On October 13, 1997, the World Bank's representative in Jakarta, Dennis de Tray, remarked that “Indonesia is not Thailand.” The comment was supposed to inspire confidence in Indonesia's ability to manage the crisis sweeping through East Asian financial markets, drawing a sharp contrast between the rigidity of Thailand's political institutions and the flexibility of Indonesia's centralized political structure. Indonesia was in negotiations with the IMF, which would provide Indonesia with emergency funds and reassure foreign investors of the government's resolve to bring the economic troubles to a quick end. International media characterized Soeharto's decision to seek IMF aid as a positive, proactive step. Foreign governments worried about the Soeharto family's involvement in inefficient enterprises that the IMF sought to eliminate, but they remained optimistic that the agreement would help Indonesia, with its history of “sensible macroeconomic policies,” to return to healthy growth.

Indonesia completed the IMF agreement (IMF I) on October 31, 1997. Yet within weeks, troubling signs had emerged that suggested that the New Order would resist many of the conditions upon which the IMF and other foreign governments had insisted. Bank Indonesia (BI), the Indonesian central bank, raised interest rates sharply but shortly thereafter reduced them again. It further undercut its high interest rate policy by providing emergency liquidity support to troubled banks. In a bid to increase efficiency and without explicit deposit insurance, the Finance Ministry announced closures of sixteen small and troubled banks, but later allowed one to reopen under a new name.