One outcome of the discussion in Chapter 12 was that justice is to be considered not just as a moral or social ideal to be striven for, but as a point of view from which alone a certain sort of understanding of human life is possible: as an epistemological concept, therefore. One needs to be careful in saying this, however. The understanding that is in question is not independent of one's moral, social, religious viewpoint: not one therefore which can be used as a foundation for such a viewpoint. It is rather a mode of understanding that presupposes the viewpoint in question. It is not easy to be clear about these relationships and as we shall see, particularly in the next chapter, Simone Weil does not always speak with the same voice about them.

The context and the terms in which the concept of justice has so far been introduced, in “The Iliad or the Poem of Force” for example, show that what Simone Weil understands by it is not something that can be taken for granted; that is to say, it is not clear on the surface what the relation is between her use of the term and the uses to which we are most accustomed in discussions of moral, social, and political issues. Fortunately, she has left an essay, and one of her most impressive, which deals with just this issue: “La personne et le sacré,” or “Human Personality.”

It is at once clear from this essay that the intellectual configuration which mainly characterizes our present time will make it peculiarly difficult to come to terms with her position.