Constitutions did not play an important role under communism. Although in all countries of our study constitutional texts were formally in force, they were not meant to constrain and to obligate the power elites. They had little, if anything, to do with the idea of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is the philosophical source and the institutional embodiment of political freedom (Mcllwain 1966; Friedrich 1974); obviously political freedom was not the inherent principle of the soviettype communist regimes. Thus, after 1989 constitutions evolved into emblems of political liberation in most of the post-communist East and Central European countries. At the same time they were rediscovered as symbols of the renaissance of these countries as independent sovereign nations. These two reasons for the regeneration of constitutionalism do not necessarily go together, much less so right after the absolute breakdown of an economic and political order. Hence, the task of the framers was to find a concord of political freedom and national sovereignty under the pressure of simultaneously creating new political and economic actors. However, fortunately this task has been solved; the mere fact that since 1989 constitutions matter again in the countries of East and Central Europe is in itself already a major achievement in the transition process.

Constitution making exemplifies an “investive” use of the energies which normally are released after the collapse of an old regime. Hence, the choices which the relevant actors – the pouvoir constituant – make are likely to have long-lasting effects.