Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 December 2009
If competitive markets arise to cover all desired commodities to be traded, then the need for government is minimal. One such minimal role is to establish and maintain property rights, since the establishment of individual rights to initial endowments and to the gains of trading those endowments is a necessary condition for the efficient use of markets; see e.g. Inman (1987). Some philosophers and economists attach a second role to the government in a perfect market economy: to use taxes and transfers so as to redistribute initial endowments (wealth) across individuals in order to attain a (in some sense) fair distribution.
Where markets fail to achieve efficiency, government intervention may be desirable. The welfare losses from each of the market failures discussed in chapter 5 suggest that an efficient and perfectly informed government has a role to play beyond the one performed by the minimal state. But how do governments and their bureaucrats actually behave? In this chapter we will begin by considering the efficient provision of a pure public good and then introduce government failures that may lead to an inefficient level of government expenditure.
Efficient provision of public goods
From the point of view of the individual consumer there need not be any remarkable difference between a private good and a public good. Both kinds of goods can be thought of as entering his preference function and adding to his welfare. This means that we would expect to find a trade-off between private and public goods. In figure 6.1a we have drawn indifference curves for a household that consumes a single private good (x) and a single public good (z).
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.