Outside the narrow world of Palermo, in the first fortnight of September the whole condition of southern Italy was rapidly changing. It was a new complication in the story that the national movement henceforward had three or more separate centres of policy-making. In addition to Palermo there was Turin, and now there was also Garibaldi's swiftly-moving headquarters on the mainland. Activity at the two capital cities of Sicily and Piedmont henceforward had to take into account the problems which arose and the decisions which were made at this third centre of operations; and the inevitable delays in communication put yet another obstacle in the way of synchronizing and harmonizing policy.

Until the last moment Cavour never quite gave up hope that he might forestall Garibaldi and arrive first in Naples. As he told Nigra privately—sending different ‘official reasons’ separately for reference to Napoleon—‘vous savez tout ce que j'ai fait pour devancer Garibaldi à Naples. J'ai poussé l'audace jusqu'au point où elle pouvait aller sans courir le risque de voir éclater la guerre civile; et je n'aurais pas même reculé devant cette extrémité, si j'avais pu espérer d'avoir pour moi l'opinion publique.’ It may be that in making this extraordinary statement Cavour was not being strictly truthful, but was just concerned to induce in Nigra a useful state of mind. Against this, however, one must remember that Nigra was his most trusted confidant and already knew the extent of Cavour's multiple policy.