WORTHINESS FOR GLORY: THE THIRD DIMENSION REVISITED

At the beginning of the previous chapter, I said that the discussion of philosophical inquiry of Chapters 9–11 would allow us to complete the ethical arguments of Chapters 2–4. The argument of Chapter 12 represents the first stage in this process. Further stages are added in this chapter and the next.

The argument of Chapter 12 addressed the question of how one determines what has objective worth in the sense of worthiness for concern from all points of view. We must now address a similar question about the other aspect of objective worth: How does one determine what has objective worth in the sense of glory, or worthiness for clear recognition with praise for deeds and accomplishments (such as Alan and his paintings)? This is a complex question that leads to a different set of issues that must be considered to give a full account of objective worth; and it will turn out that how one deals with these further issues also has an important bearing on the ethical arguments of Chapters 2–4. I will argue that the question of how one determines what has objective worth in this second aspect of glory must be dealt with in two stages. The first is the subject of this chapter, the second the subject of Chapter 14, where the arguments of Chapters 12 and 13 will be brought together and completed.