Alexandria or Athens?

Facing the “new situation.” Ribbentrop did not come to his conferences with Ciano and Mussolini on 19, 20, and 22 September bearing the “truth” about Sea Lion's indefinite postponement. He did convey a Hitler letter proposing a Führer–Duce meeting at the Brenner or in North Italy. Hitler conceded difficulties over England, and gave no assurance that the war would end soon. Ribbentrop himself was more optimistic, and gloated that London would “soon lie in rubble and ashes.” Even the skeptical Ciano noted without cavil Ribbentrop's assurances that the landing was “ready and possible.” As important to the Italian leaders, however, was Ribbentrop's fierce insistence that Hitler would fight rather than negotiate; Berlin had rejected the mediation efforts of the king of Sweden.

Ribbentrop also produced for Italian approval a number of expedients to see the Axis through the winter, should war continue. First was of course the Japanese pact, which Ribbentrop and Hitler hoped would deter or render ineffectual United States intervention. Hitler and Ribbentrop also proposed to hasten Spanish belligerence, despite Franco's exorbitant demands for French North African territory, and for food, fuel, and materiel. Mussolini was not conspicuously enthusiastic about bringing Spain in; a German operation against Gibraltar would merely replace one guardian of Italy's prison gate with another. To Ribbentrop, Mussolini suggested that if the war were likely to continue, the Axis should reserve the Spanish card for “the right moment.”