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Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2009

Déirdre Dwyer
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
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Summary

Let there be no mistake. As science continues to change the social world, great transformations of social enquiry lie ahead for all justice systems. These transformations could turn out to be as momentous as those that occurred in the twilight of the Middle Ages, when magical forms of proof retreated before the prototypes of our present evidentiary technology.

In this book I have sought to address two fundamental questions about the judicial assessment of expert evidence. First, how can a non-specialist court accurately determine facts that require specialist knowledge? This includes the subsidiary question of how, if a specialist advises the court, the non-specialist court can know whether to accept the advice? Secondly, how should we arrange our legal processes to best support our expectations of accurate fact determination, and other procedural goals, arising in whole or in part from expert evidence? Broadly, the first question has been addressed in Chapters 1 to 3, and the second question in Chapters 4 to 7. But the first question cannot be properly answered without an answer to the second, and vice versa. There are two integrating themes that have helped to define the approach taken in this book. The first has been an attempt to begin to re-integrate legal evidence theory with classical epistemology. The second has been an attempt to begin to re-integrate the study of evidence with that of procedure.

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References

Damaška, M., Evidence Law Adrift (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 151Google Scholar
Nelken, D., ‘Law and Knowledge / Law as Knowledge’ (2006) 15 Social Legal Studies570–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Twining, W., ‘Some Scepticism About Some Scepticisms’, in Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 99–164, pp. 120–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gettier, E., ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ (1963) 23 Analysis121–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T., Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar
Mackay, R. and Colman, A., ‘Equivocal Rulings on Expert Psychological and Psychiatric Evidence: Turning a Muddle into a Nonsense’ [1996] Criminal Law Review88–95Google Scholar
Vidmar, N. and Schuller, R., ‘Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony’ (1989) 52 Law and Contemporary Problems133–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woolf, Lord, ‘Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical Profession?’ (2001) 9 Medical Law Review1–16Google ScholarPubMed
Goldman, A., Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rorty, : ‘[W]e understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation’: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 170Google Scholar

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  • Conclusion
  • Déirdre Dwyer, University of Oxford
  • Book: The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence
  • Online publication: 01 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511575136.010
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  • Conclusion
  • Déirdre Dwyer, University of Oxford
  • Book: The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence
  • Online publication: 01 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511575136.010
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Déirdre Dwyer, University of Oxford
  • Book: The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence
  • Online publication: 01 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511575136.010
Available formats
×