Introduction

As comprehensively argued elsewhere in this volume, the WTO's anti-dumping provisions reflect political compromises that mask an underlying lack of consensus on the value and purpose of an antidumping regime at the national level. This is an old story that has been long argued in academic and policy circles. What is noteworthy recently is the significant increase in the use of trade remedies, especially by developing economies. As a result, while the post-Uruguay Round period is generally marked by greater economic openness resulting from various forms of trade liberalization, the use of trade remedies is no longer primarily the province of OECD economies. Indeed, the introduction and use of trade remedies is proliferating around the world.

As we discuss in greater detail herein, it is difficult to make economic sense of the core purposes of the anti-dumping provisions, except in the rare instances of true predation. Of course, there are other non-economic efficiency motivations that may help to explain the rule framework – such as protection of domestic producers, a sense of “unfairness,” or the view that this method of helping those hurt by imports is a necessary price or safety valve for nations that are taking steps in the direction of market opening.

The GATT produced a fairly large number of anti-dumping disputes but few of the panel reports were adopted and implemented.