Socrates now takes up the point raised by Cebes, that the soul may be dispersed at death. He urges that dispersal can only be suffered by composite objects, whereas the soul is not composite but of a single nature, like ‘the beautiful itself', the equal itself’ and Forms in general. Souls are akin to Forms, for both belong to the unseen order, whose attributes are changelessness and indestructibility, whereas body belongs to the visible order, whose attributes are the opposites of these. We may therefore believe that soul is ‘altogether indestructible or nearly so’.

Socrates then resumed: ‘Now the sort of question that we ought to put to ourselves is this: what kind of thing is in fact liable to undergo this dispersal that you speak of? For what kind of thing should we fear that it may be dispersed, and for what kind should we not? And next we should consider to which kind the soul belongs, and so find some ground for confidence or for apprehension about our own souls. Am I right?’

‘Yes, you are.’

‘Well now, isn't anything that has been compounded or has a composite nature liable to be split up into its component parts? Isn't it incomposite things alone that can possibly be exempt from that?’

‘I agree that that is so’, replied Cebes.