DIVERSITY OF RELATIONS

We have seen that the content, frequency and evaluation of lying varies across different domains of social life; nevertheless the mainstream of ethical pronouncements on lying in the Christian West, at least from St Augustine onwards, has been universalistic, in the sense that the moral evaluation of a lie does not depend on the gender or social affiliation of either the liar or the dupe. This universalism may be said to have reached its apotheosis in Kant's Categorical Imperative. But there are other cultures and traditions which have not subscribed to this universalist principle and even in the Christian West many exceptions to it have persisted, notably in connection with warfare, as we have seen in chapter 2. Lay evaluations of lying depart radically from the universalistic tradition. Lies are evaluated differentially not only according to domain and culture but also with reference to the status of liar and dupe, their status both relative to one another and in the wider society. For instance, studies carried out during the 1970s showed that in the United States high-status persons and those in positions of responsibility were judged more harshly when they lied than were persons of equal or low status. Lies told to a friend were considered to be more reprehensible than those told to strangers and associates (Maier and Lovrakas 1976:577).