expertise having value in the “policy game”? In this and the next two chapters, I evaluate the behavior of think tanks as well as other experts in American policy making and their success in achieving policy influence. I begin by taking stock of perceptions of think tanks among two audiences that are their frequent targets: congressional staff and journalists.