I begin by summarizing the main themes in each chapter and then offer some concluding remarks on TOM and its applications:

Chapter 1

I distinguished a game configuration, which gives the basic structure of payoffs in a matrix, from a game, which also specifies the initial state. Using game configuration 56 as an example (I usually dropped “configuration”), I illustrated the standard concepts of game theory – Nash equilibrium, dominant strategy, complete information, and so on. I then gave the rules of play and rationality rules of TOM, emphasizing that payoffs, which are strictly ordinal, accrue only when a final state, or outcome, is reached in the move–countermove process.

I illustrated the consequences of backward induction from each state in game 56, assuming a game never returns to its initial state and that the players make two-sided rationality calculations, always taking into account the other player's rational choices. Game 56 was shown to have three nonmyopic equilibria (NMEs), making the outcome highly sensitive to the initial state.

Applied to the Samson and Delilah story, beginning when Samson is unforthcoming about the source of his strength and Delilah has not yet nagged him, TOM correctly predicts that Delilah will start nagging Samson and he will succumb to her entreaties. I indicated that certain moves in games, such as Samson's reversing himself after revealing the secret of his strength, may be infeasible, which must be taken into account in applying TOM.