Richard Nixon's personal guarantee that the United States would satisfy all conditional contracts for enrichment services was extended the day he resigned the presidency. It was left for the lame-duck regime of his successor, Gerald Ford, to sort out the mess created by the mishandling of enrichment contracts and to soothe the ruffled feathers of distraught consumer governments. But that damage-limiting operation was soon caught in a wrenching reappraisal of Washington's entire policy for promoting the global development of civilian nuclear power. Beyond the immediate issue of reestablishing the United States' critical role in the market for reactor fuels loomed the growing menace of a spreading weapons capability. The year 1974 was the one in which proliferation became a problem.

In Washington problem status is accorded an issue when it ceases to be the exclusive preserve of the specialists in remote bureaucratic precincts and becomes the object of concern for the secretary of state, the national security advisor, and even the president of the United States – that is to say, the handful of people who command the power to shift the foundations of policy and to invest political capital in new undertakings. A “problem” gets attention elsewhere as well. Congressional committees hold wellpublicized hearings. Senators pronounce the gravity of the situation, some issuing cries of alarm, while others call for a sober stocktaking. The press fills with stories of revelation, and the serious journals of commentary open their pages to articles of interpretation and sage prescription.