A THEORY OF VALUES

Although this century has produced more, and more varied, ethical and metaethical theory than any other, even our more educated and intelligent people are simply embarrassed when asked how they justify the value choices and commitments they make. We could well use a credible superstructure of facts and concepts within which we might carry on intersubjective and intercultural discussions of value differences, discussions that would offer some reasonable prospect of eventual agreement. What follows here is the outline of such a superstructure, a biologically based, naturalistic, species-universal, and prescriptive value theory (McShea, 1990). The theory is designed to answer such questions as these: Can a value statement be true? If so, in what sense and for whom? How can a value statement have prescriptive force?

The theory is an update of a philosophical ethical tradition that includes Aristotle, Spinoza, and especially Hume, who set forth a naturalistic, biologically based account of human nature and the meaning of life. Modern human nature theorists, with whom we would expect to find much common ground include Mackie (1977), Murphy (1982), Ruse (1986), and occasionally Midgley (1978), although most probably would not concur in the understanding of Hume on which the theory is based.

Six Value Bases

As the greatest success of science is not the discovery of this or that truth about things, but the learned ability to think scientifically, so the reward for the study of good value theory is not the discovery of moral laws or truths, but the habit of leading an examined life (which is morality itself).