Soviet leaders were rethinking their relationship with Central and Eastern Europe. Obtained under Stalin for security, the region had proved chronically unstable. This necessitated the constant threat, and periodic practice, of Soviet military intervention. But signals given to the ‘allied’ communists to reach what accommodation they could with their own societies had been widely ignored. Most Central and East European leaders thought either that Gorbachev did not mean his rhetoric encouraging them towards independence, or that, if he did, he would soon be replaced by a new Soviet leader restoring orthodoxy. In either case, a policy of wait-and-see seemed prudent.

Gorbachev lacked political allies in Eastern Europe. To begin with, he saw some positive prospects for Hungary, which he had visited several times in his previous post as CC Secretary for Agriculture (1978–85). However, as perestroika accelerated, the long-serving János Kádár (now seventy-six) seemed left behind. As a Hungarian oppositionist remarked, it was ‘an irony of fate that Kadarist politics entered the depths of stagnation and decay when Soviet politics was in the process of leaving them’. After three decades of skilfully defending Hungary from cold winds blowing from Moscow, and introducing the most open economy in the region, Kádár and his entourage no longer had the energy or skill to navigate through the more favourable climate.