There is a troubling theoretical–empirical divide in contemporary approaches to equality and justice. All too often guiding principles prescribed by normative social and political theorists are divorced from the workable mechanisms available to political reformers. In turn, reformers are themselves all too often unclear as to what precisely should be held up as guiding objectives if they are to accomplish their purpose. The result is unsurprisingly often disappointing. Social equality between men and women, more commonly termed ‘gender equality’, is one such case and will be the general theme of this chapter.

Central to any account of equality is the principle of equal treatment, and it is this principle's translation into practice that I wish to consider specifically. The principle of equal treatment is a constitutive feature of justice and a minimum political standard throughout mainstream western political culture (Habermas 1983; Kymlicka 1990; Nagel 1991). It is understood as prescribing treatment of individuals as equals, i.e. with equal concern and respect (Dworkin 1977: 370) and not the often unacceptable notion that all individuals are indistinguishable and thus should be treated uniformly. To treat people equally, in this latter sense, might of course be appropriate according to the principle of equal treatment but is not necessarily so. This subtlety allows us to create institutions and structures which can administer the equal treatment of individuals who are alike in ‘relevant and specified respects’ in a way that is constructive and just.